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1  INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Background and Motivation  
“La propriété, c'est le vol!”
1 – P. J. Proudhon (French politician and philosopher) 
The Frenchman Pierre J. Proudhon (1809-1865) coined this expression in one of his 
first  writings,  claiming  that  any  form  of  ownership  has  to  be  considered  as  theft. 
Proudhon concluded that as long as ownership is connected with privileges, which serve 
for  the  expropriation  of  others,  society  should  inhibit  the  resulting  accumulation  of 
wealth and power. With the rejection of ownership per se, Proudhon became the first 
one to call himself „anarchist,‟ and despite later disagreements, maintained a stimulating 
intellectual  partnership  with  Karl  Marx  for  several  years.  Accordingly,  Proudhon  is 
considered to have had an important influence on the later writings of Marx. Whereas 
the popularity of anarchistic and Marxist movements has been marginalized since their 
advent, the worldwide financial and economic crisis escalating since 2008 has refocused 
the public attention on the topic of ownership - not only, but particularly on its negative 
aspects,  as  already  referred  to  by  Proudhon.  Recently,  massive  interventions  by 
governmental institutions, including substantial nationalizations in the banking sector, 
as well as takeover battles, such as Schaeffler / Continental and Porsche / Volkswagen 
in Germany, led to severe criticism of the so called socialization of losses in contrast to 
the maximization of personal benefits in previous years. Within this scope, the question 
about who should own, monitor, control, and benefit from companies has attained wide 
public attention. 
However, the fundamental topic of the “right or best form of ownership”, as implicitly 
asked by Proudhon, is neither new nor only related to economics. In fact, the question 
for the optimal distribution of ownership rights, and thus, implicitly for the ownership 
concentration,  has  been  addressed  for  centuries  and  millennia  by  philosophy  and 
theology. Accordingly, not only ancient authors, such as Plato or Aristotle, but also 
medieval  writers,  such  as  the  priest  Thomas  Aquinas,  as  well  as  rather  modern 
philosophers, like John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and Georg W. F. Hegel, discussed a 
broad range of ownership related topics in their writings (Waldron, 2004).  
                                                 
     
1 ”Ownership is theft!” (Proudhon, 1840). Introduction     
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Despite  the  long  tradition  of  this  topic  of  ownership,  the  form  of  organizations  we 
consider today as normal when speaking about „ownership‟ of companies, including 
different levels of management and separated owners, is relatively young and occurred 
for the first time in the late 19
th century among the companies constructing the rail 
system of America (Chandler, 2001). Thus, ownership – as we know it today – and 
related research questions about the merits and downsides, have been dealt with for 
comparatively  little  time:  in  modern  management  research,  the  area  of  ownership, 
spearheaded by the work on the separation of ownership and control by the work of 
Berle  and  Means  (1932),  has  been  in  vogue  for  a  bit  more  than  seven  decades. 
Compared  to  the  aforementioned  philosophers  and  theologians,  which  took  a  rather 
normative perspective in their works, Berle and Means took an economic perspective on 
ownership, following the argument of efficiency and considering, unlike Proudhon, not 
only negative (costs), but also positive aspects (benefits). 
In the relatively short period since the study of Berle and Means in 1932, we have 
witnessed substantial change in the global ownership landscape. On the one hand, these 
changes  were  induced  by  exogenous  shocks,  such  as  wars  or  governmental 
interventions, e.g., those caused by the 2008 financial crisis mentioned above. On the 
other hand, they were called forth by continuous developments, for example, through 
the  pressure  of  market  forces  (Daily,  Dalton,  &  Rajagopalan,  2003).  These 
developments  provided  a  wide  range  of  opportunities  to  study  the  dynamics  of 
ownership  structures  of  firms,  leading  to  a  flurry  of  different  streams  of  research 
following up on the ideas introduced by Berle and Means (1932).  
The studies by Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985), partly challenging the 
view of Berle and Means (1932), established two of the most prominent topics in the 
ownership research of the last three decades. These topics are the identification of the 
determinants of ownership structure, and the evaluation of potential performance effects 
of alternative ownership structures, as addressed by Berle and Means. 
In the first stream of research, dealing with the determinants and influence factors of the 
ownership structure of firms, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) set the cornerstone in the search 
for the key drivers of the level of ownership concentration. Building on these findings, 
Thomsen and Pedersen (1998), Van der Elst (2004) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1999), amongst others, came to the conclusion that not only firm, 
but also industry-, and country-specific factors  significantly influence the ownership Introduction     
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structure of firms. However, not only did scholars investigate different types and levels 
of influence factors, but also various characteristics of the ownership structure of a firm. 
While Demsetz and Lehn‟s study focuses on the ownership concentration of a firm in 
general,  others,  such  as  Hansmann  (1996),  Delios  and  Beamish  (1999),  and  Dong, 
Bowles,  and  Ho  (2002),  include  the  identity  (e.g.,  employees  or  managers)  of  the 
owners in their analyses.  
After  all,  it  appears  that  much  has  been  learned  about  the  determination  of  the 
ownership  structure  of  firms.  However,  whereas  many  studies  have  independently 
confirmed the effect of firm specific influence factors, relatively few authors included 
industry-  and  country-level  determinants  in  their  studies,  and  barely  any  study 
simultaneously  accounts  for  firm-,  industry-,  and  country-level  determinants. 
Furthermore, the few existing studies of this kind yield partly ambiguous results and 
thus call for further investigation (La Porta, et al., 1999; Thomsen & Pedersen, 1997, 
1998; Van der Elst, 2004).  
The  second  stream  of  research,  dealing  with  the  performance  effects  of  alternative 
ownership structures, directly dates back to Berle and Means (1932). They suggested a 
positive  effect  of  ownership  concentration  on  performance  due  to  the  increase  in 
monitoring efficiency. Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) challenged this 
view by arguing that the ownership concentration does not have a performance effect, 
since  the  ownership  structure  is  endogenously  determined,  considering  costs  and 
benefits. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) confirmed this view and added, corresponding 
to the first stream of research described above, that the ownership structure of a firm is 
multi-faced and several characteristics have to be considered, such as the identity of the 
owner.  However,  these  publications  far  from  ended  the  discussion  regarding  the 
performance  effect  of  the  ownership  structure.  To  mention  a  few  studies,  Morck, 
Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1988)  found  a  significant  curvilinear  performance  effect  in 
general,  and  Thomsen,  Pedersen,  and  Kvist  (2006)  found  a  significant  performance 
effect only for countries with a relatively high ownership concentration. In total, the 
literature  on  the  relationship  of  ownership  concentration  and  performance  is 
characterized by a remarkable incongruity when it comes to the question of whether 
there is a performance effect or not. The meta-analyses by Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-
Meca (2007) and  Van  Oosterhout  (2008) illustrate the respective  results  of existing 
studies and show that not only the results of studies vary, but also how, and to what Introduction     
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extent  the  studies  account  for  the  endogeneity,  curvilinearity,  and  differences  in 
performance measures.  
This thesis relates directly to the two illustrated streams of research, taking an economic 
perspective on the topic of ownership concentration. The question for the concentration 
of the ownership structures of firms, i.e. whether the ownership rights of a firm are held 
by just a few shareholders, or by many, and what the relative size of the ownership 
stakes of different shareholders is, is of central concern in the governance literature. On 
the firm level, the level of ownership concentration and the connected blockholdings 
play a crucial role for the monitoring, and thus the risk oversight of a firm (Berle & 
Means,  1932;  Holderness  &  Sheehan,  1988).  Furthermore,  in  terms  of  the  overall 
welfare of a society, ownership concentration in combination with pyramidal chains of 
control and entrenchment can have negative effects on the innovative strength and the 
dynamics of an economy. Finally, in terms of distributive justice, the overall ownership 
concentration in an economy has to be monitored as one of the key indicators (Morck, 
Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005). 
Building on the status quo of current research, I particularly address the research gap of 
industry-  and country-level  determinants  of ownership concentration.  Furthermore,  I 
combine the findings of the existing literature on the performance effects of ownership 
concentration  in  order  to  mitigate  the  ambiguity  of  the  results  of  existing  studies. 
Accordingly,  the  key  objective  within  the  scope  of  this  thesis  is  to  analyze  and 
understand  the  determinants  and  effects  of  alternative  levels  of  ownership 
concentration.  In  detail,  I  identify  the  key  determinants  influencing  the  ownership 
structure  of  firms,  the  relative  importance  of  the  industry-  and  country-level,  and 
evaluate  how  much  of  the  observed  variance  in  ownership  concentration  can  be 
explained  with  the  help  of  the  identified  determinants.  Additionally,  I  analyze  the 
potential  performance  implications  of  alternative  levels  of  ownership  concentration 
while  accounting  for  endogeneity,  international  differences,  curvilinearity,  and 
alternative  performance  measures.  Accordingly,  I  address  three  guiding  research 
questions contributing to the existing ownership research: 
   Introduction     




Question 1:  What  is  the  relative  importance  of  the  industry-  and 
country-level  for  the  determination  of  the  ownership 
concentration of firms? 
Question 2:  How much of the observed variance do the key firm-, 
industry-, and country-level determinants of ownership 
concentration explain? 
Question 3:  Does the level of ownership concentration have an effect 
on firm performance? 
 
1.2  Outline  
The  first  chapter  of  this  thesis  provides  an  overview  on  the  motivation  and  basic 
concepts applied in the subsequent essays. In this chapter, I describe the structure of the 
thesis and the key questions addressed within the different sections. 
The  thesis  encompasses  three  self-standing  essays,  two  of  which  focus  on  the 
determinants and one on the performance effects of ownership concentration. The first 
two essays, dealing with the relative importance of industry- and country-factors for, 
and the key drivers of ownership concentration, have a combined literature review and 
theory section, but self-standing chapters for the hypotheses development, results, and 
discussion.  The  third  essay  comprises  an  independent  literature  review,  theory 
development, results, and discussion part.  
For the statistical analyses, I collected an initial dataset for all three essays. According 
to  the  requirements  of  the  analyses  within  the  three  essays,  I  created  respective 
subsamples of the initial dataset. Accordingly, as all three essays essentially rely on the 
same data set and the same key ownership variables, a detailed description of the data 
set, and the respective subsamples and variables is placed in front of the three essays. 
The last chapter of the thesis provides a conclusion, summarizing and discussing the key 
findings of the single essays. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of this thesis. Introduction     
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Figure 1: Outline of the Thesis 
 
Looking at  the existing  literature of the last  25  years dealing with  the topic of the 
determinants of ownership concentration, and thus addressing research questions one 
and two, significant advancements have been made in understanding the determination 
of the ownership concentration of firms. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) set the cornerstone 
in this area of research, investigating and identifying mainly firm-level determinants. 
Within the next years, other authors, such as Thomsen and Pedersen (1998), Van der 
Elst (2004), and La Porta, et al. (1999), significantly contributed to the understanding of 
the allocation of ownership rights. They provided more insights into the industry- and 
country-level  and  identified,  for  example,  the  legal  origin  of  a  country  and  the 
regulation  of  an  industry  as  significant  drivers  of  ownership  concentration.  A  few 
studies, for example, those of Crespi-Cladera (1996), Lamba and Stapledon (2001) and 
Jong  and  Semenov  (2006),  followed  this  development  and  focused  on  confirming 
existing, and identifying new industry- and country-factors. However, although all these 
authors asked the question of the significance of a wide range of single determinants of 
ownership concentration, the question for the importance of the respective industry- and 
country-level has not been asked so far. Thus, we do not know how much these two 
levels  contribute  to  the  ownership  structure  of  a  firm.  After  all,  it  might  not  be 
reasonable to keep searching for groups of determinants that potentially explain only a 
small part of the variance in ownership concentration.  
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 5: Conclusion
Chapter 2: Description of the Datasets
Relative Importance of 
Industry-and Country-
Level
Explanatory Power of 
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Accordingly, I complement the existing research and  fill this  gap by evaluating the 
relative  importance  of  the  industry-  and  country-level  for  the  level  of  ownership 
concentration of a firm. In the scope of the analyses, I address the following questions 
in detail: 
1a) Are all industries and countries significantly different from each other in terms 
of ownership concentration? 
1b) How much of the observed variance in ownership concentration between firms 
can be attributed to the industry- and country-level? 
In the light of the results of the analysis of the relative importance of the industry- and 
country-level, in the second essay, I readdress the question for the most important firm-, 
industry-,  and  country-level  determinants  of  ownership  concentration  and  their 
explanatory power. 
Since the study of Demsetz and Lehn (1985), most of the studies [e.g., Pedersen and 
Thomson (1999), Bergstrom and Rydqvist (1990), and Gedajlovic (1993)] include firm-
level determinants in their analyses. However, whereas many studies have analyzed the 
firm and industry effects in detail, a better understanding of the mode of action of the 
country-level has been the subject of relatively few studies, such as the one of La Porta, 
et al. (1999). Many studies solely contain firms from one country, such as Pittatore and 
Turati (2000) or Morck and Nakamura (2000), and therefore international differences 
are neglected. Additionally, some studies include the international perspective in their 
analyses but focus on particular geographic regions, for example, Europe (Pedersen & 
Thomsen, 1999; Thomsen & Pedersen, 1997, 1998, 2000). Furthermore, those studies 
accounting for international differences widely fail to account for firm-, industry-, and 
country-determinants simultaneously.  
Thus,  few  studies  have  shown  to  what  extent  the  ownership  frameworks,  mostly 
developed  on  observations  based  on  the  United-States  (US)  –  and  so  the  identified 
determinants of ownership concentration – are applicable in an international context. 
The second essay addresses this topic, answering the following questions. 
2a)  What  are  the  significant  drivers  of  ownership  concentration  on  the  firm-, 
industry-, and country-level? Introduction     
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2b)  How  much  of  the  observed  variance  in  ownership  concentration  can  be 
explained by the identified firm-, industry-, and country-level determinants? 
2c) How much of the explanatory power of the legal origin of a country can be 
attributed  to  so  far  identified  country-level  determinants  of  ownership 
concentration? 
The  third  research  question,  dealing  with  the  effect  of  ownership  concentration  on 
performance, directly relates to the discussion of Berle and Means (1932), Demsetz and 
Lehn  (1985),  Demsetz  and  Villalonga  (2001),  and  Thomsen  et  al.  (2006).  The 
mentioned meta studies by Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca (2007) and Van Essen 
and Van Oosterhout (2008) show that the inconclusive results of the existing studies 
might  be  attributed  to  whether  studies  account  for  endogeneity,  curvlinearity,  
alternative performance measures, and differences between countries. The majority of 
the existing studies do not account for all of these issues. Accordingly, in the subsequent 
analyses,  I  close  this  research  gap  by  considering  the  above  mentioned  findings 
regarding the relationship of ownership concentration and performance and address the 
following questions within the scope of the third essay: 
3a) Is there a performance effect of ownership concentration when accounting for 
the endogeneity of the ownership structures of firms? 
3b) Is the relationship between ownership concentration and performance 
curvilinear? 
3c) Is there a different effect of ownership concentration for alternative measures of 
firm performance? 
3d)  Does  the  effect  of  ownership  concentration  on  performance  differ  among 
countries, legal origins or different levels of concentration? 
1.3  Abstracts 
Having  illustrated  the  background,  motivation,  and  structure  of  this  thesis,  I 
subsequently  describe  the  research  approach  and  provide  the  abstracts  of  the  three 
essays in sections 1.3.1–1.3.3. Introduction     
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Figure 2 provides an overview of the unit of analysis, the sample, the independent and 
dependent variables, and the methodology of the three essays.
2  
Figure 2: Overview on the Three Essays 
 
All three essays address the same unit of analysis, namely the firm. However, whereas 
the  first  two  essays  include  only  a  single  characteristic  of  a  firm  –  the  level  of 
concentration  of  the  ownership  structure  –  the  third  essay  includes  the  level  of 
ownership  concentration  and  the  firm  performance  as  dependent  variables  in  the 
analysis. 
The  sample  sizes  of  the  three  essays  vary  from  essay  to  essay  due  to  the  varying 
complexity  of  the  applied  statistical  models  and  the  different  number  of  included 
variables.
3 
For  all  essays ,  I  used  the  same  dependent  variables  to  measure  the  ownership 
concentration of a firm, and for the third essay , I included two  different variables to 
                                                 
2For a detailed description of the sampling, dependent and independent variables, and the  
  methodology refer to the respective chapters. 
3Cf. chapter 2.2. 
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measure  firm  performance.
4  In terms of indep endent variables,  I included  only  two 
variables in the first essay,  and substantially more (up to 16)  in the second and third 
essays. 
In terms of methodologies, for the first essay , I used analyses of variance (ANOVAs) 
and random intercept models without additional covariates in combination with variance 
decomposition techniques. For the second essay , I applied  hierarchical linear models 
(HLMs). For the third essay, a two stage least squares regression (2SLS) in combination 
with ordinary least squares regressions (OLS) were the methods of choice. 
1.3.1  Relative Importance of Industry- and Country-Level 
In this essay, I analyze the relative importance of the industry- and country-level for the 
determination of ownership concentration. Using a sample of 1,305 firms from nine 
countries  estimates  of  a  random-intercept  model  show  a  high  significance  of  the 
country-level (25.3% explained variance) and a subordinate role of the industry-level 
(2.1% explained variance). Further analyses show that the country-level also influences 
the effect of industry-level determinants and accordingly explains why single country 
studies  of  the  determinants  of  ownership  concentration  frequently  derive  seemingly 
opposing results. The varying level of shareholder protection between countries with 
different  legal  origins  (common  law,  French  civil  law,  and  German  civil  law)  is 
identified as one of the main drivers causing differences in ownership concentration 
between countries. 
1.3.2  Explanatory Power of Firm-, Industry-, and Country-Level Determinants  
Within the scope of this essay, I analyze and identify the key determinants of ownership 
concentration on the firm-, industry-, and country-level. Furthermore, I evaluate the 
explained variance by the identified determinants on the respective levels. Building on 
the work of Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Thomsen and Pedersen (1999; 1997, 1998), and 
La Porta, et al. (1998, 1999), I derive hypotheses and test them on a sample of 900 firms 
from nine countries using hierarchical linear models. The results indicate that firm risk, 
firm size, legal origin, and shareholder protection significantly influence the level of 
ownership  concentration.  The  industry-level  in  general,  and  the  regulation  of  an 
industry in particular, play a subordinate role for the allocation of ownership rights. In 
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total,  the  estimated  models  can  explain  up  to  32%  of  the  observed  variance  on 
ownership  concentration.  Whereas  the  legal  origin  and  the  level  of  shareholder 
protection  almost  explain  the  complete  variance  in  ownership  structure  between 
countries,  up  to  89%  of  the  industry-,  and  only  8%  of  firm-level  variance  can  be 
attributed to the tested determinants. The results suggest, first, identifying additional 
firm-level  determinants  of  ownership  concentration  to  yield  models  with  a  higher 
explanatory power and, second, decomposing the complex effect of legal origin to gain 
further insights in country-level determinants. 
1.3.3  Performance Effects of Ownership Concentration 
In  this  essay,  I  analyze  the  relationship  between  ownership  concentration  and  firm 
performance while accounting for the endogeneity of the ownership structure of firms, 
curvilinearity, differences in corporate governance systems, and alternative performance 
measures. Using a sample of 1,079 firms from eight countries I find that ownership 
concentration  has  no  effect  on  firm  performance,  after  all.  The  results  support  the 
findings by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and cast doubt on the results of the study by 
Thomsen, et al. (2006), who argued that in countries with a German or French civil law 
background, corporate governance systems might push ownership concentration levels 
above and beyond the value-maximum point.  
1.4  Research Scope 
In the subsequent chapters, I describe the basic theoretical concepts used throughout all 
three essays, namely the concept of ownership applied and the underlying ownership 
framework for the determination of the level of ownership concentration. 
1.4.1  Concept of Ownership 
Generally, the concept of ownership is more complex than it appears on first sight and 
can be addressed from several different perspectives.  
As  mentioned  in  the  introduction,  many  philosophers  have  addressed  the  topic  of 
ownership. However, these scholars mostly took a normative perspective, discussing to 
what extent private, compared to public or collective ownership, should be allowed and 
supported,  for  example,  in  order  to  optimize  distributive  justice  (Bergström,  1999; 
Christman, 1994; Waldron, 2004). Introduction     
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A  second  perspective,  stemming  from  the  field  of  psychology,  is  the  so  called 
„psychological  ownership,‟  which  refers  to  “a  state  in  which  an  individual  feels  as 
though the target of ownership is „theirs‟ (i.e., „It is mine‟)” (Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 
2003,  p.  86).  This  state  of  feeling  is  regardless  of  whether  the  individual  actually 
possesses  legal  ownership  rights  or  not  (Pierce,  et  al.,  2003;  Pierce,  Rubenfeld,  & 
Morgan, 1991). 
Within the scope of this thesis, however, I take a legal perspective on ownership and 
consider any individual or institution as an owner who holds the respective constitutive 
set of legal rights. Still, as pointed out by Learmount and Roberts (2006), in terms of 
rights, „ownership‟ is a multifaceted term and encompasses a whole battery of attributes. 
It  appears  that  in  the  literature,  there  is  consensus  about  six  essential  rights  –  or 
dimensions – of ownership (Becker, 1977; Learmount & Roberts, 2006; Munzer, 1990; 
Reeve, 1986; Waldron, 1988). Christman (1994) summarizes them accordingly:  
“First, the right to possess (the right of exclusive physical control that the nature 
of the thing admits, coupled with a claim-right to noninterference). Second, the 
right to use (a claim-right to exclusive use of the thing implying a general duty on 
the part of all others not to use the thing without the owner‟s permission). Third, 
the right to the capital (the power to make valid disposition of the thing owned as 
well as the power to transfer title; this element can be separated into the rights of 
alienation, consumption, and modification). Fourth, the right to manage (a cluster 
of powers to  contract  with others  concerning control  over various uses of the 
thing).  Fifth,  the  right  to  security  (right  against  expropriation:  applies  as  a 
qualifier of the first four elements) and sixth, the right to the income (the right to 
increased benefit from the ownership derived from others‟ goods given in trade)” 
(p. 227). 
According to Christman (1994), these six different rights of ownership can be grouped 
into two categories: rights to control and rights to returns. The first group encompasses 
the rights to use, possess, alienate, consume, and modify the owned assets, and the 
second one the rights to transfer and gain income from the owned asset. Singer (2000) 
comes  to  a  similar  conclusion;  however,  he  terms  the  control  and  return  rights  as 
„Castle‟ and „Investment‟ concepts.  
The  property  rights  literature  has  already  discussed  these  two  fundamental  sets  of 
ownership rights. Accordingly, Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and Introduction     
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Hart (1995) emphasize control rights more than return rights. In classical property rights 
theory though, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) define ownership mainly by the residual 
right  to  returns.
5  I argue, however, that both sets of rights  have to be considered . 
Equating ownership solely with the right to residual returns would not be reasonable, as 
owner managers would not necessarily have the control over their firm and the question 
of who actually controls a firm would be unanswered.  Similarly, equating ownership 
solely with the right to control would not  account for the possible separation of 
ownership and control,  as described by Berle  and  Means  (Jongwook & Mahoney, 
2005). 
Accordingly, in the following, I understand ownership, in accordance with Milgrom and 
Roberts (1992), Hansmann (1996), and Richter  and Schroeder (2006, 2008), amongst 
others, by the two previously illustrated set of rights: 
(1) The right  to  the residual  control  of the asset being owned; that is,  those 
control  rights  that  are  not  held  by  other  parties  or  assigned  to  them  by 
contract.  
(2) The right to appropriate any residual returns that accrue from that asset; that 
is, those returns that remain once all legitimate claims of all other parties 
with which the firm maintains contractual relationships have been satisfied. 
As mentioned in the introduction, I focus on the level of concentration of the ownership 
structure within this thesis. With the notion of „ownership concentration,‟ I refer to the 
distribution of the ownership rights in an asset (e.g., a firm) among different parties. 
Thus, according to the two previously illustrated set of ownership rights, in firms with 
dispersed  ownership  structures,  many  parties  own  relatively  small  stakes,  and  thus, 
possess  relatively  limited  rights  to  control  and  accrue  residual  returns  of  the  firm 
concerned.  At  high  levels  of  ownership  concentration,  relatively  few  parties  own 
relatively large stakes in the respective firm, and thus, possess relatively strong control 
and residual return rights.  
However, to cover the full complexity of ownership, it is not only the benefits, and 
thereof  the  rights  illustrated  above,  that  have  to  be  considered,  but  the  costs  of 
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ownership as  well. Whereas the right to control and to accrue earnings endows the 
owner with privileges, the holders of ownership rights can accrue a variety of costs. The 
costs of ownership include costs occurring with the transactions of becoming an owner, 
as well as costs connected with enforcing the ownership rights, such as  monitoring, 
collective  decision  making,  and  general  risk  bearing  (Hansmann,  1988;  Jensen  & 
Meckling, 1976).
6  
1.4.2  Ownership Framework 
Several existing economic models dealing with the whys and wherefores of ownership 
have been developed, focusing on alternative perspectives and concepts. However, most 
of the developed frameworks deal with particular ownership related issues rather than 
with  developing  a  general  ownership  framework.  For  example,  Coase  (1937), 
Williamson (1985), and Hart (1995) focus on explaining ownership as an alternative to 
market contracting. Williamson (1975) and Perry (1989) highlighted asset specifity in 
connection with transaction costs as a reason for vertical and related diversification. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Demsetz (1983), and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) developed 
a framework to identify determinants of ownership concentration.  Hansmann (1988, 
1996), however, took one of the few holistic approaches to developing an ownership 
framework, which has been used in a few studies in the recent years, and on which I 
base the analyses in the following essays (Greenwood, Deephouse, & Li, 2007; Richter 
&  Schroeder,  2006,  2008;  Thomsen  &  Pedersen,  1997,  1998,  2000,  2003;  Von 
Nordenflycht, 2007).  
According to Hansmann‟s framework, the ownership structure of a firm considers, and 
thus, optimizes the costs and benefits connected with, and influenced by alternative 
ownership structures. The framework considers all costs and benefits arising within the 
nexus of contracts a firm operates in. This nexus, as initially referred to by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Williamson (1990), consists of four groups of patrons, namely 
employees, providers of capital and suppliers, customers, and the firm itself (Figure 3). 
   
                                                 
     
6Singer (2000, 2006) also refers to costs of ownership as liabilities related to the day-to-day business, 
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Figure 3: Nexus of Contracts 
 
Source: Hansmann (1996). 
All four classes of patrons have a contractual relationship with the firm and any type of 
patron could become an owner of the firm by acquiring the respective set of ownership 
rights.  The  framework  captures  all  types  of  costs  occurring  within  this  nexus  of 
contracts. On the one hand, these are the costs of market making in connection with the 
transactions  based  on  the  contractual  relationship,  such  as  the  costs  of  market 
contracting, (ex post) transaction costs and information costs. On the other hand, costs 
occur in connection with the ownership  rights,  as illustrated in the previous  section 
(Tirole, 1988; Williamson, 1985). 
By assigning (more or less ownership) rights to a particular group of patrons, the costs 
of market making occurring within the nexus might be avoided by these changes in the 
ownership structure, but with the price of incurring ownership costs. Accordingly, the 
costs arising from assigning ownership rights to one of the classes of patrons equal the 
newly  occurring  costs  of  ownership  plus  the  new  level  of  costs  of  market  making. 
Under the assumption of (semi) efficient markets, firms are urged to optimize any type 
of costs and benefits in order to survive in the mid- to long term, or they will otherwise 
be pushed out of the market by their competitors (Fama, 1970). The same holds true for 
the previously mentioned costs, which can be influenced by the ownership structure of a 
firm.  Accordingly,  the  ownership  concentration  will  level  out  at  the  level  of 
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alternative ownership structures are equal.
7 Thus, I agree with the idea initially proposed 
by Demsetz (1983) and tested by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) that the ownership structure 
of a firm is endogenously determined, minimizing costs occurring within the nexus of 
contracts. Accordingly, any factor influencing either the costs of ownership or the costs 
of market making  arising within the nexus of contracts  also influences the ownership 
structure of a firm, and thus, the level of ownership concentration. Consequently, these 
factors can be considered determinants of ownership concentration.  
Whereas I consider a variety of costs and benefits arising within the nexus of contracts, 
the framework of Hansmann (1996) also distinguishes between the identi ties of  the 
types of owners. I disregard this aspect in the subsequent essays in order not to increase 
the complexity of the respective models too much. Instead, I use the ideas of Hansmann 
(1996) and other authors mentioned in the respective parts of this thesis to create a more 
comprehensive framework  than the one proposed by Demsetz  and  Lehn (1985) to 
explain the level of ownership concentration and respective performance effects. 
Whereas the ownership structure, by its nature, is a firm-specific phenomenon, it is not 
only firm-specific characteristics that influence the level of o wnership concentration. 
Figure  4  illustrates  the  different  groups  of  potential  influence   factors  and  their 
interactions. 
Figure 4: Determinants of Ownership Concentration 
 
                                                 
     
7In mathematical terms, the ownership structure minimizes the costs of ownership (CO) and the costs 
of market contracting (CC): ?𝐼?𝐼?𝐼??(𝐶?? +   𝐶𝐶?)  ?? where i is an index of the firm‟s patrons and 
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As  shown,  in  the  subsequent  essays  I  distinguish  three  groups  of  influence  factors, 
namely firm-, industry-, and country-level determinants of ownership concentration. On 
all three levels, differences between firms, industries, and countries, can influence the 
relationships, and thus, the costs and benefits within the nexus of contracts, eventually 
altering the level of ownership concentration. Additionally, the three levels might not 
only influence the ownership structure directly, but also indirectly affect each other, and 
thus, influence the respective effects of the determinants. 
In  the  subsequent  essays,  I  identify  several  firm-,  industry-,  and  country-level 
determinants of ownership concentration, evaluate their effects theoretically, and test 
them  empirically.  To  derive  the  theoretical  effects,  I  assess  the  influence  of  the 
respective firm-, industry-, and country-characteristics on the ownership concentration 
from several theoretical perspectives. Subsequently, I illustrate two exemplary detailed 
lines of arguments of different determinants of ownership concentration and elaborate 
on the application of alternative theoretical concepts.
8 
As a first example, I argue at the firm-level that the size of a firm will have a negative 
effect on the level of ownership concentration for several reasons to be illustrated next.
9 
The price of a certain ownership stake of a relatively small firm will be lower than the 
same ownership stake of a larger, more valuable firm.  Theoretically, any private or 
institutional owner, if not in possession of the necessary funds, could take out a 
respective loan to acquire any ownership stake of a firm,  irrespective of the price and 
the size of the firm. However, a significant stake of a large firm bought by an investor 
with  relatively  low  funding  capacities  could  come  along  with  significant  costs 
(Modigliani & Miller, 1963). First, taking out a loan is not free and , as any market 
transaction, connected with transaction costs  (Coase, 1937, 1960; Williamson, 1981, 
1985). Additionally,  considering the financial restrictions and lim ited portfolios of 
(particularly individual) investors,  according to portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952), a 
significant stake in a large firm will almost inevitably lead to a suboptimal portfolio 
diversification. This suboptimal diversification will  incur costs either by a decreased 
portfolio performance or by  transaction costs connected with the reallocation of the 
                                                 
 
8The  elaboration in the subsequent essays will be more condensed than these illustrative lines of 
arguments. Due to the exemplary nature of the line of arguments at this point of this thesis, I will 
refrain from referring to other authors following similar or a different lines of arguments. For a review 
for the existing effects, please refer to the literature reviews in the respective chapters.  
9The firm size is analyzed in both the first and the second essay as a determinant of ownership     
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portfolio  to  restore  the  optimal  diversification.  The  previously  illustrated  costs  will 
increase the larger the firm size is, as the same share of a firm becomes more expensive. 
Eventually,  all  costs  to  the  investor  will  be  redirected  to  the  firm  in  the  form  of 
increased  expectations  with  respect  to  company  performance  /  dividend  payments  / 
stock performance.  
Accordingly, the larger the firm, the higher the costs connected with acquiring a specific 
ownership stake. The larger the costs for an owner connected with the acquisition of 
such an ownership stake, the less attractive larger stakes in a company will be, and thus, 
the smaller the stakes acquired by the owner. Consequently, the larger the firm is, the 
lower is the level of ownership concentration.  
 
As  a  second  illustration,  this  time  at  the  country-level,  I  argue  that  the  level  of 
shareholder protection has a negative effect on the level of ownership concentration.
10 
The level of shareholder protect ion determines which rights (minority) owners have 
although they do not have control over the company , and how costly it is to carry out 
and enforce their rights. In terms of theoretical concepts, level of shareholder protection 
influences how severe the principal agent conflict between the owners and managers is, 
and how costly and efficient the respective  resolution or mitigation of this situation is 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
The lower the level of shareholder protection is, the fewer rights do minority owners 
have and the more difficult and costlier is the enforcement of these rights.  Thus, the 
lower the level of shareholder protection, the less attractive  the  smaller ownership 
stakes are due to the relative increase in connected costs and the higher the risk of moral 
hazard by the management, even up to  potential expropriation. Speaking in terms of 
property rights, the  higher the  level of shareholder protection, the more valuable the 
minority ownership stakes  are  and vice versa  (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Dems etz, 
1967; Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990) . Consequently, I argue that the 
higher the level of shareholder protection, the more attractive smaller ownership stakes 
are, and thus, the lower the ownership concentration.  
                                                 
   
10The level of shareholder protection is analyzed in the second and the third essays as a determinant of  
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The two elaborations on the effect of firm size and shareholder protection on ownership 
concentration clearly show that I do not use just one, but a combination of several 
widely  accepted  guiding  theories  to  evaluate  the  theoretical  effect  of  the  identified 
determinants  on  ownership  concentration.  In  the  subsequent  essays,  the  lines  of 
arguments will be related to principal-agent theory, transaction costs, property rights, 
institutional economics, and portfolio theory. 
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2  VARIABLES AND DATA 
The empirical analyses in all three essays are based on subsamples stemming from the 
same  initial  data  set.  Subsequently,  I  first  illustrate  the  variables  used  in  the  three 
essays. Second, I describe the data collection process of the initial sample and test the 
data for representativeness. Third, I present the three subsamples of the initial data set 
used for the statistical analyses within the essays. 
2.1  Variables 
Throughout the three essays in this thesis, I use several dependent and independent 
variables within the scope of the statistical analyses. In the subsequent chapters, I will 
describe the measures of all variables. 
2.1.1  Dependent Variables 
2.1.1.1  Ownership Concentration 
The central operationalization in this thesis is the measure of the concentration of the 
ownership structure of a firm. This measure is particularly important as it is used in all 
three essays. 
The ownership specific concentration measure cr5, and the log-transformed counterpart, 
tcr5, capturing the sum of the percentage ownership shares held by the five biggest 
owners, will be used as primary dependent variables.  
In  existing  studies  on  the  topic  of  ownership  concentration,  two  different  types  of 
measures of concentration are used: ownership specific count measures, such as cr5, 
and universal concentration measures, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI).  
In terms of ownership specific count measures, several alternatives can be found in the 
literature, ranging from  the total shares held by the  three, five, ten, or even twenty 
owners with the largest shares of ownership rights, up to block holdings of owners with 
more than 5% of the total ownership shares. The advantage of these measures is that the 
demands  on  the  ownership  data  are  rather  low.  At  the  same  time,  there  is  the 
disadvantage  that  all  these  measures  only  provide  a  small  snapshot  of  the  overall 
ownership  structure.  Also,  increasing  the  number  of  considered  owners  does  not 
enhance but rather decreases the precision of the picture of the ownership structure, as Variables and Data     
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the variance between firms is decreased. Hence, it is hard to determine whether to use 
the  percentages  of  shares  held  by  the  top  three,  five,  ten,  or  any  other  number  or 
(Sanchez-Ballesta & Garcia-Meca, 2007; Van der Elst, 2004). 
Among  the  universal  ownership  measures,  the  HHI  is  the  most  frequently  applied 
approach in both ownership and non-ownership related fields. The sum of the squared 
percental shares of all owners calculates this index. On the one hand, the HHI has a 
strong advantage as measure of ownership concentration: The HHI takes all owners into 
consideration, thus, drawing a precise picture of the complete ownership structure. On 
the other hand, considering the complete ownership structure makes high demands on 
the ownership data used to calculate the HHI. Accordingly, for some firms, complete 
ownership  information  is  available,  and  for  others,  only  parts;  therefore,  the 
comparability of the calculated HHIs suffers (Sanchez-Ballesta & Garcia-Meca, 2007; 
Van der Elst, 2004). 
All of the measures mentioned above have been applied frequently and successfully in 
the ownership literature. I believe that the advantages of the specific ownership count 
measures outweigh the advantages of the HHI measure. Especially the fact that in my 
sample, on average, 64.25% of the ownership structure is available with a relatively 
high standard deviation of 22.6%, so that disqualifies the HHI due to its aforementioned 
illustrated disadvantage.  
Thus, in the subsequent analyses, I rely on one of the ownership specific concentration 
measures, namely cr5, and do not use the HHI. To account for the issue of decreasing 
variance with an increasing number of owners considered, I choose a medium number 
of owners and use cr5 (ownership shares held by the top five owners) as the primary 
measure for ownership concentration, which has also been used, amongst others, by 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). 
However, as Table 1 shows, all of the previously illustrated ownership concentration 
measures correlate highly and significantly (on a 0.01 significance level) so that the 
importance of the choice amongst these ownership measure is relatively low, as also 
proposed by Van der Elst (2004).
11 
                                                 
     
11Calculations at this point are based on the Initial Sample as illustrated in the subsequent chapters. Variables and Data     
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Table 1: Correlations of Dependent Variables 
 
Due to the percentage values, the dependent variable cr5, is bounded. To account for 
this issue, I transform the bounded dependent variable into an unbounded variable by 
applying the following formula to cr5 as suggested by Demsetz and Lehn (1985): 
log
?????????? ?????????????
100 − ?????????? ?????????????
 
 
The  transformed  variable  is  designated  by  prefixing  a  t  (tcr5).  However,  since  the 
transformed  variable  tcr5  cannot  be  interpreted  as  easily  as  the  initial  cr5  variable, 
containing  the  actual  percentage  values,  I  use  the  transformed  variable  only  where 
necessary, for example, in regression analyses, and the untransformed variable for the 
descriptive statistics. 
2.1.1.2  Firm Performance 
In the third essay, the firm performance is the pivotal dependent variable of the second 
stage regression (chapter 4). 
In the existing literature on the performance effects of ownership concentration, both 
market-  and  accounting-based  measures  have  been  frequently  used.  Both  types  of 
measures have different advantages, disadvantages, and meanings, and thus, might have 
different  implications  for  the  ownership  concentration  and  firm  performance 
relationship.
12  
Accounting-based measures, on the one hand, provide a past-oriented view on the firm 
performance, are subject to artifacts and distortion caused by differences in accounting 
systems, and can be easily manipulated by the management. Furthermore, accounting 
based measures tend to undervalue firms as intangible assets are only partly taken into 
account. Market-based measures, on the other hand, provide a view on the anticipated 
                                                 
     
12See Table 37 for an overview of the applied performance measures. 
cr5 cr10 cr20 hhi
cr5 1
cr10 0.975*** 1.00
cr20 0.919*** 0.979*** 1.00
hhi 0.847*** 0.772*** 0.699*** 1.00
* p<0.10 ** p <0.05  *** p<0.01Variables and Data     
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future performance of a firm,  and  are affected  by  the  psychological  and behavioral 
aspects of investors and the general economic environment, and so are subject to forces 
beyond management control.  
Neither purely market nor accounting based is Tobin‟s Q, which is one of the most 
frequently  used  performance  measures  in  the  ownership  literature.  Tobin‟s  Q  is 
calculated by the market value of a firm divided by the replacement value of the assets 
(mostly approximated by the total assets of a firm).
13 Tobin‟s Q has the advantage of 
combining the past-oriented view of the accounting profits with the future-oriented view 
of the market based measures, but it also catches the distortions and caveats of both 
types of performance measures (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Richard, Devinney, Yip, 
& Johnson, 2009; Sanchez-Ballesta & Garcia-Meca, 2007).  
Despite  the  different  characteristics  of  the  alternative  performance  measures, 
accounting-based and market-based performance measures are typically closely linked 
and, considering a certain time lag, are fairly highly correlated, as confirmed by Table 
2.
14 Furthermore, investors do not ignore the past perform ance, that is, the accounting 
measures, when evaluating investment opportunities (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001).  
 
Table 2: Correlation of tobinsq5yr and roa5yr 
 
In the subsequent analyses, I will use two different types of performance measures to 
test the results of the analyses for robustness: Tobin‟s Q (tobinsq5yr), as a combination 
of market and accounting based measures, and return on assets (roa5yr) as a purely 
accounting based measure. To account for unsystematic variances and to alleviate one-
time effects, I use the average of the last five years (2003–2007). 
                                                 
13See Table 37 for an overview of the applied performance measures. 
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2.1.2  Independent Variables 
In  the  subsequent  essays,  I  distinguish  between  firm-,  industry-,  and  country-level 
determinants and variables, described in the three following subchapters. 
2.1.2.1  Firm-Level Variables 
At the firm-level, I measure three different independent variables, namely the size-, 
risk- and performance of a firm. 
With the variable logmarketcap I measure the size of a firm by the logarithm of the total 
market capitalization at the end of 2007. In contrast to Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), I 
do not use the total assets as a measure of firm size, as I argue that the stock market 
value of a firm is the much more important characteristic for potential owners than the 
total assets, which do not necessarily correlate perfectly with the stock market value. To 
account  for  the  decreasing  effect  of  extraordinary  high  market  capitalization  on 
ownership concentration, I use the logarithm of the total market capitalization as the 
final measure. 
To measure the risk of a firm, I use the variables risk and risk_sqr. As suggested by 
Thomsen  and  Pedersen  (2000),  I  measure  the  sensitivity  of  a  firm‟s  stock  price 
compared to the movement of an underlying index as risk measure. The sensitivity is 
calculated by the slope of a regression of the weekly stock market prices on a market 
portfolio over one year (2007) (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). To account for a potential 
curvilinear effect, I also include the variable risk_sqr, containing the squared value of 
risk. 
In the third essay (chapter 4), I do not only use the firm performance as dependent 
variable,  as  described  above,  but  also  as  an  independent  variable.  Since  the  same 
variable  cannot  be  used  in  both  stages  of  the  2SLS,  I  had  to  choose  a  different 
performance measure than Tobin‟s Q and return on assets. Thus, I use the logarithm of 
the five-year average of the earnings before interests (EBIT), taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization  (logebit5yr)  as  alternative  measure.  This  measure  is  more  robust  to 
differences in accounting systems and influences by management than other accounting 
based performance measures due to the exclusion taxes and financing costs (Richard, et 
al., 2009). To account for the partly enormous EBITs of the most profitable companies, 
I use the logarithm to smoothen the effect of these outliers. As for the performance Variables and Data     
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measure  as  a  dependent  variable,  I  use  the  five-year  average  of  the  respective 
performance indicator (2003-2007).  
2.1.2.2  Industry-Level Variables 
At the industry-level, I measure the industry affiliation, industry regulation, industry 
competition,  life  cycle  stage,  information  asymmetries,  investments  into  intangible 
assets, and leverage. 
In  the  subsequent  essays,  one  essential  measure  is  the  industry  affiliation  of  each 
company.  The  categorical  variable  industry  captures  the  respective  belonging.  As 
measure for the industry, I use the two digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
code of the industry a company is primarily active in (according to Table 3). 
Table 3: Coding of Variable industry 
 
 
However, this measure comes along with the shortcoming that diversified firms will 
have  a  primary  industry,  but  are  actually  doing  business  in  several  industries. 
Particularly in the samples I use, including exclusively the largest listed companies in a 
country, it is more than probable that the firms are highly diversified. Accordingly, the 
measure is rather a rough proxy for the industry affiliation of a company. A weighted 
measure would have been the much more precise assessment, for example, by sales, 
according  to  the  extent  a  company  is  conducting  business  in  different  industries. 
Unfortunately, such a measure would have led to an extreme loss in observations due to 
the immense demand of data, and thus, could not be realized.  
The measure of industry affiliation by means  of the SIC codes has been frequently 
applied  in  existing  ownership  studies  and  has  been  shown  to  possess  adequate 
Industry
variable





Retail / Wholesale 52-59 6
Finance, Insurance /Real Estate 60-67 7
Other Services 70-89 8
Public Admin 91-97 9
Industry SIC codesVariables and Data     
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explanatory power (Ang & Cole, 2000; Bergh, 1995; Carlin & Mayer, 2003; Cho, 1998; 
Chung & Pruitt, 1996; Core & Larcker, 2002; Cui & Mak, 2002; Dai, 2007; D. J. Denis 
& Sarin, 1999; Douma, George, & Kabir, 2006; Leech & Leahy, 1991; Mak & Li, 2001; 
Maury,  2006;  Mingfang  &  Simerly,  1998;  Montgomery,  1982;  Ramaswamy,  2001; 
Singh & Davidson Iii, 2003). Thus, in light of the wide acceptance of this measure, and 
additionally in default of an applicable alternative, I use the industry affiliation measure 
as described above in the subsequent essays. 
I measure the industry regulation by the dummy variable regulation, which takes the 
value  1  (regulated)  for  SIC  codes  60–67  (Financial  Services),  49  (Utilities),  and  0 
(unregulated) for all other industries. This has been the method of choice of several 
publications  in  the  ownership  research  (Thomsen  &  Pedersen,  1998;  Van  der  Elst, 
2004). Despite this measure has been frequently applied, it has several shortcomings, as 
for  example,  illustrated  by  Van  der  Elst  (2004).  First,  the  measure  by  means  of  a 
regulation dummy is rough at best, as it does not give indication about the type of extent 
of  regulation.  Second,  the  applied  operationalization  does  not  account  for  country 
differences in regulations. However, in due of a better alternative, as for example, an 
industry regulation index per country, and in the light of the wide acceptance of the 
applied  measure,  I  rely  on  the  previously  illustrated  method  despite  the  presented 
shortcomings. 
Within the scope of the second essay (chapter 3.5), I include the competition of an 
industry, the information asymmetries, and the life cycle stage of an industry in the 
analyses, following the suggestions by Thomsen and Pedersen (1998) for the measures. 
Accordingly, the intensity of competition in an industry is represented by the variable 
industrycompetition,  and  captures  the  average  profit  margin  (return  on  sales)  in  an 
industry  (measured  by  the  two  digit  SIC  code)  from  2003–2007.  As  suggested  by 
Thomsen and Pedersen (1998), I argue that the profit margin in an industry decreases 
with an increase in competition and thus use the profit margin in the respective industry 
as a proxy for competition.  
Due to the nature of the construct of information asymmetries, the level of asymmetries 
is  hard  to  measure  and  can  be  approximated  at  best.  I  approximate  the  level  of 
information  asymmetries  by  the  from  2003-2007  average  research  and  development 
(R&D) expenses over sales ratio in an industry, which Aboody (2000) and Shastri and 
Clarke (2001) have confirmed as a representative proxy. According to the authors, the Variables and Data     
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higher the research intensity in an industry, the bigger the information asymmetries 
within  the  firms  operating  in  the  respective  industry  are,  as  the  research  and 
development efforts are hardly to monitor by the management due to the unforeseeable 
developments  and  the  specific  knowledge.  The  variable  industryrnd  represents  this 
measure. 
The  stage  of  the  life  cycle  of  an  industry  is  approximated  by  the  average  turnover 
growth  in  the  industry  from  2003–2007,  which  is  captured  by  the  variable 
industrylifecycle.  According  to  Thomsen  and  Pedersen  (1998),  with  an  increasing 
maturity of an industry, the turnover growth will decrease. Thus, measuring the turnover 
growth will draw a picture of the maturity of an industry, whereas high turnover growth 
rates indicate a relatively young industry, with small growth rates indicating a relatively 
mature industry (Audretsch & Woolf, 1986). 
I use the debt to asset ratio (debttoassets) to control for the leverage of a company and 
the  according  effects  on  the  profitability  of  the  firm,  and  thus,  on  the  performance 
measures. The debt to assets ratio is calculated by the reported end of year total debts 
divided by total assets at the end of 2007 (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001).  
Furthermore, I use the investments into intangible assets to account for distortions in the 
accounting-based  part  of  the  performance  measures.  I  measure  the  investments  into 
intangible assets by the R&D over assets ratio, rndtoassets, as the R&D expenses are 
only  partially  /  marginally  activated  due  to  restrictions  of  the  accounting  standards 
(Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001).  
Also, I include the capital expenditure over assets ratio (capextoassets) to control for 
differences in performance measures caused by accounting artifacts stemming from the 
different methods and states of depreciation (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001).  
2.1.2.3  Country-Level Variables 
At the country-level, I measure the country affiliation, the legal origin of a country, the 
level  of  shareholder  protection,  stock  market  development,  and  the  uncertainty 
avoidance according to Hofstede (2001). 
Similar to the measure of the industry affiliation, I determine the country of a firm by 
the location of a company‟s headquarters, which is captured by the variable country. 
This measure comes with the same issue as the industry measure, as companies might Variables and Data     
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be  primarily  registered  in  one  country  but  are  actually  active  in  several  countries. 
However, as in the case of the industry affiliation, most of the studies cited above for 
the industry affiliation widely also use the measure by means of the headquarters. Also, 
considering the availability of data an alternative,  a more precise, weighted country 
measure is not available. 
To account for country differences in terms of their legal background, I use the dummy 
variable legalorigin, taking the value 0 for countries with a common law background 
(the  UK,  the  US,  Australia,  and  Canada),  1  for  countries  with  a  German  civil  law 
background (Germany, Japan, and Brazil), and 2 for countries with a French civil law 
background (France and Italy). 
To measure shareholder protection, I use the variable shareholderprotection, taking the 
value of one of the factors of the Economic Freedom Index by the Heritage Foundation 
(Kane, Holmes, & O'Grady, 2007). As there is no direct measure of the complex topic 
of shareholder protection, a proxy has to be used. One way is realized by the Heritage 
Foundation, which evaluates ten different measures of economic freedom for most of 
the existing countries annually. This shareholder protection index assesses the ability of 
individuals or institutions to accumulate private property, and how far laws go to protect 
private property of investors. Based on information from the Economist Intelligence 
Unit, Country Commerce, Country Profile, and Country Report, 2005 and 2006, US 
Department  of  Commerce,  Country  Commercial  Guide,  2005  and  2006,  and  US 
Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2005 and 2006, the 
index evaluates the shareholder protection between 0% (private property is outlawed 
and all property belongs to the state) and 100% (private property is guaranteed by the 
government,  also  for  minority  holders).  The  factor  scores  the  degree  to  which  a 
country‟s laws protect private property rights and the degree to which its government 
enforces  those  laws.  It  also  assesses  the  likelihood  that  private  property  will  be 
expropriated,  and  analyzes  the  independence  of  the  judiciary,  the  existence  of 
corruption within the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce 
contracts. I use this assessment of the Economic Freedom Index 2007 to measure the 
level of shareholder protection for the country a firm is primary registered in (Kane, et 
al., 2007). 
Furthermore, I measure the development of the stock market by the logarithm of the 
total turnover in 2007 of the biggest stock exchanges in the respective countries. The Variables and Data     
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variable  logstockmarket  takes  the  value  for  the  respective  country  a  firm  is 
headquartered in (Thomsen & Pedersen, 1997). 
To  account  for  cultural  differences,  I  use  the  uncertainty  avoidance  index,  uai,  as 
introduced by Hofstede (1980, 1991, 2001). The level of uncertainty avoidance in a 
country assesses how the people in the respective society cope and deal with uncertainty 
and ambiguity. Generally, the higher the uncertainty avoidance in a country, the more 
people  tend  to  consider  uncertain  outcomes  as  undesirable  and  uncomfortable.  This 
uncertainty  avoidance  index  can  take  values  between  0%  and  100%,  where  100% 
represents the highest uncertainty avoidance, and 0% the lowest.  
2.2  Data 
In the subsequent chapters, I describe the target population for the statistical analyses, 
how  I  collected  the  necessary  data,  and  which  respective  databases  I  choose. 
Furthermore,  I  test  the  representatives  of  the  initial  dataset  and  describe  the  three 
subsamples used in the three essays. 
2.2.1  Target Population and Method of Data Collection 
To answer the previously formulated research question, two essential types of data had 
to be gathered: First, detailed information on the ownership structure of firms, and, 
second,  various  firm-,  industry-,  and  country-characteristics,  as  illustrated  in  the 
previous sections. 
To gain insights not only into differences between the ownership structures of firms, but 
also into industries and countries, a diverse international sample is required. In addition 
to that, as will be described in the individual essays, it is not only necessary that firms 
from different countries are included in the sample, but that the respective countries 
stem from different legal origins (common law, German civil law, and French civil 
law). 
The total population eligible for the subsequent analyses would be all firms from any 
country. To collect the respective sample, different methods were considered, namely 
data collection via survey, interview, and existing ownership databases. However, due 
to the magnitude of the required sample and the sensitive type of information needed, I 
decided to use secondary data from existing ownership databases. Variables and Data     
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This  collection  method  requires  matching  ownership  information  on  firms  with 
additional firm, industry, and country details stemming from different databases. The 
existing and available ownership databases typically provide detailed information on 
publicly  listed  firms  from  a  variety  of  countries.  The  quality  and  availability  of 
ownership information included in these databases is closely related to the size of the 
respective firm and the economic development of the respective country. Thus, for data 
availability reasons, I will, as for example, Thomsen and Pedersen (1999; 1996, 1997, 
1998,  2000,  2003)  did,  focus  on  the  largest  publicly  firms  in  the  most  economic 
developed countries. In addition to better data availability, focusing on these companies 
enhances the coverage of a country‟s economic activity (Thomsen & Pedersen, 1997). 
Moreover, Thomsen and Pedersen correctly point out that “more variation in ownership 
patterns [can be expected] for large [than for small] companies” (p. 766), which is 
consistent with the view of Faccio and Lang (2002) who indicate that “cross-country 
differences become less significant among small firms” (p. 381).  
Unfortunately, the selected type of ownership information does not account for the issue 
of the separation of cash flow and control rights for some type of shares. As stated in the 
beginning, ownership is constituted by a set of two rights, namely cash flow and control 
rights. However, the distribution of control and cash flow rights can vary either by 
different classes of shares with different voting rights for given cash flow rights, or by 
pyramiding and chains of control (Faccio & Lang, 2002; Morck, et al., 2005). Whereas 
the chosen database provider tries to account for chains of control to a certain extent, the 
sample does not account for the differences between cash flow and control rights (dual-
class shares). Accordingly, some of the owners included in the database might only 
possess cash flow rights without any right to control the firm. However, I argue that this 
will not affect the subsequent analysis in a substantial way, as the basic underlying 
ownership concept, considering costs and benefits of alternative form, holds true even if 
only parts of the potential  costs and benefits  are considered.  Furthermore, for most 
countries, although becoming more and more popular, preferred stocks are relatively 
sparsely used and thus only a minor issue in my sample (Houston & Houston, 1990).  
2.2.2  Initial Sample 
To collect the respective sample from existing ownership databases, several database 
providers were available. Variables and Data     
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In terms of quality and availability of ownership information, I eventually decided to 
retrieve the ownership details from the ownership add-on of the Thomson One Banker 
(T1B).
15  Similarly,  company details were retrieved from the  Thomson Datastream 
Advance  (Datastream)  and  Thomson  Worldscope  database  and  merged  with  the 
ownership data. The composition of the sample followed a multi-step process described 
as follows. 
In a first step, I confined the sample to firms from the ten largest economies by the size 
of their  gross domestic product ( GDP)  in 2007:  Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain,  the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US). 
Due to data unavailability, the inclusion of further countries (e.g. , China, Russia, or 
India) would not have contributed to the quality of the sample and were excluded. On 
the one hand, the selection of these countries ensures the  availability of the ownership 
information, and, on the other, provides more than two countries of each legal origin.  
For each of these ten countries, I sought to collect ownership information on  the 150 
largest (by turnover as of December 2007) publicly listed companies contained in the 
database.  
In a second step, I cleaned the dataset from observations with missing or unreliable 
information. I deleted firms  without any available information about their ownership 
structure from the sample, eliminating 22 of 1,500 firms.  
Subsequently, for 12 firms, the identified owners held more than 100% of a firm. By 
comparing the identified ownership shares in 2007 with the previous and following year 
(2006 and 2008), I was able to correct for several issues caused  by comma splices. 
However, for six firms, I was not able to identify the problem and consequently deleted 
them from the sample. 
Afterwards, 19 firms with no clear indication of their primary industry or headquarter s 
were deleted.  
Lastly, double listings,  that is, firms listed on more than one stock exchange, were 
deleted  from  the  sample,  keeping  only  the  listing  in  the  country  the  firm  is 
headquartered in. This process led   to  losing another 41 firms from  eight  different 
countries, resulting in an overall population of 1,412 firms from ten countries. Table 4 
                                                 
15For a more detailed discussion regarding the quality and representativeness of the data, refer to   
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shows the number of firms per country included in the initial sample. Due to the data 
cleaning process, 13 firms from Brazil, 32 firms from Italy, and 43 firms from Spain 
dropped out of the sample.  
Table 4: Observations per Country in the Initial Sample 
 
 
Table 5 provides basic descriptive statistics of the initial sample and shows that on 
average, the five top owners own 42% of a firm. The median is lower than the mean, 
indicating  outliers  with  a  relatively  high  level  of  ownership  concentration.  The 
skewness and kurtosis show that the distribution differs from the normal distribution.  
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of cr5 in the Initial Sample 
 
Table 6 and Table 7 provide further descriptive statistics of the ownership concentration 
variable cr5 by industries and countries. The statistics show a fairly high variance in 
ownership concentration between both industries and countries. For the countries, the 
US and Japan are, at 24.71% and 24.75% respectively, similarly concentrated and have 
the lowest ownership concentration of the countries. Italy and Spain turn out to have the 
highest ownership concentration in the sample at 57.29% and 59.13% average holdings, 
respectively. For each country, firms with low (below 10%) and high (>60%) levels of 
ownership concentration are included in the sample.  
For  the  industries,  Mining  turns  out  to  have  the  lowest  ownership  concentration  at 
38.88%  on  average,  and  Construction,  at  51.89%,  the  highest  level  of  ownership 
concentration. However, the spread between the industries is not as high as between the 
countries. Similar to the countries though, firms with high and low levels of ownership 
concentration are present in all industries.  
 
Country Australia Brazil Canada France Germany Italy Japan Spain UK USA
N 150 137 150 150 150 118 150 107 150 150
N Mean Median Skewness Kurtosis
1,412 41.62 35.43 0.55 2.31Variables and Data     
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of cr5 by country in the Initial Sample 
 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of cr5 by industry in the Initial Sample 
 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of the ownership measure cr5 over the total sample 
and underlines the findings of the descriptive statistics by showing that the distribution 
is right / positively skewed, has a relatively high peak with fat tails, and differs from the 
normal distribution.
16  
                                                 
     
16Refer to chapter 2.1 for a description of the measure of ownership concentration. 
Country N mean min max sd
Japan 150 24.75 1.01 67.81 14.23 
United-States 150 24.71 0.94 72.17 9.93 
United-Kingdom 150 32.47 8.90 77.01 12.79 
Canada 150 34.61 1.49 93.09 20.70 
Australia 150 38.31 0.75 96.27 20.99 
Germany 150 48.51 1.02 99.75 27.49 
Brazil 137 51.24 0.94 100.00 28.72 
France 150 54.41 1.42 99.87 26.07 
Italy 118 57.29 0.12 98.22 19.56 
Spain 107 59.13 8.24 99.34 19.43 
Total 1,412 41.62 0.12 100.00 24.15 
Industry N mean min max sd
Mining 85 38.88 7.53 97.69 24.12 
Finance,Insurance, Real-Estate 240 39.09 0.75 99.97 26.43 
Manufacturing 517 40.64 1.35 99.75 22.87 
Retail/Wholesale 171 41.40 0.94 98.24 23.75 
Transportation 215 42.75 0.12 100.00 26.54 
Services 123 44.66 4.58 94.02 20.93 
Construction 41 51.89 10.89 97.23 23.80 
Total 1,392 41.37 0.12 100.00 24.23 Variables and Data     
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Figure 5: Distribution of cr5 in the Initial Sample 
 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the distribution of the transformed ownership concentration measure 
tcr5. As the comparison with the in the in graphic integrated Gaussian function shows, 
is the transformed ownership measure much closer to the normal distribution than the 
untransformed ownership measure. However, being right skewed and high peaked, the 
histogram  shows  the  same  characteristics  as  the  original  ownership  measure. 
Accordingly, as suggested by Figure 5 and 6, a Shapiro-Wilk-Test (SW-Test) and a 
Skewness-Kurtosis-Test (SK-Test) for normality clearly reject the null-hypothesis on a 
0.01  significance  level  that  either  measure  of  ownership  concentration  is  normally 
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Figure 6: Distribution of tcr5 in the Initial Sample 
 
The  three  individual  essays  require  a  different  amount  of  additional  information  / 
variables,  resulting  in  different  subsamples  of  this  initial  dataset.  I  describe  this 
additional data collection process and the respective resulting subsamples in  section 
2.2.4. 
 
2.2.3  Representativeness of the Ownership Data 
Several  database  providers  offer  ownership  information  of  firms.  For  reasons  of 
availability,  quality,  and  representativeness,  I  eventually  used  the  relatively  new 
Ownership Add-on of the T1B.  
The T1B ownership data combine and are retrieved from a variety of different sources. 
For institutional owners, these sources include official filings, mutual fund reports, and 
shareholder reports. The majority of the mutual fund data is sourced directly from the 
institutions with which Thomson Reuters has established lasting working relationships 
over the years. Ownership information is also sourced via stock exchanges and official 
regulatory  bodies.  For  substantial  and  declarable  stakes,  the  ownership  data  is  also 
sourced from annual and interim reports, stock exchanges, official regulatory bodies, 
third-party data vendors, company websites, news sources, and through direct contact 
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departments.
17 The combination of the various sources should ensure  a decent, and by 
other databases unmatched coverage of the ownership structure of the firms included in 
the database. 
To my knowledge,  the T1B ownership database itself has not  yet  been tested for 
reliability  and  representativeness.  However,  according  to  Thomson   Financial,  the 
ownership information provided in the T1B Ownership add-on is widely congruent with 
the  discontinued  Thomson  “Compact  Disclosure”  and  “Spectrum”  databases,  and 
similar methods are used to collect the ownership details. Thus, I use existing studies 
accessing the reliability of the data available in the Compact Disclosure and Spectrum 
database as a proxy for the T1B data.  
Two  studies  by  Kole  (1995)  and  Anderson  and  Lee  (1997)  have  analyzed  various 
sources ownership sources, also including Compact Disclosure and Spectrum. However, 
the studies by Kole, Anderson and Lee focused solely on the management holdings of 
firms,  and  thus,  possess  limited  explanatory  power  for  the  overall  ownership  data 
available in the T1B. 
Kole  (1995)  tests  three  different  sources  of  ownership  data  used  in  various  papers, 
proxy statements, Corporate Data Exchange Volumes, and the Value Line Survey, and 
concludes that each of them is equally well suited for ownership research and that the 
nature of the database does not influence the statistical analyses.  
When  testing  the  managerial  ownership  information  available  in  the  Compact 
Disclosure,  Value  Line  Survey,  Corporate  Text,  and  Spectrum,  Anderson  and  Lee 
(1997) come to a different conclusion.  They actually do find qualitative differences 
between the alternative data sources. Whereas they rate the Compact Disclosure data 
second  and  highly  reliable,  they  find  certain  differences  in  the  managerial  holdings 
among a few databases, including Spectrum. Anderson and Lee base their results on the 
finding  that  they  were  not  able  to  reproduce  the  curvilinear  effect  of  management 
holdings  on  performance  measures  as  Tobin‟s  Q,  as  proposed  by  McConnell  and 
Servaes (1990). I argue, however, that this finding provides only weak evidence that the 
                                                 
17Information  according  to  Thomson  Customer  Support.  Table  A  -  3  provides  a  more  detailed 
description of the data included in the ownership data. The illustration, however, is only exemplary 
and mainly includes detailed descriptions of the respective US SEC and UK RNS filings. The actual 
ownership data included in the database goes far beyond the listed sources. 
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data might not be representative. First, as illustrated in the literature review of the third 
essay in this thesis, the effects of ownership concentration on performance are far from 
consistent and the study of McConnell and Servaes is one of plenty studies, many of 
which yield conflicting results. Second, contrary to Anderson and Lee, I was able to 
reconstruct several effects of the existing ownership research, as you will see in the 
subsequent essays.  
Furthermore,  comparing  my  ownership  data  with  existing  studies  using  alternative 
sources, no reason is provided to doubt the representativeness of the ownership data 
available  in  the  T1B.  Table  8  shows  the  average  ownership  concentration  of  cr3, 
summing up the percental ownership rights held by the top three owners of the initial 
dataset and the data used in the seminal work of LLSV (1998).
18  
Table 8: Comparison of the Ownership Data with La Porta, et al (1998) 
 
Despite the studies by LLSV (1998) being published over ten years ago, and thus the 
ownership data is even older, and although they only analyzed the ten largest firms in 
each country and excluded financial companies, the average ownership concentration of 
the top three owners is remarkably similar to the data used in this study. 
Similarly, the ownership data gathered in 1999 for Van der Elst‟s (2004) study basically 
shows the same characteristics for those countries in common with this thesis (Table 9).  
                                                 
     




La Porta et al (1998)
United-States 22 20
Japan 22 18
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Table 9: Comparison of the Ownership Data with Van der Elst (2004)  
 
Although the differences between the two data sets are slightly higher than in the first 
comparison, in general, the countries show the same characteristics – that is, whether 
countries have typically a high or a low ownership concentration relative to each other. 
The change in ownership concentration in the last ten years and the number of the 
identified owners might explain the slight differences. As mentioned above, I could 
identify, on average, 60% of the owners of a firm. However, Van der Elst (2004) might 
have  been  able  to  identify  more  owners,  which  would  have  led  to  a  higher  HHI, 
explaining the higher values for all countries. 
Summing  up,  the  T1B  Ownership-Add  on  appears  to  provide  high  quality  and 
representative  ownership  data.  Comparing  the  initial  sample  with  the  data  of  two 
existing studies shows only minor differences. These might be explained by that the 
data in the other studies were gathered over ten years ago and that different kinds of 
data were collected (only the ten largest firms, no financial companies). Furthermore, 
although not specifically testing the T1B and focusing solely on managerial holdings, 
the  study  by  Kole  (1995)  does  not  find  significant  differences  between  alternative 
ownership sources. Still, Anderson and Lee (1997) mention discrepancies in managerial 
holdings among different sources. However, I argue that these findings provide only 
weak evidence and that they are not necessarily transferrable from managerial holdings 
to the complete ownership structure. In addition, I could not confirm the limitations 
brought forward by Anderson and Lee, since I was able to reproduce the results of 
existing studies, as you will see within the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, according 
to the Thomson Customer Support, the introduction of the T1B has further improved the 
quality of the ownership data. In addition, several existing studies in the ownership area 
rely on the Compact Disclosure and Spectrum databases for their analyses,  yielding 




Van der Elst (2004)
United-States 350 402
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Hendrickx, 2000; Cheung & Wei, 2006; Cornett, Marcus, Saunders, & Tehranian, 2007; 
Duggal  & Millar, 1999;  Gaspar & Massa, 2007;  Holderness,  Kroszner, & Sheehan, 
1999;  Holderness  &  Sheehan,  1988;  Sias,  Starks,  &  Titman,  2006;  Thomsen  & 
Pedersen, 2000).  
2.2.4  Subsamples 
Compared to the initial sample described above, the actual samples analyzed within the 
scope  of  the  three  individual  essays  vary  due  to  different  requirements  in  terms  of 
variables. In the following section, I describe the samples used in the three essays and 
provide descriptive statistics. 
2.2.4.1  Sample of the First Essay 
In the first individual essay, the statistical analyses do not require additional information 
– and thus variables – than those included in the initial sample. Table 4 shows that the 
number  of  firms  per  country  was  reduced  for  Brazilian,  Italian,  and  Spanish  firms 
within the process of the data cleaning, as described for the initial sample. For Brazil 
and Italy, the number of missing firms is hardly significant and mediocre, respectively. 
In  Spain,  however,  the  number  of  firms  per  country  was  reduced  by  almost  30%. 
Accordingly, to ensure the comparability between the countries, Spain dropped out of 
the sample, resulting in a final sample for the first essay of nine countries and 1,305 
firms. Table 10 shows the final distribution of firms per country in the first sample. 
Table 10: Observations per Country in the First Sample 
 
Table 11 provides basic descriptive statistics, which differ only slightly from the initial 
sample. Compared to the initial sample, only Spain dropped out of the sample, which is 
why the first sample has a similar mean and median ownership concentration as the 
initial sample and the distribution is similarly skewed and peaked. Figure 7 graphically 
illustrates the distribution of the ownership variable cr5. Again, the distribution is quite 
comparable to the one from the initial sample (Figure 5 and Figure 6). The distribution 
is right / positively skewed, has fat tails, and thus, differs from the normal distribution. 
Country Australia Brazil Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK USA
N 150 137 150 150 150 118 150 150 150Variables and Data     
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For further descriptive statistics of this sample, please refer to the respective section of 
the first essay (section 3.4.4.1). 
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics of cr5 in the First Sample 
 
Figure 7: Distribution of cr5 in the First Sample 
 
 
As  for  the  initial  data  set,  Figure  8  illustrates  the  distribution  of  the  transformed 
ownership concentration measure. Although the distribution of tcr5 for this first sample 
appears to be closer to the normal distribution than the initial sample, it still differs 
significantly. Again, a SW-Test and a SK-Test for normality clearly reject the null-
hypothesis of normality on a 0.01 significance level for both cr5 and tcr5 (see Table A - 
1 and Table A - 2 in the appendix). 
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Figure 8: Distribution of tcr5 in the First Sample 
 
 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) between the initial and the first sample, as reported 
in  Table  12,  shows  that  the  sample  of  the  first  essay  is,  in  terms  of  ownership 
concentration, with a p-Value of 0.12, not significantly different from the initial sample. 
Accordingly, the representativeness of the ownership data should be ensured.
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Table 12: ANOVA of cr5 in the First and Initial Sample 
 
 
2.2.4.2  Sample of the Second Essay 
For the second essay, also dealing with the determination of the level of ownership 
concentration,  I  used  the  first  sample  as  a  starting  point.  However,  the  statistical 
analyses required more variables than in the first essay. 
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tcr5
Number of Observations  2717 R-Squared 0.001
Root MSE  24.048 Adj. R-Squared 0.001
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F
Model 1397.43 1 1397.43 2.42 0.1202
sample 1397.43 1 1397.43 2.42 0.1202
Residual 1570112.26 2715 578.31
Total 1571509.69 2716 578.61Variables and Data     
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Adding the necessary company, industry, and country details to the data set resulted in a 
significant  reduction  in  observations  per  country  due  to  the  unavailability  of  the 
respective  data  for  several  companies.  Including  the  additional  information  in  the 
dataset and merging them with the respective ownership information led to the number 
of  firms  per  country  in  Australia,  Brazil,  France,  and  Italy  dropping  close  to  100. 
Accordingly, to ensure comparability amongst the countries, I restricted the sample to 
the 100 largest firms with complete information, leading to a final sample of 900 firms 
from  nine  countries  for  the  second  essay.  Table  13  illustrates  the  observations  per 
country in this sample. 
Table 13: Observations per Country in the Second Sample 
 
Figure  9  illustrates  the  distribution  of  this  subsample,  and  Table  14  provides  basic 
descriptive statistics. Both the mean and median of the second sample are slightly lower 
than in the first and the initial sample. The distribution is more right skewed and higher 
peaked than the previous samples. However, the distribution clearly shows the same 
characteristics as the two previously illustrated samples and differs from the normal 
distribution.  For  further  descriptive  statistics  of  this  sample,  please  refer  to  the 
respective chapter of the second essay (section 3.5.4.1). 
Table 14: Descriptive Statistics of cr5 in the Second Sample 
 
Country Australia Brazil Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK USA
N 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N Mean Median Skewness Kurtosis
900 38.71 30.98 0.73 2.51Variables and Data     
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Figure 9: Distribution of cr5 in the Second Sample 
 
 
Figure 10 shows the distribution of the transformed ownership concentration measure 
for the sample of the second essay. As this sample was based on the first sample, the 
histogram unsurprisingly draws a similar distribution as for the first sample and the SW- 
and SK-Tests for normality reject normality on a 0.01 significance for both measures of 
ownership concentration (see Table A - 1 and Table A - 2 in the appendix). 
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According  to  Table  15,  which  shows  the  results  of  an  ANOVA  of  the  ownership 
concentration between the initial sample and the sample of the second essay, with a p-
value  of  0.15  there  is  no  systematic  difference  between  this  sample  and  the  initial 
sample.
20  
Table 15: ANOVA of cr5 in the Second and Initial Sample 
 
 
2.2.4.3  Sample of the Third Essay 
For the third essay, dealing with the performance effects of ownership concentration, 
the initial sample was used as starting point. However, as in the case of the second 
essay, several additional company details were necessary and added to the data set. 
Unlike the second essay, the third essay required the inclusion of various performance 
indicators for several years, which turned out to be particularly problematic in terms of 
data availability. In this process, compared to the initial sample, the number of firms for 
Australia and Italy dropped by 69 and 78, respectively, and thus I had to exclude both 
countries from the sample. Additionally, 36 firms from Brazil, and 29 firms from France 
had to be deleted due to missing information. Accordingly, Spain, Brazil, and France 
have significantly less firms per country. Thus, not to further decrease the number of 
total firms included in this sample, I decided to keep these three countries in the sample 
despite the lower number of firms. Dropping Spain, Brazil, and France from the sample 
particularly would have caused issues in terms of legal origin, as no country would have 
been left to represent the French civil law. The process led to a final sample of 1,079 
firms from eight countries. Table 16 illustrates the composition of this data set.    
 
                                                 
20The results of the ANOVA were robust to using either tcr5 or cr5. 
Number of Observations  2312 R-Squared 0.001
Root MSE  23,885 Adj. R-Squared 0.001
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F
Model 1156.00 1 1156.00 2.03 0.1547
sample 1156.00 1 1156.00 2.03 0.1547
Residual 1256796.80 2310 570.49
Total 1256952.80 2311 570.76Variables and Data     
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Table 16: Observations per Country in the Third Sample 
 
Table  17  and  Figure  11  provide  basic  descriptive  statistics  of  the  third  essay  and 
illustrate the distribution of the ownership concentration. The mean of 40% and the 
median of 35% are almost equal to those of the initial and first sample, and the right 
skewed and high peaked distribution is close to the one from the second subsample. For 
further descriptive statistics of this sample, please refer to the respective section of the 
first essay (section 4.5.1). 
Table 17: Descriptive Statistics of cr5 in the Third Sample 
 
Figure 11: Distribution of cr5 in the Third Sample 
 
Figure 12 shows the distribution of tcr5 for the sample of the third essay, which, so far, 
is the closest approximation to a normal distribution. However, the SW- and SK-Test 
for normality reject normality on a 0.01 significance for both measures of ownership 
concentration, still (see Table A - 1 and Table A - 2 in the appendix). 
Country Brazil Canada France Germany Japan Spain UK USA
N 101 150 121 150 150 107 150 150
N Mean Median Skewness Kurtosis
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Figure 12: Distribution of tcr5 in the Third Sample 
 
As suggested by the descriptive statistics, according to an ANOVA, the sample of the 
third essay is not significantly different from the initial sample in terms of ownership 
concentration (Table 18).
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Table 18: ANOVA of cr5 in the Third and Initial Sample 
 
   
                                                 






















1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00
tcr5
Number of Observations  2491 R-Squared 0.001
Root MSE  23.45 Adj. R-Squared 0.000
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F
Model 889,221 1 889,221 1.62 0.2038
sample 889,221 1 889,221 1.62 0.2038
Residual 1369798.43 2498 550,340
Total 1370687.65 2490 550.48Determinants of Ownership Concentration     
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3  DETERMINANTS OF OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 
In this chapter, I address the first two research questions dealing with the determination 
of  the  level  of  ownership  concentration  of  firms.  In  chapter  3.1,  I  provide  an 
introduction into the field, and section 3.2 reviews the literature on firm-, industry-, and 
country-level determinants. Subsequently, I address the first research question dealing 
with the relative importance of the industry- and country-level in chapter 3.4, and the 
second research question, identifying the key drivers of ownership concentration and 
their explanatory power, in chapter 3.5. 
3.1  Introduction 
In the current ownership research, it appears commonly accepted that the ownership 
structure  of  firms,  and  so  the  level  of  ownership  concentration,  is  endogenously 
determined  following  economics  laws.  Several  studies,  such  as  Demsetz  and  Lehn 
(1985), Thomsen and Pedersen (1999), and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), yielded 
respective results that for the determination of the ownership structure of a firm costs 
and benefits are considered, resulting in an equilibrium structure. Demsetz and Lehn set 
the cornerstone in the search for the key drivers identifying factors influencing this 
equilibrium, leading to a higher or lower level of ownership concentration. 
In  the  last  25  years  of  research  on  the  drivers  of  ownership  concentration,  several 
studies have shown that the level of concentration, despite being a firm-specific factor, 
is not only influenced by firm-level, but also by industry- and country-level factors. 
Specifically, in their seminal work Demsetz and Lehn (1985) showed theoretically and 
empirically that the firm size, firm risk, and industry regulation influence the ownership 
concentration of a firm. Whereas Demsetz and Lehn focused mainly on the firm-level, 
Thomsen and Pedersen (1998) and Van der Elst (2004) identified exclusively industry-
level drivers of ownership concentration, namely industry firm size, industry risk, and 
regulation. A third stream of research, spearheaded by LLSV (1998) and La Porta, et al. 
(1999), focused on country-level determinants of ownership concentration and reasoned 
that  via  the  shareholder  protection,  the  origin  of  a  country‟s  law  influences  the 
ownership concentration.  
Despite the progress in the research of the determinants of ownership concentration, 
several  questions  remain  unanswered.  Whereas  many  studies  include  firm-level Determinants of Ownership Concentration     
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determinants in their analyses, relatively few studies analyzed the industry-level and / or 
the country-level. Additionally, most of the studies focus only on one of these levels, 
disregarding a potential interaction of the different groups of determinants.  
This gap in the existing research raises a question about the theoretical foundation of the 
existing ownership frameworks. Most studies focusing on the firm- and industry-level 
rely on the concepts developed by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), which is widely based on 
agency theory. With the insights gained from studies, such as Van der Elst (2004) and 
LLSV  (1998),  the  institutional  economics  perspective  gained  constantly  more 
importance.  However,  due  to  the  wide  default  of  studies  combining  both  views, 
comparative assessments of both theoretical approaches are largely missing. In the two 
subsequent  essays,  I  analyze  the  determinants  of  ownership  concentration  and 
simultaneously account for firm-, industry-, and country- level differences  and their 
interrelation.  
3.2  Theory & Literature Review  
In the following section, I provide a review on the theoretical arguments and empirical 
results of existing studies analyzing firm-, industry-, and country-level determinants. 
3.2.1   Firm-Level Determinants 
The  seminal  study  of  Demsetz  and  Lehn  (1985)  focuses  mainly  on  firm-level 
determinants of ownership concentration. The authors identify the risk and the size of a 
firm as the key drivers of ownership concentration. 
According to Demsetz and Lehn (1985), a firm‟s risk has a curvilinear, inverted-u-
shaped effect on the level of ownership concentration. With respect to the risk of a firm, 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) propose on the basis of two considerations that risk has a 
curvilinear,  bell-shaped  effect  on  ownership  concentration.  First,  they  argue  that 
relatively large ownership stakes provide incentives for blockholders to monitor the 
firm and its management (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Berle & Means, 1932). Equalling 
risk with volatility, the benefits of monitoring the management should be higher the 
more  volatile  a  business  is,  as  a  high  volatility  necessitates  frequent  decisions  and 
changes by the management. Thus, firms with a higher firm-specific risk favor a higher 
ownership concentration due to the increase in monitoring incentives.  Determinants of Ownership Concentration     
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Second,  Demsetz  and  Lehn  (1985)  argue  that  at  high  levels,  firm  risk  may  have  a 
decreasing effect on ownership concentration. The higher the risk of a firm, the smaller 
the stakes owners can acquire while maintaining optimal portfolio diversification. A 
suboptimal portfolio diversification leads either to decreased portfolio performance, or 
to costs connected with the reallocation of the assets in order to reestablish the optimal 
level of diversification. Therefore, increasing firm risk renders larger ownership stakes 
less attractive, resulting in a negative effect of firm risk on ownership concentration 
(Markowitz, 1952).  
According to Demsetz and Lehn (1985), the marginal increase in monitoring incentives 
is relatively high at low risk-levels, but decreases with increasing risk. The marginal 
negative effect of risk on portfolio diversification is relatively small for low levels of 
risk,  but  rises  with  increasing  risk.  Therefore,  at  low  risk  levels,  the  ownership 
increasing effect of monitoring incentives will outweigh the decreasing effect of firm 
risk, whereas for higher risk levels, the opposite effect holds. Thus, on aggregate, the 
relationship between firm risk and ownership concentration is bell-shaped. 
With regards to firm size, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that the larger the size of a 
firm,  the  larger  the  investment  required  to  obtain  a  particular  fraction  of  equity. 
Increasing firm size will be associated with the acquisition of relatively smaller equity 
stakes by a greater number of investors, and hence with lower ownership concentration, 
for two reasons. First, acquiring a significant share in a large firm likely leads to a 
suboptimal portfolio diversification of the investor concerned. The investor will incur 
the  resulting  costs  either  in  form  of  decreased  portfolio  performance  or  in  form  of 
transaction  costs  associated  with  reestablishing  optimal  diversification  (Markowitz, 
1952; Miles & Ezzell, 1980; Modigliani & Miller, 1963). Second, although an investor 
may use debt capital to acquire a given share in a firm, acquiring debt is connected with 
transaction costs and interest payments. These costs increase with the amount of debt 
necessary to leverage the acquisition of ownership stakes e.g., as debt providers may 
expect additional securities for the provision of larger amounts of debt (Leland & Toft, 
1996). Both arguments support the hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, firm size should 
have a negative effect on ownership concentration. Testing their hypotheses on a sample Determinants of Ownership Concentration     
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for  511  US  firms,  Demsetz  and  Lehn  find  significant  evidence  for  both  arguments 
discussed above.
22 
Several authors have tested the hypotheses developed by Demsetz and Lehn  (1985) in 
different settings and on alternative samples and  have confirmed the results to a large 
extent. Bergstrom and Rydqvist (1990) confirmed the firm size and risk effects using a 
sample of about 600 Swedish, and   Crespi-Cladera  (1996)  used panel-data of  193 
Spanish firms and came to the same result. However, some studies yielded conflicting 
results. Gedajlovic (1993) found a significant firm-size effect using a sample of  500 
Canadian firms. However, Gedajlovic did not find the predicted effect of firm -specific 
risk, which might be explained by the fact  that he did not  account for the  potential 
curvilinearity of the relationship. 
3.2.2  Industry-Level Determinants 
In addition to the firm-specific factors, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) also investigated the 
regulation of an industry and argued that regulation has a negative effect on the level of 
ownership  concentration.  Demsetz  and  Lehn  hypothesize  that  in  the  absence  of 
regulation  bigger  ownership  stakes  ensure  higher  power  of  control  for  owners. 
Regulation, however, restricts the options available to owners and renders the benefits 
of majority ownership less attractive, and thus, as proposed by property rights theory, 
renders blockholdings less valuable (Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1967). Accordingly, fewer 
owners  will  acquire  blockholdings,  which  leads  to  a  decrease  in  ownership 
concentration. Testing this hypothesis on a sample for 511 US firms, Demsetz and Lehn 
find significant evidence for their argument.  
However, the effect of industry regulation on ownership concentration is disputable. 
Van  der  Elst  (2004)  argues  that  the  industry  effect  varies  between  countries  as  the 
institutional conditions for the respective industries, for example the regulation, varies 
from  country  to  country,  and  that  the  general  conditions,  as  the  possibility  to 
accumulated private benefits in the light of the legal / corporate governance systems, are 
not the same in all countries either (Bebchuk, 1999). Using a sample of 2,204 European 
firms  Van  der  Elst  confirms  his  line  of  arguments  and  finds  significant  industry 
differences for some countries, and not significant differences for others.  
                                                 
22For a more detailed theoretical elaboration on the effect of firm risk and firm size please refer to 
chapter 1.4.2. Determinants of Ownership Concentration     
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Furthermore, whereas several other authors followed the suggestions of Demsetz and 
Lehn  and  tested  and  confirmed  the  initially  developed  hypotheses  on  alternative 
samples, others find contradicting results.  
Bergstrom and Rydqvist (1990) confirm a significant negative effect of regulation on 
ownership concentration with a sample of 600 Swedish firms. Kole and Lehn (1999) 
analyze  22 years of the US airline industry after the Deregulation Act in 1978 and also 
find the predicted increase in ownership concentration after deregulation. Gedajlovic 
(1993),  however,  uses  a  sample  of  500  Canadian  firms  and  finds  no  statistically 
significant effect of industry regulation on ownership concentration. Similarly, Crespi-
Cladera (1996) does not find an effect of regulation in 193 Spanish firms.  
Aside from the regulation of an industry, Thomsen and Pedersen (1998) investigated the 
industry-level  in  detail  and  found  further  significant  industry  effects  on  ownership 
concentration.  Using  a  sample  of  1,200  European  firms,  Thomsen  and  Pedersen 
attribute  the  industry  effect  to  the  lifecycle  stage  of  an  industry,  differences  in 
information asymmetries between industries, and the intensity of competition.  
Thomsen  and  Pedersen  (1998)  hypothesize  that  entrepreneurial  ownership  typically 
characterizes  the  early  stages  of  an  industry  life  cycle,  that  is,  majority  /  highly 
concentrated  ownership.  Accordingly,  the  younger  an  industry  is,  the  higher  the 
ownership  concentration  is  (DeJong,  1989;  Mueller,  1972,  1988).  In  terms  of 
information  asymmetries,  Thomsen  and  Pedersen  hypothesize,  in  accordance  with 
Zeckhouser  and  Pound  (1990),  that  in  R&D  intensive  industries  the  information 
asymmetries will be higher than in industries where R&D plays a less important role. 
R&D activities are typically hard to monitor as the progress and status is hardly to 
evaluate  by  not  directly involved persons, such as  the  owners. Thus, the gain  from 
larger ownership stakes in  terms of increasing  monitoring efficiency decreases  with 
increasing  research  intensity,  leading  to  a  lower  ownership  concentration.  Lastly, 
Thomsen and Pedersen propose that the intensity of competition is an industry inherent 
monitoring of the management of a company, and Frick (2004) argues that a higher 
competition enables the owners to monitor more efficiently by comparing the results of 
their firm with the competition. For both reasons a higher competition diminishes the 
agency problems of dispersed ownership. Accordingly, a high intensity of competition 
allows for a higher ownership dispersion (Nickel, Nilotisas, & Dryden, 1997; Stickney, Determinants of Ownership Concentration     
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1993). Unfortunately, except or the study of Thomsen and Pedersen itself, no other 
study followed up on these hypotheses. 
3.2.3  Country-Level Determinants 
The youngest stream of research in the field of determinants of ownership concentration 
is the one dealing with the effect of country differences on the level of concentration. As 
one  of  the  precursors  in  this  field,  Thomsen  and  Pedersen  (1997)  spearheaded  the 
analysis. The authors reason that the degree of ownership concentration in a country is 
negatively correlated with the size of the stock market. They propose that companies in 
countries with well-developed stock markets search more financing via the stock market 
due to the decrease in capital costs. The better a stock market is developed, the stronger 
the decrease in capital costs is and the more firms will search financing via the stock 
market (Claessens,  Klingebiel,  & Schmukler, 2006). Going public itself will almost 
inevitably lead to higher ownership dispersion due to the significant increase in minority 
owners.  Therefore,  an  increase  in  the  probability  for  a  firm  seeking  stock  market 
financing will lead to higher ownership dispersion. Additionally, an important feedback 
loop  further  increases  the  effect.  A  higher  stock  market  development  leads  to  a 
disproportionate increase in investors compared to a relatively constant number of listed 
firms. The more investors participate in the stock market, the smaller the ownership 
shares of firms available for every owner. For both reasons, Thomsen  and Pedersen 
propose a causal relationship from stock market size to ownership dispersion. Using a 
sample of 1,200 firms from 12 European countries, the authors find significant support 
for  their  hypothesis.  Jong  and  Semenov  (2006)  followed  up  on  the  stock  market 
hypothesis and also found confirmatory evidence. 
Furthermore, in their seminal works LLSV (1999; 1998) argue that the legal origin of a 
country has a significant influence on the level of ownership concentration of a firm. 
LLSV  find  that  countries  with  a  common  law  background  typically  have  a  lower 
shareholder protection than countries with a civil law background, and that German 
civil law countries typically have a lower level of shareholder protection than French 
civil law countries.
23 According to Beck (2003a, 2003b), the shareholder protection is 
influenced by the legal origin, as common law countries adapt faster to their changing 
                                                 
      
23Common law countries considered in this study: Australia, Canada, UK, and USA; German civil law 
countries  considered  in  this  study:  Brazil,  Germany,  and  Japan;  French  civil  law  countries 
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environment than civil law countries do. According to Beck, common law – based on 
case law – adapts incrementally to meet the needs of the economy as they change over 
time. The civil law, however, based on codes and statutory texts, adapts significantly 
more  slowly  due  to  relatively  infrequent  revisions  of  the  underlying  concepts. 
Furthermore, whereas German civil law countries accepted the need for jurisprudence 
and  designed  the  legal  system  to  adapt  incrementally,  French  civil  law  countries 
followed to a large extent the Napoleonic doctrine and thus refrained from interpreting 
the legal rules according to the development over time, but focused on applying the 
legal rules as they were. Accordingly, the authors argue that the protection of minority 
owners is a relatively new issue in terms of legislation, which is why the faster adapting 
common law countries will have integrated a better shareholder protection than the civil 
law  countries,  and  that  the  French  civil  law  countries  possess  a  lower  level  of 
shareholder  protection  than  the  German  civil  law  countries.
24  A  high  level  of 
shareholder protection favors the rights of minority owners by protecting them from 
expropriation and strengthening their position to execute their ownership rights. Thus, 
the costs connected with the enforcement of minority owner rights decreases with an 
increase in shareholder protection. Accordingly, a higher level of shareholder protection 
renders small ownership rights more attractive and therefore lead s to a lower level of 
ownership concentration (and vice versa).  
LLSV (1998) successfully test their hypothesis on roughly 500 firms from 49 countries. 
La  Porta,  et  al.  (1999)  confirm  the  negative  effect  of  shareholder  protection  on 
ownership concentration using a sample containing up to 540 firms from 27 countries. 
Also,  Faccio  and  Lang  (2002)  find similar results for 5,232 corporations from 13 
Western European countries.  
Despite the clear empirical evidence, the line of arguments brought forward by LLSV 
(1998,  1999),  the  legal  origin  hypothesis ,  is  disputed  (Braendle,  2006;  Chirinko, 
Garretsen, Van Ees, & Sterken, 2004; Coffee, 1999, 2001a, 2001b) . Braendle (2006) 
argues by a “convergence theory” that the effect of legal origin is not as distinct as 
assumed and has actually disappeared in the course of time; thus, different legal origins 
would  never  be  able  to  influence  shareholder  protection  and  so  the  ownership 
concentration significantly. Also, Coffee (1999) doubts the findings of LLSV as the 
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dispersed ownership arose in the US and UK in complete absence from what we know 
today as shareholder protection. Coffee even puts the consideration forward that the 
shareholder protection and ownership concentration relationship developed vice versa, 
that is, that first, the dispersed ownership structures emerged, and this, in a second step, 
led to the development of a corporate governance system with a strong protection for 
minority owners. Chirinko, et al. (2004) follow this idea and do not confirm an effect of 
shareholder protection on ownership concentration for the Netherlands. Unfortunately, 
all three authors fail to provide an alternative concept within their criticisms. 
Using a different line of arguments than LLSV (1998; 1999), Roe (2004) provides an 
additional explanation for a similar country related effect on ownership concentration. 
According  to  Roe,  the  ownership  concentration  should  be  higher  in  Continental-
European countries than in Anglo-American countries, which is largely congruent with 
the effect  illustrated by  LLSV  (1998). Roe argues  that in  the Continental-European 
social democracies, the relatively strong influence by the states and employees might 
lead to suboptimal shareholder-value maximization. This calls for a higher influence of 
the  shareholders  on  the  company,  realized  by  block  holdings,  leading  to  an  overall 
higher ownership concentration. Roe argues that the influence of employees and politics 
on  firms  is  lower  in  common  law  countries,  allowing  a  more  dispersed  ownership 
structure. Except for the studies by Roe himself (Roe, 2004, 2006; Roe & Gordon, 
2004), his approach has not been further investigated within the scope of the ownership 
literature. However, the empirical tests for the hypotheses brought forward by LLSV 
(1998)  partly  confirm  the  concept  of  Roe,  as  the  legal  origin  of  a  country  mostly 
coincides with the classification according to Roe. 
Anyhow,  even  when  focusing  particularly  on  the  Continental-European  corporate 
landscape, Barca and Becht (2001) found significant differences in the median voting-
block of the largest shareholder between the UK, Austria, Germany, and Italy. These 
results suggest that there must be even more to the country-level than predicted by the 
concept of Roe (2004), as his theory cannot explain these differences. 
One  additional  country  factor  potentially  explaining  the  so  far  unexplained  country 
variance is analyzed by Jong and Semenov (2006), being the first study to analyze the 
effects  of  cultural  differences  on  the  level  of  ownership  concentration.  Jong  and 
Semenov  argue  that  the  norms  and  values  in  a  country,  determined  by  its  culture, 
determine  the  behavior  of  owners  /  investors,  and  by  means  of  that,  influence  the Determinants of Ownership Concentration     
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institutional environment in terms of legal framework and corporate governance, and so 
the level of ownership concentration.  
The construct „culture‟ is complex and hard to grasp and, as illustrated by Kim and Gray 
(2009), a variety of frameworks with different approaches have been developed. Jong 
and Semenov (2006) rely on the widely used cultural dimensions by Hofstede (1980, 
1991, 2001).
25  
Among  the  different  dimensions  introduced  by  Hofstede,  a ccording  to  Jong  and 
Semenov, the level of uncertainty avoidance in a country
26 will have the most direct and 
thus strongest (positive) effect on the level of ownership concentration.  In countries 
with a relatively high level of uncertainty avoidance, people feel more threatened by 
uncertainty and try to protec t themselves against uncertain   developments.  In those 
countries, stock markets  will be less developed, as more people will refrain from the 
uncertainty  connected  with  investments  into  stocks,  and  the  level  of  shareholder 
protection will be lower as the need for protection of the relatively few minority owners 
is not as high as in countries with more developed stock markets.
27 As argued above, a 
less developed stock market and a lower shareholder protection will lead to a higher 
level of ownership concentration, which is why Jong  and Semenov predict the positive 
effect of uncertainty avoidance on ownership concentration. Jong and Semenov test the 
effect of uncertainty avoidance on ownership concentration with a sample containing 
the average ownership concentration of 27 countries and find confirmative evidence for 
their line of arguments.  
 
                                                 
      
25Cf. Schwartz (1994, 2003), House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman,  and Gupta (2004), and Kogut and 
Singh (1988) for alternative frameworks. 
      
26“The  Uncertainty  Avoidance  Index  (UAI)  deals  with  a  society‟s  tolerance  for  uncertainty  and 
ambiguity;  it  ultimately  refers  to  man‟s  search  for  Truth.  It  indicates  to  what  extent  a  culture 
programs  its  members  to  feel  either  uncomfortable  or  comfortable  in  unstructured  situations. 
Unstructured situations are novel, unknown, surprising, different from usual. Uncertainty avoiding 
cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict laws and rules, safety and security 
measures, and on the philosophical and religious level by a belief in absolute Truth; 'there can only 
be one Truth and we have it. People in uncertainty avoiding countries are also more emotional, and 
motivated by inner nervous energy. The opposite type, uncertainty accepting cultures, are more 
tolerant of opinions different from what they are used to; they try to have as few rules as possible, 
and on the philosophical and religious level they are relativist and allow many currents to flow side 
by side. People within these cultures are more phlegmatic and contemplative, and not expected by 
their environment to express emotions” (Hofstede, 2001). 
      
27According to the discussion of LLSV and Braendle (2006), it remains unclear whether the size of a 
stock market influences the level of shareholder protection or vice versa. Determinants of Ownership Concentration     
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3.3  Methodology 
In the two subsequent essays, different econometric methods will be applied to answer 
the research questions.  
In a first step, I use univariate statistics to describe the samples, illustrating the level of 
ownership concentration in the respective industries and countries. Afterwards, I apply 
analyses  of  variance  (ANOVAs)  to  test  the  sample  for  significant  differences  in 
ownership  concentration  between  various  groups  of  firms,  such  as  industries  and 
countries.  In  a third step,  I estimate  hierarchical  linear models  (HLMs)
28, including 
fixed and random effects, to determine the significance of the individual determinants.  
Based on the estimations of the HLMs ,  I use variance decomposition techniques to 
assess the different models‟ explained variance. 
Existing studies on the determinants of ownership concentration largely rely on ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regressions to evaluate the significance of the identified drivers. 
However, as soon as industry and country factors are included, OLS regressions do not 
account for the hierarchical / nested structure of the data. As standard errors of OLS 
regression coefficients are typically too small for clustered data, statistical significance 
tests of individual coefficients involving division by the standard error tend to exceed 
the level of Type I errors (alpha inflation). An intraclass correlation (ICC) as low as 
0.01 or 0.05 can lead to significant distortion in estimation results of an OLS model, and 
the bias increases with ICC and sample size (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2002). 
To account for the clustering of the data and to yield as unbiased results as possible, I 
use  HLMs  to  address  research  questions  one  and  two,  determining  the  relative 
importance of the industry- and country-level and the key determinants of ownership 
concentration. For the first essay, a random-intercept model with two random intercepts 
will  be  estimated.
29  For the second essay, a  fully-fledged  HLM with two random 
intercepts and various covariates / fixed effects will be used.
30  
Considering that I only included the largest firms of a country in the sample and taking 
the criticism of Holderness (2009) into account, the analyses of the largest firms might 
not be representative for smaller firms , and thus, the total population. Accordingly, I 
                                                 
     
28Also referred to as hierarchical mixed model, depending on whether random and fixed effects are           
included or not. 
     
29Cf. section 3.4.3. 
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refrain from generalizing the estimation results for the total population, and therefore 
use fixed effect models for the determinants of ownership concentration. With respect to 
the random intercepts, I argue that the average concentration per industry and country 
can vary from case to case, which is why I use random and not fixed intercepts in the 
models (Marchenko, 2006; Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Wooldrige, 2001). 
To estimate the models, I use the Restricted Maximum Likelihood Method (REML), 
which provides more robust estimators than the Maximum Likelihood (ML) method, 
particularly when using an unbalanced dataset (different number of observations) per 
grouping variable (countries and firms) (Marchenko, 2006). 
To determine the explained variance by the covariates, I use an established variance 
decomposition  technique,  similar  to  the  one  introduced  by  the  discussion  of 
Schmalensee (1985; 1989) and Rumelt (1991), to evaluate the importance of industries 
and business units for the performance of a firm. This method has been the variance 
decomposition technique of choice of several studies (Brush & Bromiley, 1997; Fitza, 
Matusik, & Mosakowski, 2009; Hawawini, Subramnian, & Verdin, 2003; Makino & 
Isobe, 2004; McGahan & Porter, 1997, 2002; Powell, 1996; Roquebert, Adrisani, & 
Philipps, 1996; Sea-Jin & Singh, 2000). 
I follow the approach suggested by Snijders and Bosker (1999) and Rabe-Hesketh and 
Skrondal (2005) and use HLMs to calculate the respective Pseudo-R² to determine the 
explained variance by the respective variables. In OLS, the R² is approximated by the 
estimated residual variance of the null model minus the estimated residual variance of 
the full model divided by the estimated variance of the null model:
31 
𝑅2 =
  (?? − ?  )2 −   (?? − ?  )2
? ?




2   − 𝜎1
2   
𝜎?
2    
For a random-intercept model, the residual variance is given by 𝑉?? ? + 𝜖??  =  ѱ  +
 𝜃, leading to the following calculation of the total R² by determining the proportional 
reduction in the estimated total variance by comparing the null model with the full 
model. ѱ  0 + 𝜃  0 are the estimates for the null model, and ѱ  1 + 𝜃  1 are the estimates for 
the full model to be evaluated: 
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𝑅2 =
ѱ  0 + 𝜃  0 − (ѱ  1 + 𝜃  1) 
ѱ  0 + 𝜃  0
 
As suggested by Raudenbusch and Bryk (2002), I consider the proportional reduction 
for  each  random  intercept  separately  to  determine  the  reduction  in  variance  for  the 
separate levels. Accordingly, it follows for a two level model: 
𝑅2
2 =
ѱ  0− ѱ  1 
ѱ  0      and  𝑅1
2 =
 𝜃  0− 𝜃  1 
𝜃  0
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3.4  Relative Importance of Industry-, and Country-Level  
In the previous sections, I provided a literature review on the determinants of ownership 
concentration and presented the statistical methods for the subsequent analyses. The 
following sections constitute the first of three essays in this thesis. 
3.4.1  Introduction 
Generally, the level of ownership concentration is a firm-level phenomenon. However, 
the literature review  provides clear theoretical  and empirical  evidence  that not  only 
firm-,  but  also  industry-  and  country-characteristics  influence  the  ownership 
concentration.  Looking at the existing ownership research, the analyses of the three 
levels of influence factors in general, and the choice of whether investigating the firm-, 
industry-  or the country-level,  seems quite deliberate  and without clear guidance  of 
which  level(s)  of  determinants  is  /  are  the  most  important  one(s).  Accordingly, 
answering the research question for the relative importance of the industry- and country-
levels  for  the  determination  of  the  actual  firm-specific  characteristic  „ownership 
concentration‟ seems to be particularly worthwhile for different reasons. First, and most 
importantly, determining the relative importance of the industry- and country- level will 
help  to  pave the way  for improved theoretical  frameworks for the determination of 
ownership  concentration.  Understanding  the  relative  importance  of  the  two  levels 
enables  us  to  focus  future  research  on  the  most  meaningful  level  of  ownership 
determinants.  Particularly  in  terms  of  institutional  economics  the  insights  from  the 
subsequent analyses will shed light on the importance of the different institutional levels 
for  the  ownership  structure  of  firms.  Second,  with  respect  to  policy  implications, 
understanding the respective influence of country- and industry-level on the ownership 
structure,  and  thus,  corporate  governance,  can  help  to  render  respective  laws  and 
regulations more efficient.  
Accordingly, the aim of this paper is to answer the question for the relative importance 
of the industry- and country-level and to analyze the interplay of both levels. The results 
help  to  pinpoint  the  path  for  future  research,  lay  the  foundation  for  further  policy 
implications, and give practitioners further insights in the market dynamics regarding 
the ownership structure of firms.  Relative Importance of Industry-, and Country-Level     
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The structure of the subsequent essay is as follows: Having provided the description of 
the data set, a literature review, and the econometric methods upfront, I first formulate 
expectations about the relative importance of the industry- and country-level on the 
basis  of  the  existing  ownership  frameworks.  Second,  I  provide  an  overview  on  the 
statistical model used in the empirical analyses. Third, I describe the results, and discuss 
their importance with respect to the theoretical propositions developed at the outset. 
Lastly, I derive implications and recommendations for future research.  
3.4.2  Development of Hypotheses 
The theoretical frameworks, such as those of Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Hansmann 
(1996), or LLSV (1998), have proven to possess significant explanatory power for the 
identification  of  firm-,  industry-,  and  country-specific  determinants  of  ownership 
concentration. However, none of these findings or frameworks provides a theoretical 
explanation  how  the  industry-  and  country-level  relate  to  each  other  and  what  the 
relative importance is, regardless of individually identified determinants of ownership 
concentration.  To  derive  an  estimate  based  on  the  already  identified  industry-  and 
country-level effects, I will discuss the findings of the respective studies, subsequently.  
Just  by  looking  at  the  different  industry-specific  influence  factors  of  ownership 
concentration identified in the literature review, it turns out that the industry regulation 
is the only solely industry-specific factor which has been identified so far; the other 
factors are actually firm-specific factors, also potentially influenced by the industry a 
firm is active in. Accordingly, I argue that the lion‟s share of these effects should be 
captured  by  the  firm-level,  and  consequently  industry-regulation  will  be  the  most 
significant driver of the industry-level. However, as for example, illustrated by Van der 
Elst (2004) or by the inconclusive results  by  Gedajlovic (1993)  and  Crespi-Cladera 
(1996), this supposedly strongest industry-effect appears not to be significant for all 
countries, suggesting that the total industry-effect over all countries is rather small.  
The  results  of  the  existing  studies  on  country-level  determinants  of  ownership-
concentration suggest that, according to LLSV (1998) and Roe (2004), the legal-origin, 
and respective effects on the corporate governance system, have a significant effect on 
the level of ownership concentration of firms. The results furthermore imply that even 
further important country-level drivers of ownership concentration, such as the cultural 
factors analyzed by Jong and Semenov (2006), exist but have not been identified yet. Relative Importance of Industry-, and Country-Level     
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Overall, even the identified country-level determinants – and so the country-level in 
total – appear to have a strong effect on the level of ownership concentration of a firm.  
Summarizing  the  previous  findings,  the  evidence  of  the  existing  research  on  the 
industry- and the country-level suggests that, whereas the country-level has a strong 
influence on the level of ownership concentration, the industry-level appears to play a 
subordinate  role.  These  results  indicate  that  institutional  theory  in  general  is  an 
important instrument to explain the level of ownership concentration of firms and is a 
valuable  addition  to  ownership  frameworks  solely  based  on  principal  agent  theory. 
However, the institutional differences on the industry-level seem to be less striking and 
relevant  for  the  ownership  concentration  than  the  highly  significant  country-level. 
Unfortunately, these results do not necessarily provide indication for the actual relative- 
importance  of  the  two  levels.  Several  potentially  important  drivers  of  ownership 
concentration of both levels might have been disregarded so far. Thus, in default of a 
respective theoretical framework I do not formulate specific hypotheses. Instead, I use 
explorative analyses to answer the research question of the relative importance of the 
industry- and country-level. 
3.4.3  Statistical Model 
In this chapter, I describe the statistical model applied in the subsequent analyses. The 
sample and the variables will not be explained as they have been illustrated in chapter 2. 
As described in the methods section (section 3.3), a random-intercept model, that is, a 
HLM with two random intercepts and without additional covariates will be used. To 
assess the relative importance, I evaluate the by the two random intercepts explained 
variance. The analyses rely on the following (empty) random-intercept-model:
32 
 1 ???? = (𝗽1 + ?? + ?) + 𝜖???  
In this equation, ??,?,? represents the ownership concentration of firm f, primarily active 
in  industry  i,  and  headquartered  in  country  c.  The  first  right-hand-side  term  is  the 
constant term 𝗽1, the overall average concentration for all firms over all industries and 
all countries. ?? represents the random intercept for an industry, capturing the effect for 
the  respective  industry  i,  in  country  c,  on  ownership  concentration.  Accordingly,  I 
                                                 
     
32Notation according to Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2005). Relative Importance of Industry-, and Country-Level     
Results    62 
 
assume that industries are nested in countries. On the one hand, firms are located in 
specific countries, as are the industries. On the other hand, most industries can be found 
across the world in almost any country, and so I could argue in favor of countries being 
nested in industries. However, I postulate that most industries have country specific 
characteristics, such as regulations, and Van der Elst (2004) empirically confirms this 
observation. Therefore, I treat the industries as nested in countries and not vice versa. 
Lastly, ? represents the random intercept for each country to measure the ownership 
concentration effect of the country-level. The final term, 𝜖???, is the residual / error term 
of the overall model.  
3.4.4  Results 
3.4.4.1  Descriptive Statistics and Analyses of Variance 
Table 19 shows the number of firms in each country represented in the sample and 
respective  descriptive  statistics  for  the  variable  cr5.  Looking  at  the  mean,  standard 
deviation, minimum, and maximum, I see that countries with a low, medium, as well as 
high average ownership concentration are included in the sample. Furthermore, whereas 
in all countries companies with highly dispersed and highly concentrated ownership are 
represented, mean values and standard deviations differ significantly. The US shows the 
lowest  average  concentration  at  24.71%,  and  Italy  the  highest  at  57.29%.  Another 
interesting observation is that the standard deviation of the ownership concentration 
does not seem to correlate with the ownership concentration itself. Brazil, on the one 
hand,  has,  at  51.24%,  a  relatively  high  concentration,  and  at  28.72%,  a  quite  high 
standard deviation. Italy, on the other hand, is, at 57.29%, similarly highly concentrated 
but has a much lower standard deviation of 19.56%.  Relative Importance of Industry-, and Country-Level     
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Table 19: Descriptive Statistics of cr5 by country 
 
 
Looking  at  the  industries  (Table  20),  the  difference  between  highly-  and  lowly-
concentrated industries is not as distinct as between countries, or even between single 
firms.  With  an  average  concentration  of  46.74%,  the  Construction  industry  has  the 
highest ownership concentration, and at 35.91% the Financial Service industry has the 
lowest average ownership concentration. 




3.4.4.2  Analyses of Variance of Country Differences 
Table  21  shows  the  results  of  an  ANOVA  testing  for  significant  differences  in 
ownership  concentration  between  countries.  The  ownership  concentration  varies 
significantly  between  countries  on  a  0.01  significance  level,  which  gives  a  first 
Country N mean min max sd
Japan 150 24.75 1.01 67.81 14.23
United-States 150 24.71 0.94 72.17 9.93
United Kingdom 150 32.47 8.90 77.01 12.79
Canada 150 34.61 1.49 93.09 20.7
Australia 150 38.31 0.75 96.27 20.99
Germany 150 48.51 1.02 99.75 27.49
Brazil 137 51.24 0.94 100 28.72
France 150 54.41 1.42 99.87 26.07
Italy 118 57.29 0.12 98.22 19.56
Total 1,305 40.19 0.12 100 23.94
Industry N mean min max sd
Mining 81 37.65 7.53 96.27 22.86
Finance, Insurance, Real-Estate 213 35.91 0.75 99.97 25.22
Manufacturing 487 39.92 1.35 99.75 22.87
Retail/Wholesale 163 40.74 0.94 98.24 23.91
Transportation 206 42.11 0.12 100 26.52
Services 123 44.66 4.58 94.02 20.93
Construction 32 46.74 10.89 97.23 23.42
Total 1,305 40.19 0.12 100 23.94Relative Importance of Industry-, and Country-Level     
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indication  for  the  relative  high  importance  of  the  country-level  for  the  level  of 
ownership concentration.  
Table 21: ANOVA of tcr5 by country 
 
Table  22  gives  a  more  detailed  view,  showing  pairwise  ANOVAs  of  cr5  for  all 
countries. The first column provides the name of the country, the second column the 
average concentration in the respective country. Columns 3–8 provide the p-values of 
the  ANOVAs.  Any  p-value  lower  than  0.05  indicates  a  significant  difference  in 
ownership  concentration  between  the  two  respective  countries.  On  first  sight,  the 
ANOVA table provides indication for two different groups of countries: Countries with 
relatively low ownership concentration (Japan, the US, the UK, Canada, and Australia) 
and countries with relatively high ownership concentration (Germany, Brazil, France, 
and Italy). Depending on the applied significance level, there is additional evidence for 
a third group of countries, comprising France and Italy, as on a 0.10 significance level 
their  level  of  ownership  concentration  is  systematically  different  from  the  one  of 
Germany and the ownership concentration in Italy differs from the one of Brazil.  
Table 22: Pairwise ANOVAs of tcr5 by countries 
 
Overall, these results provide confirmative evidence for the two concepts developed by 
Roe (2004) and LLSV (1998). As illustrated in the literature review, according to Roe, 
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F
Model 429.66 6 53.7 36.09 0.0000
Country 429.66 6 53.7 36.09 0.0000
Residual 1,913.87 1,298 1.48
Total 2,343.54 1,304 1,811
Number of obs = 1,305 R-Squared = 0.1833
Root MSE = 1.21993 Adj. R-Squared = 0.1783
Country Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Japan 24.75
(2) US 24.71 0.98
(3) UK 32.47 0 0
(4) Canada 34.61 0 0 0.28
(5) Australia 38.31 0 0 0 0.13
(6) Germany 48.51 0 0 0 0 0
(7) Brazil 51.24 0 0 0 0 0 0.41
(8) France 54.41 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.33
(9) Italy 57.29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.32Relative Importance of Industry-, and Country-Level     
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the ownership concentration of Continental-European countries will be lower than in 
Anglo-American countries. The ANOVA table shows that Germany, France, and Italy 
have a significantly different (higher) ownership concentration compared to the US, the 
UK, Canada, and Australia. However, why the ownership concentration in the US and 
the UK appears to significantly different cannot be explained at this point.  
According  to  LLSV‟s  theory,  the  variance  in  ownership  concentration  between 
countries  can  be  partly  attributed  to  differences  in  shareholder  protection  stemming 
from varying legal origins, which allows a slightly finer grained differentiation than 
Roe‟s (2004) argument. Table 22 shows that, generally, the common law countries (the 
US, the UK, Canada, and Australia) have a lower ownership concentration than the 
German  civil  law  countries  (Germany  and  Brazil),  which  have  a  lower  ownership 
concentration than the French civil law countries (Italy and France). Surprisingly, Japan 
has one of the lowest ownership concentrations among all countries included in the 
sample. Due to its German civil law roots, I would have expected a higher ownership 
concentration,  and  the  frequently  analyzed  Keiretsus,  controlling  vast  parts  of  the 
Japanese economy, seemed to confirm this idea. However, LLSV came to the same 
results as I did and reasoned that the legal system in Japan, despite its German civil law 
origin, was heavily influenced by the US after WWII, shaping a rather common law 
oriented legal system, with the according increase in shareholder protection, leading to a 
low ownership concentration. Furthermore, Miwa and Ramseyer (2002) actually found 
no evidence for significant cross holdings of the Keiretsus, and Kato, Lemmon, Luo, 
and Schallheim (2005) argued that the holdings by directors and managers are relatively 
low, as Japanese firms were not allowed to grant stock options until 1997, providing 
another  reason  for  the  low  level  of  concentration.  Overall,  the  low  ownership 
concentration in Japan seems to be surprising, though reasonable. 
The ANOVAs widely confirm the differences between the common law and civil law 
countries.  However,  there  is  limited  evidence  for  the  difference  in  ownership 
concentration between German and French civil law countries.  
Table 23 gives more insight into ownership differences between the three types of legal 
origins. The results clearly show that common law countries have the lowest ownership 
concentration,  German  civil  law  intermediate  concentration,  and  French  civil  law 
countries the highest ownership concentration. An ANOVA highlight the statistically Relative Importance of Industry-, and Country-Level     
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significant differences between these three groups of countries on a 0.01 significance 
level, and thus, clearly confirms the concept of LLSV (Table 24).  
Table 23: Descriptive Statistics of tcr5 by legalorigin 
 
Table 24: ANOVA of tcr5 by legalorigin 
 
3.4.4.3  Analyses of Variance of Industry Differences 
The descriptive statistics by industries (Table 20) already gave an indication that the 
industry-level  might  not  be  as  important  as  other  factors  influencing  the  level  of 
ownership concentration, as the variance between industries was rather low. Still, an 
ANOVA  (Table  25)  confirms  a  significant  difference  between  industries  on  a  0.05 
significance level.  
Table 25: ANOVA of tcr5 by industry 
 
As  for  the  countries,  I  calculated  pairwise  ANOVAs  for  the  industries.  Table  26 
illustrates the results. 
legalorigin N mean min max sd
Commow Law 600 32.52 0.75 96.27 17.5
German Civil Law 437 41.21 0.94 100 26.98
French Civil Law 268 55.68 0.12 99.87 23.43
Total 1,305 40.19 0.12 100 23.94
R-Squared = 0.0911
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F
Model 221.76 2 110.88 65.26 0.0000
legalorigin 221.76 2 110.88 65.26 0.0000
Residual 2,212.05 1,302 1.69
Total 2,433.05 1,304 1.86
Number of obs = 1,305
Root MSE = 1.30344 Adj. R-Squared = 0.0897
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F
Model 24.75 6 4.12 2.29 0.0330
Industry 24.75 6 4.12 2.29 0.0330
Residual 2,319.79 1,298 1.80
Total 2,343.54 1,304 575
Number of obs = 1,305 R-Squared = 0.0106
Root MSE = 1.34175 Adj. R-Squared = 0.0059Relative Importance of Industry-, and Country-Level     
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Table 26: Pairwise ANOVAs of tcr5 by industry 
 
Overall, the pairwise ANOVAs show a relatively diverse picture, which is not as clear-
cut as the one for the countries. With the exception of the group of Financial Services 
companies (2), most of the industries do not differ systematically from each other in 
terms of ownership concentration. On a 0.10 significance level, the Financial Services 
industry has a different (lower) ownership concentration than all other industries, except 
for Mining. As Financial Services industry typically is one of most strictly regulated 
one (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985), this partly confirms the importance of regulation for the 
level of the ownership concentration. However, taking a closer look, the evidence turns 
out to be only mediocre. In the light of a 0.05 instead of a 0.10 significance level, most 
of the ANOVAs are not statistically significant. Still, an ANOVA on the full sample 
using the regulation dummy variable and tcr5 confirms the significance of the regulation 
for the level of ownership concentration on a 0.05 significance level.  
Table 27: ANOVA of tcr5 by regulation 
 
Table 28 shows the results of ANOVAs of industry regulation and cr5 for different 
countries,  the  average  concentration  per  country  in  regulated  and  not  regulated 
industries, as well as the number of regulated firms in each country. 
Industry Mean (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) Mining 37.65
(2) Finance, Insurance, Real-Estate 35.91 0.73
(3) Manufacturing 39.92 0.44 0.1
(4) Retail 40.74 0.24 0.09 0.44
(5) Transportation 42.11 0.15 0.03 0.13 0.57
(6) Services 44.66 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.31 0.74
(7) Construction 46.74 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.22 0.48 0.46
R-Squared = 0.0047
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F
Model 11.09 1 11.09 6.20 0.0129
Industry 11.09 1 11.09 6.20 0.0129
Residual 2,332.44 1,303 1.79
Total 2,343.53 1,304 1.79
Number of obs = 1,305
Root MSE = 1.33793 Adj. R-Squared = 0.0040Relative Importance of Industry-, and Country-Level     
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Table 28: Comparison of cr5 by regulation and country 
 
Although  the  number  firms  in  regulated  industries  are  similarly  spread  over  all 
countries, the results show that only for the US, the UK, Canada, and Australia, industry 
regulation appears to have a significant effect on ownership concentration. Interestingly, 
all countries where industry regulation has a significant effect on ownership have a 
common law origin, which was not predicted by the theoretical concepts of Roe (2004) 
or LLSV and needs further discussion in subsequent parts of this essay. 
3.4.4.4  Regression Analyses 
The previous results of the analyses of industry- and country-level show the relevance 
of  both  levels  for  the  determination  of  the  ownership  concentration  of  a  firm.  The 
results,  however,  are  more  distinct  for  the  country-level  than  for  the  industry-level, 
which leads me to the conclusion that the relative importance of the country-level is 
higher than the one for the industry-level. Nevertheless, an empirical evaluation of the 
specific relative importance is still missing and to be addressed in the next paragraph.  
In the following, the  results of the estimation of model (1), and a variation  of this 
model, using the legal origin and the regulation dummy as random intercepts instead of 
the  country  and  the  industry  dummies,  are  presented.  Calculating  the  ICC  for  both 
grouping variables industry (ICC of 0.01) and country (ICC of 0.19) strengthens the 
preliminary findings of previous analysis that the country-, compared to the industry-
level, has a higher relative importance for the ownership concentration. On the other 
hand, both levels of ICCs highlight the necessity for a random intercept model to avoid 
the explained alpha inflation. 
Countries ANOVA regulated unregulated Freq.
United-Kingdom 0.01 22.76 25.24 32
United-States 0.02 29.22 33.28 30
Canada 0.04 32.18 35.56 42
Australia 0.00 31.51 40.78 40
Japan 0.37 22.81 25.25 31
Germany 0.13 53.08 47.37 30
Brazil 0.21 55.34 49.37 43
France 0.33 47.86 55.66 24
Italy 0.35 51.17 58.70 22
Average cr5Relative Importance of Industry-, and Country-Level     
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Table 29 shows the calculated variance components, standard errors (in brackets), and 
residuals for the random intercepts [industry and country for model (1) and regulation 
and legalorigin for model (2)]. 
Table 29: Variance Components of Random Intercept Model 
 
The overall variance of model (1) sums up to 592.92, whereas country explains 150.18, 
and industry (in interaction with country) 12.51 of the total variance of the model. This 
equals an explained variance of 2.11% (12.51 / 592.92) by industry and 25.33% (150.18 
/ 592.92) by country. The relatively low standard errors (6.89 and 78.06, respectively) 
of  both  industry  and  country  highlight  the  significance  of  both  levels  for  the 
determination of ownership concentration.
33 These results ultimately confirm the theory 
and the impression of the previously conducted analyses, and show the high importance 
of the country-level and the relative low importance of the industry-level.  
Existing studies  and the analyses of the previous paragraphs suggest that for the 
country-level  the legal origin, and for the industry -level the regulation,  are the key 
drivers of ownership concentration for the respec tive levels. Accordingly, model (2) 
uses two different random intercepts , namely the already previously used  regulation 
dummy, and a new dummy variable, legalorigin. According to the estimated variance 
components,  legalorigin  explains  118.56  of  the  total  variance,  equaling  19%  of 
explained variance. Regulation, in interaction with legalorigin, accounts for 11.80 or 
1.9% of the total variance. Compared to model (1), model (2) shows that both dummies 
                                                 
      
33The model with the alternative structure  of countries being nested in industries did not converge 










Total Variance 592.92 623.96
a = Dummy Variable                         Standard Errors in ParenthesesRelative Importance of Industry-, and Country-Level     
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account for major variance of the country- and industry-level; particularly regulation 
seems to explain most of the industry effect. Similarly, the legalorigin variable, explains 
a significant share of the country-level. 
3.4.5  Preliminary Conclusion 
3.4.5.1  Discussion 
The aim of this essay was to assess the relative importance of industry- and country-
level factors for the determination of ownership concentration. Within the course of the 
investigation I used ANOVAs and a hierarchical random-intercept model to determine 
the explained variance of the industry- and country-level. Using a sample of 1,305 firms 
from nine countries, there is theoretical and empirical evidence that both country and 
industry  matter  significantly  for  the  determination  of  ownership  concentration. 
However, the analyses show that whereas the country-level has with roughly 25% a 
strong effect on the ownership concentration, the industry-level has with 2% only minor 
impact.  Furthermore,  among  the  country-level  determinants,  the  legal-origin  of  a 
country‟s corporate governance system (common law, German civil law, or French civil 
law) significantly influences the ownership concentration. On the industry-level, there is 
evidence that the industry regulation plays the most important role of all industry-level 
determinants; still, the total effect is weak. 
Although the empirical results of the already existing studies partly suggested that the 
importance  of  the  country-level  outweighs  the  importance  of  the  industry-level,  the 
actual magnitude of the difference in the relative importance is somewhat surprising, as 
– compared to the influence of the country-level – the industry-level plays an almost 
negligible role. In the light of the results it is questionable, whether the analyses of the 
industry-level actually promise valuable insights into the allocation of ownership rights. 
At the country-level, it appears that the differences between common-, German civil-, 
and French civil law strongly drive the ownership concentration in a country. However, 
as  illustrated  in  the  literature  review,  the  hypothesis  initially  formulated  by  LLSV 
(1998) is not undisputed. Still, despite the criticism brought forward by both Braendle 
and Coffee, the theoretical hypotheses and the empirical evidence match too well than 
that I would dismiss LLSV‟s concepts, particularly since neither Braendle nor Coffee 
provide viable alternative concepts. Relative Importance of Industry-, and Country-Level     
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For the industry-level, the literature review identified several industry factors as having 
an  influence  on  the  ownership  concentration.  Despite  the  relative  high  number  of 
factors,  my  analyses  show  that  the  total  importance  of  industry  factors  for  the 
determination of ownership concentration is relatively low, and that industry regulation 
appears to account for the largest part of the total industry effect. However, the effect of 
industry regulation appears to be statistically significant in common law countries only 
and not in German- or French civil law countries. This could be explained either by a 
particularly high regulation in the common law countries or by an alternative so far 
unobserved  moderating  country  effect,  which  influences  industry-  and  firm-specific 
drivers of ownership concentration. I argue that the differences in shareholder protection 
due to different legal origins outweigh the effect of industry regulation on ownership 
concentration. The ownership increasing effect of a lower shareholder protection in the 
civil law countries renders smaller ownership stakes so unattractive, that the ownership 
increasing effect of regulated industries has no significant effect. However, to address 
this question in detail, an industry regulation index for a variety of countries would be 
necessary.  
When interpreting the identified industry-effect, an issue to be considered is the tested 
sample.  All  included  firms  are  large  and  publicly  traded  firms,  which  are  typically 
highly  diversified,  and  thus,  active  in  several  industries.  Accordingly,  it  is  not  too 
surprising that the identified industry-effect is rather small, as the high diversification 
necessarily dilutes the effect of single industries. 
Evaluating the key contributions of this study, it was one of the intentions to pinpoint 
the direction for future research of the determinants of ownership concentration. On the 
one hand, looking at the results of the country-level analyses, compared to the relative 
high importance of this level, remarkably few studies have focused on this particular 
group of influence factors. On the other hand, despite the relatively low importance of 
the  industry-level,  many  studies  include  the  effect  of  industry-specific  factors.  This 
clearly  shows  that  some  of  the  existing  studies  focused  exclusively  on  a  group  of 
influence factors hardly possessing explanatory power. Accordingly, to proceed with the 
research  on  determinants  of  ownership  concentration,  I  suggest  that  more  attention 
should  be  paid  to  the  country-level  determinants  of  ownership  concentration. 
Particularly, a better understanding of the effects of corporate governance systems on 
ownership  concentration,  potentially  in  the  light  of  the  Braendle‟s  (2006)  criticism, Relative Importance of Industry-, and Country-Level     
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promises  valuable  insights  with  meaningful  implications.  Furthermore,  additional 
determinants of ownership concentration might be identified, for example, the study of 
Jong and Semenov (2006), who focus on cultural differences and potential implications 
for ownership concentration.  
Looking at the industry-level determinants, particularly the interplay of the country- and 
industry-level  provides  room  for  extensive  research.  Particularly,  constructing  the 
already mentioned industry regulation index could provide valuable insights in this area.  
In terms of policy implications, the interdependence of industry and country rules and 
the respective moderating effects for the determinants of ownership concentration is the 
most  important  finding.  Disregarding  this  significance  of  the  national  corporate 
governance system for regulation will lead to inefficient or even useless policy making 
in terms of regulation.  
In terms of theory development, the analyses confirm what I indicated in the hypotheses 
development  chapter. The results  show that institutional  economics  is  of significant 
importance for the determination of the level of ownership concentration of a firm and, 
besides the principal-agent view, has to be included in any future ownership framework. 
However, the institutional differences between industries are not as pronounced or are 
simply less important than the institutional differences between countries.  
Looking at implications for practitioners, the results provide only limited guidance. In 
terms  of  corporate  governance,  my  results  question  the  effectiveness  of  industry 
regulation. Furthermore, it becomes clear that the country-level has to be considered for 
foreign expansions and investments. The ownership structures of firms can apparently 
differ substantially from those in the home country for good reasons.  
3.4.5.2  Limitations 
The study is subject to several limitations to be addressed in future research. First, as 
mentioned  before,  the  measure  of  the  industry  and  country  variables  is  relatively 
imprecise. To get a better picture of the main industry and country a firm is active in, 
more details on the revenues generated in the respective industries and countries would 
have been helpful to create a weighted industry and country index. Unfortunately, to my 
knowledge,  such  a  sample  with  this  kind  of  information  for  a  large  sample  of 
international firms is not available.  Relative Importance of Industry-, and Country-Level     
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Second, the sample comprises only relatively large and publicly listed firms, and even 
for those the complete ownership structure is not available. An even bigger sample than 
the one used, including ownership information on smaller and not-listed firms would 
potentially provide further insights into the determination of ownership concentration. 
Third, the sample includes mostly highly developed countries. Brazil is the only country 
included in my analysis, which is widely considered as an emerging economy. Future 
analysis  might  be  able  to  gather  more  ownership  information  from  less-developed 
countries, such as China, India, and Russia, and potentially gain valuable insights from 
analyzing  the  ownership  structure  under  these  circumstances.  As  there  are  more 
dynamics  in  a  less  developed  market  and  the  institutional  environment  is  typically 
changing much faster, important insights in the allocation of ownership rights might be 
gained. 
Fourth, additional country-specific determinants of ownership concentration should be 
included in the analyses. As described above, some authors identified industry-level 
factors based on firm-level factors (e.g., firm size and industry-specific firm size). The 
same technique can be applied to identify additional country-level factors. The industry 
regulation, for example, has attracted a lot of attention, but a country-specific regulation 
has so far not been analyzed. 
Finally, the study relies on cross-sectional data. Adding a time-perspective, that is, using 
panel data over several decades would enable the research to gain valuable insights into 
the changes in ownership structure over time.  
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3.5  Explanatory Power of Firm-, Industry-, and Country-Level 
Determinants 
The following sections constitute the second essay of this thesis. Building on the results 
of the previous chapter, this essay addresses the second research question dealing with 
the identification and analysis of the key determinants of ownership concentration and 
their explanatory power.  
3.5.1  Introduction 
Since the seminal work of Demsetz and Lehn, several studies, such as those of Thomsen 
and Pedersen (1998), Van der Elst (2004), and La Porta, et al. (1999), showed that not 
only firm-, but also industry- and country-specific factors drive the level of ownership 
concentration of firms significantly.  
Comparing the relative importance of these different levels of influence factors, the 
analyses in the previous essay found that, besides the firm-level, the country-level has a 
strong  influence  on  the  determination  on  ownership  concentration,  whereas  the 
industry-level plays only a subordinate role. Yet, a better understanding of the mode of 
action of the country-level has been the subject of relatively few studies. Many of the 
existing studies analyzed samples solely containing firms from one country [e.g., from 
the US in the study of Demsetz  and  Lehn (1985), or Japan in the study of Prowse 
(1992)], neglecting international differences at all. The few studies including several 
countries  in  their  analyses  frequently  focused  on  particular  geographic  regions,  for 
example,  Europe  (Pedersen  &  Thomsen,  1999;  Thomsen  &  Pedersen,  1997,  1998, 
2000). Additionally, most studies focused solely on one of the mentioned levels, while 
not controlling for the effects of the other two levels. Accordingly, we do not know how 
much  the  identified  drivers  of  ownership  concentration  eventually  explain  of  the 
observed variance in total, and on the firm-, industry-, and country-levels, respectively. 
Furthermore, in terms of statistical methods, most of the existing studies rely on OLS 
regressions. However, due the nested structure of firms, industries, and countries, OLS 
estimators  can  yield  biased  results,  which  is  why  I  rely  on  HLMs  to  assess  the 
explanatory power of the identified determinants. 
The subsequent study accounts for the previously identified issues. In the following, 
based on the results of existing studies, I will identify the most significant drivers of 
ownership  concentration  of  the  firm-,  industry-,  and-  country-levels.  Afterwards,  I Explanatory Power of Firm-, Industry-, and Country-Level Determinants     
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evaluate  the  by  the  identified  factors  explained  variance.  Using  a  cross  sectional, 
international  sample  of  900  firms  from  nine  countries,  the  empirical  analyses  will 
account for the nested structure of the data, and I will control for interaction effects of 
the respective levels. 
The results of the analyses contribute to the existing research on the ownership structure 
of firms. Identifying the most important drivers of ownership concentration and their 
explanatory power will help to focus future research on the most meaningful factors, 
potentially  decomposing  the  effect  in  separate  parts  to  gain  further  insights  in  the 
allocation of ownership rights. The analyses will help to understand where we actually 
stand in the research of the determinants of ownership structure, and indicate how far 
we eventually might be able to go in explaining the observed variance in ownership 
structure across firms, industries, and countries. In terms of policy implications, the 
determination of the key factors will help to evaluate which regulatory measures might 
be effective and which might not.  
The  essay  is  structured  as  follows.  In  one  of  the  previous  sections,  I  reviewed  the 
existing  literature  dealing  with  the  determinants  of  ownership  concentration  and 
described the econometric methods used in the subsequent analyses. I also illustrated 
the data set for this essay in the beginning of the thesis. Thus, subsequently I derive 
hypotheses  and  explain  the  statistical  model.  Afterwards,  I  describe  the  results  and 
discuss their importance with respect to the theoretical propositions developed at the 
outset.  Lastly,  I  derive  the  key  conclusions  and  implications,  providing 
recommendations for future research.  
3.5.2  Development of Hypotheses 
Based on the theory and literature review in section 3.2, I formulate hypotheses for the 
firm-, industry-, and country-level determinants in this section. The hypotheses will be 
tested within the scope of the statistical analyses. 
3.5.2.1  Firm-Level 
From all three levels, the results illustrated in the literature review show that firm-level 
determinants of ownership concentration are the most consistent and least doubted ones. 
As mentioned in the review, several studies have confirmed both hypotheses initially 
brought forward by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) predicting a negative effect of firm size Explanatory Power of Firm-, Industry-, and Country-Level Determinants     
Development of Hypotheses    76 
 
and  an  inverted-u-shaped  effect  of  firm  risk.  Since  there  is  neither  theoretical  nor 
empirical evidence questioning the predicted effects, I agree with the presented line of 
arguments and accordingly formulate the following two hypotheses for the firm-level: 
Hypothesis 1a: The size of a firm has a negative effect on the level of ownership 
concentration. 
Hypothesis 1b: The risk of a firm has a curvilinear (inverted u-shaped) effect on the 
level of ownership concentration. 
3.5.2.2  Industry-Level  
Compared  to  the  firm-level,  a  different  picture  is  drawn  for  the  industry-level 
determinants.  Whereas  several  industry-influence  factors  of  ownership  concentration 
have been identified, empirical evidence and theoretical arguments are inconclusive. 
As illustrated in the literature review, theory predicts a negative relationship between 
industry regulation and ownership concentration due to the decreased benefits of block / 
majority  holdings.  However,  the  empirical  evidence  is  not  conclusive  for  different 
countries (Crespi-Cladera, 1996; Gedajlovic, 1993; Van der Elst, 2004). Similarly, in 
the previous essay, I find a significant effect of regulation on ownership concentration 
in  common  law  countries,  only.  I  argue  that,  first,  the  effect  of  regulation  can  be 
influenced  by  country-level  factors  and,  second,  that  the  extent  of  the  industry 
regulation can differ from country to country. Accordingly, since the sample I analyze 
contains various countries with different legal origins, it is unclear whether there will be 
a significant effect of industry regulation on ownership concentration, or not. Thus, I 
refrain  from  formulating  a  specific  hypothesis  regarding  the  effect  of  industry 
regulation. 
Similarly, the overall effect of the industry-level determinants identified by Thomsen 
and  Pedersen  (1998)  is  uncertain.  Looking  at  the  hypotheses  brought  forwarded  by 
Thomsen and Pedersen regarding the information asymmetries, competition, and life 
cycle stage of an industry, I argue that for all three factors opposing arguments can be 
formulated.  In  terms  of  information  asymmetries,  I  argue  that  there  is  not  only  an 
ownership decreasing effect. Whereas the benefits of monitoring might decrease with 
higher information asymmetries, they can also lead to a higher need for thorough and 
effective monitoring, thus, resulting in a higher ownership concentration. Similarly, for Explanatory Power of Firm-, Industry-, and Country-Level Determinants     
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the effect regarding the competition in an industry, I could also argue by the “control 
potential” introduced by Demsetz and Lehn (1985). According to the control potential, a 
high competition requires fast and efficient decisions to ensure the competitiveness of a 
company,  and  thus,  favors  higher  ownership  concentration  (Demsetz,  1973).  Third, 
looking at the life cycle stage, young and entrepreneurial owned companies are unlikely 
to  disclose  their  ownership  concentration,  and  are  normally  not  included  in  the 
ownership studies. Generally, since the companies mostly included in ownership studies 
are the biggest, publicly listed firms in a country, most of them can be found in rather 
mature industries, including relatively mature companies. In addition to that, there are 
no  precise  proxies  for  the  constructs  of  information  asymmetries  and  competition, 
further  diluting  the  anyhow  theoretically  uncertain  effects  (Aboody  &  Lev,  2000; 
Shastri  &  Clarke,  2001).  Furthermore,  as  shown  by  the  previous  essay,  the  total 
industry-effect, particularly in an international context, has a rather weak effect on the 
ownership  concentration.  Accordingly,  the  effect  of  any  industry-characteristic, 
representing only a part of the total industry effect, can be marginal at best. In total, as 
in the case of the industry-regulation, the effect of the previously described industry-
level effects is unclear, and in addition to that, difficult to measure due to its expected 
magnitude. Accordingly, I once more refrain from formulating specific hypotheses due 
to the default of a clear theoretical argument. 
In total, I was not able to formulate an irrefutable hypothesis for any of the identified 
industry  factors.  Accordingly,  investigating  the  industry  effects  will  be  subject  to 
explorative analyses. 
3.5.2.3  Country-Level  
According to the literature review, LLSV (1998) and Roe (2004) identified the legal 
origin and the shareholder protection of a country as the key determinants of ownership 
concentration.  Despite  the  criticism  of  Coffee  (1999,  2001a,  2001b)  and  Braendle 
(2006), I follow the arguments by LLSV and Roe. I argue, in contrast to Coffee and 
Braendle, that the dispersed ownership structure in the common law countries did not 
develop in the absence of corporate governance systems, but that both, the dispersed 
ownership  and  the  respective  institutional  framework,  developed  simultaneously. 
Furthermore, whether the level of ownership concentration influenced the legal system 
or vice versa would - at least empirically - not make a difference. Thus, I hypothesize in 
accordance with LLSV and Roe that the legal origin of a country will have a significant Explanatory Power of Firm-, Industry-, and Country-Level Determinants     
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effect on the level of ownership concentration by means of the level of shareholder 
protection and the employee influence on the firm. Accordingly, I argue that a high 
level of shareholder protection renders minority ownership stakes more attractive and 
thus increases the level of ownership concentration. However, I expect that the legal 
origin, as a rather rough measure, will pick up several other country effects potentially 
influencing the ownership concentration, and therefore, will have a stronger effect on 
the  level  of  ownership  concentration  than  the  level  of  shareholder  protection. 
Accordingly, I formulate the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2a: The legal origin of a country has a significant effect on the level 
of ownership concentration. In detail, the ownership concentration of firms will 
be the highest in French civil law countries, second highest in German civil law 
countries, and lowest in common law countries. 
Hypothesis 2b: The level of shareholder protection has a negative effect on the 
level  of  ownership  concentration,  which is  weaker  than  the  one  of  the  legal 
origin of a country. 
Additionally, I agree with the argument brought forward by  Thomsen and Pedersen 
(1997) and confirmed by Jong and Semenov (2006), that the development of a stock 
market  in  a  country  has  a  significant  negative  effect  on  the  level  of  ownership 
concentration. The bigger the size and the more liquid a stock market is, the more likely 
the probability is for a firm to go public due to the decreasing cost of capital. Since 
going public typically multiplies the number of owners, the ownership concentration 
will decrease significantly, leading to a negative effect of the development of a stock 
market on ownership concentration. Thus, I formulate the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2c: The level of stock market development has a negative effect on 
the level of ownership concentration. 
Lastly, whereas Jong and Semenov‟s (2006) study is the only analysis of cultural effects 
on ownership concentration so far, I agree with the arguments brought forward by the 
authors. According to Jong and Semenov, the higher the uncertainty avoidance in a 
country  is,  the  less  developed  is  the  stock  market  and  the  lower  is  the  level  of 
shareholder  protection,  and  accordingly,  the  higher  is  average  level  of  ownership 
concentration.  Although  the  culture  in  a  country  is  highly  complex  with  various 
characteristics,  I include Hofstede‟s (2001) uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) only, Explanatory Power of Firm-, Industry-, and Country-Level Determinants     
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since,  according  to  Jong  and  Semenov,  the  uncertainty  avoidance  has  -  among  the 
cultural  dimensions  developed  by  Hofstede  -  the  strongest  effect  on  the  level  of 
ownership concentration in a country.  Following this line of arguments, I formulate the 
last hypothesis for the country-level as follows. 
Hypothesis 2d: The level of uncertainty avoidance in a country has a positive 
effect on the level of ownership concentration. 
3.5.2.4  Explained Variance 
As mentioned in the introduction, despite the substantial research on the determinants of 
ownership  concentration,  it  remains  unclear  how  much  of  the  observed  variance  in 
ownership concentration between firms, industries, and countries can be explained by 
the identified influence factors. As there is no clear theoretical framework providing an 
answer to this question, I will address this question in an explorative way, and not 
derive explicit hypotheses. 
Starting  with  the  country-level,  I  expect  that  the  estimated  models  will  explain  the 
largest  part  of  variance  between  countries  for  two  reasons.  First,  the  determinants 
included in the model, and amongst those in particular the legal origin, pick up a wide 
range of factors having a direct or indirect effect on ownership concentration, such as 
the shareholder protection, development of a stock market, cultural effects, and other 
determinants we are not aware of, yet. Second, due to the restricted sample size, the 
relatively high number of variables (up to 16 in the full model) necessarily leads to an 
(artificially) high explanation in variance.  
At  the  industry-level,  I  argue  that  a  significant,  though  minor  part  of  the  observed 
variance will be explained by the estimations. As mentioned above, the total industry 
effect  is  relatively  small  and  one  of  the  identified  major  industry  effects,  industry 
regulation, is not even significant for all countries. I also take into consideration that 
differences in ownership concentration between industries are doubtlessly subject to 
random effects, it is probable that the previously identified variables can only explain a 
minor share of the systematic variance in ownership concentration. Additionally, the 
companies  in  the  sample  are  rather  large  and  significantly  diversified,  diluting  the 
industry effect, thus making it even harder to identify systematic industry differences. 
Although the number of industry clusters is much higher than the number of country Explanatory Power of Firm-, Industry-, and Country-Level Determinants     
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clusters, the number of variables is relatively high, inflating the explained variance to a 
certain extent as for the country-level. 
Looking at the firm-level, I argue that only a minor part of the variance in ownership 
concentration  can  be  explained.  After  all,  from  all  three  levels,  the  variance  in 
ownership  structure  is  the  highest  on  the  firm-level,  which  is  not  surprising  as 
ownership  structure  itself  is  a  firm-specific  phenomenon.  Accordingly,  on  the  firm-
level,  the  part  of  the  variance  in  ownership  concentration  suspect  to  random 
effects/unsystematic  differences  will  be  the  highest  and  cannot  be  explained.  The 
previously identified variables have been shown in existing studies to influence the level 
of ownership concentration. However, more influence factors have not been identified 
yet and potentially might be hard to test for [e.g., the private benefits mentioned by 
Lamba  and  Stapledon  (2001)  and  Bebchuk  (1999)].  Unlike  for  the  country-  and 
industry-level, the number of firms is sufficiently high that I do not expect an „artificial‟ 
effect by the number of variables on the explained variance.  
3.5.3  Statistical Model 
In this section, I will describe the statistical model applied in the subsequent analyses. 
The sample and the variables will not be described as they have been illustrated in 
chapter 2. 
The analyses in the subsequent sections rely on the following hierarchical mixed model 
with two random intercepts and several additional covariates
34: 
 1  ???? = ((𝗽1 + ??) + ?) + 𝗽2?2??? + ..+ 𝗽?????? + 𝜖???  
In this equation, ???? represents the ownership concentration of firm f, primarily active 
in  industry  i,  and  headquartered  in  country  c.  The  first  right-hand-side  term  is  the 
constant term 𝗽1, the overall average concentration for all firms over all industries and 
all countries. ?? represents the random intercept for the industry-level to evaluate the 
effect  of  the  respective  industry  i  in  country  c,  on  ownership  concentration. 
Accordingly, I assume, as in the previous essay, that industries are nested in countries. 
? denotes the random-intercept for each country, capturing the ownership concentration 
effect of the country-level. 𝗽2?2??? + ..+ 𝗽?????? represent the fixed part of the model, 
                                                 
     
34Notation according to Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2005). Explanatory Power of Firm-, Industry-, and Country-Level Determinants     
Results    81 
 
that is the covariates. The final term, 𝜖???, is the residual / error term of the overall 
model. 
3.5.4  Results 
3.5.4.1  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 30 to Table 32 report the descriptive statistics on the sample, including mean, 
maxima, minima, and number of firms per industry, country, and for the full sample. 
The statistics show that there is a high variance in ownership concentration between 
firms,  industries,  and  countries.  The  US  and  the  Mining  industry  show  the  lowest 
concentration  at  22.32%  and  35.20%,  respectively,  and  Italy  (56.48%)  and  the 
Construction industry (48.51%) the highest. 
Table 30: Descriptive Statistics of cr5 by country 
 
Table 31: Descriptive Statistics of cr5 by industry 
 
Country N mean min max sd
Australia 100 36.13 0.75 95.56 20.78
Brazil 100 46.7 0.94 98.8 28.4
Canada 100 31.75 1.49 93.09 20.48
France 100 52.48 2.17 99.87 24.22
Germany 100 48.44 1.02 99.75 27.77
Italy 100 56.48 0.12 98.22 20.71
Japan 100 23.19 6.36 64.47 12.87
United Kingdom 100 30.96 8.90 77.01 13.21
United States 100 22.32 0.94 51.21 7.72
Total 900 38.72 0.12 99.87 23.81
Industry N mean min max sd
Mining 63 35.2 7.53 91.26 23.22
Finance, Insurance, Real-Estate 164 34.6 0.75 99.65 24.58
Manufacturing 343 38.16 4.85 99.75 22.49
Retail/Wholesale 88 39.39 2.17 95.56 22.92
Transportation 151 42.26 0.12 99.87 26.47
Services 67 42.58 4.58 94.02 22.54
Construction 24 48.51 18.73 97.23 22.24
Total 900 38.72 0.12 99.87 23.81Explanatory Power of Firm-, Industry-, and Country-Level Determinants     
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Table 32: Descriptive Statistics of all Variables 
 
Table 33 shows the correlation matrix for all variables used in the analyses. First, the 
correlation  coefficients  of  cr5  give  an  indication  of  the  effect  of  the  variables  on 
ownership concentration. All correlation coefficients with the dependent variable widely 
carry the expected signs and significance levels.  
Second, the size of few correlation coefficients of the independent variables merit a 
closer look (Mela & Kopalle, 2002). Apparently, the firm risk is highly correlated with 
the squared term of the firm risk (0.95). In addition, the level of shareholder protection 
and the level of uncertainty avoidance correlate highly with the dummy variable for the 
legal origin (-0.75 and -0.46). However, since correlation coefficients for continuous 
and categorical variables have only a weak significance, and, most importantly, I do not 
intend to include these variables in the same regression models, this will not lead to 
statistical  problems  (Mela  &  Kopalle,  2002).  More  problematic  are  the  significant 
correlations of the firm size (logmarketcap) with the development of the stock market 
(logstockmarket) (0.50), and the level of shareholder protection (shareholderprotection) 
with the level of uncertainty avoidance (uai) (0.66). Content wise, the correlation of 
logstockmarket and logmarketcap, seems to be a mere statistical artifact stemming from 
taking the logarithm, as the initially variables (stockmarket and marketcap) are almost 
uncorrelated (0.05). In order to mitigate the effect of the high correlations, I address this 
issue within the scope of the regression analyses as described below. 
Third, the generally high correlation of the different country variables suggests a close 
interaction with, and dependence on each other, meriting a closer look in the discussion 
part of this study.  
 
Variable mean max min sd
logmarketcap 9.23 16.64 4.28 2.41
risk -0.91 0.3 -2.55 0.4
firmrisk_sqr -0.99 0.1 -6.5 0.85
shareholderprotection 76.67 90 50 16.34
logstockmarket 14.84 16.57 13.89 0.79
uai 72 91 38 18
industryrnd 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.01
industrycompetition 0.07 1.99 0.0 0.17
industrylifecycle 11.27 25.29 3.03 3.97
cr5 38.72 99.87 0.12 23.81Explanatory Power of Firm-, Industry-, and Country-Level Determinants     
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I  use  three  alternative  techniques  to  account  for  the  high  correlations  of  several 
variables to ensure the reliability of the estimation results. First, I control for the size of 
the variance inflation factors of the models. Second, I use two separate techniques to 
mitigate  the  previously  shown  correlations,  namely  orthogonalization  and  marginal 
derivatives. 
In  detail,  on  the  one  hand,  I  orthogonalize  the  highly  correlated  variables 
logstockmarket / logmarketcap and shareholderprotection / uai (McCallum, 1970). As 
shown in the previous essay, the variance in ownership concentration is the highest on 
the firm-level, and significantly lower on the country-level. Thus, I use the firm-specific 
variable  logmarketcap  as  primary  variable  and  the  country-specific  variable 
logstockmarket as secondary variable for the orthogonalization. For the second pair of 
variables,  I  use  the  uncertainty  avoidance  as  primary  variable,  as  the  culture  in  a 
country, according to Jong & Semenov (2006) and Hofstede (2001), is one of the most 
deeply rooted institutional characteristics in a country and thus will pick-up the main 
effect.  
On  the  other  hand,  as  robustness  test  to  the  orthogonalization,  I  use  an  alternative 
technique, namely marginal analysis, to control for the high correlations and compare 
the results with the estimation using the orthogonalized variables. To do so, I include 
multiplicative  interaction  terms  for  the  respective  variables  in  the  regressions. 
Afterwards, I use marginal derivatives to determine the isolated effect on the level of 
ownership concentration. I derive these marginal derivatives by calculating the marginal 




                                                 
      
35The newest version of the statistical software used, Stata 11, comes with a special set of tools 
(“margins”) for marginal analysis which I used for the mentioned analysis. Explanatory Power of Firm-, Industry-, and Country-Level Determinants     










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
(1) logmarketcap 1
(2) risk 0.14*** 1
(3) risk_sqr 0.11*** 0.95*** 1
(4) legalorigin -0.19*** -0.17*** -0.18*** 1
(5) shareholderprotection 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.17*** -0.75*** 1
(6) logstockmarket 0.50*** 0.12*** 0.10*** -0.28*** 0.42*** 1
(7) uai -0.25*** 0.18*** 0.15*** -0.46*** 0.66*** 0.25*** 1
(8) regulation
a 0.07** 0.02 0.03 -0.07** 0.02 -0.06* -0.01 1
(9) industryrnd -0.01 -0.07** -0.11*** 0.10*** -0.06* 0.08** -0.03 -0.23*** 1
(10) industrycompetition -0.33*** -0.04 -0.03 0.14*** -0.13*** -0.26*** 0.07** -0.07** 0.05 1
(11) industrylifecycle 0.02 0.31*** 0.33*** -0.20*** 0.18*** -0.06* 0.15*** 0.05 -0.33*** 0.05 1
(12) cr5 -0.41*** -0.20*** -0.15*** 0.39*** -0.28*** -0.32*** -0.11*** -0.04 -0.01 0.20*** -0.06*
a Dummy Variable
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01Explanatory Power of Firm-, Industry-, and Country-Level Determinants     
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3.5.4.2  Regression Analyses 
Subsequently, I provide the estimation results of the previously presented hierarchical 
mixed models and assess the in the beginning of this essay formulated hypotheses. In 
total, I will estimate five different models. First, the null model, containing just the 
random intercepts. The null model will be used as reference point to evaluate the by the 
in the subsequent models added covariates explained variance at the firm-, industry-, 
and country-level. Second, I estimate the Basic-Model-I, containing only the in other 
studies‟  frequently  and  successfully  tested  determinants  of  ownership  concentration, 
namely firm size, firm risk, industry regulation, and legal origin. As a variation of the 
basic model, I exchange the legal origin covariate by the shareholder protection measure 
to compare the respective effects (Basic-Model-II). Third, I estimate the full model, 
containing all residual determinants identified in the theory section but not included in 
the  models  so  far  (Full-Model-I).  Also,  the  same  variation  as  for  Basic-Model-I 
(shareholder protection instead of legal origin) is tested (Full-Model-II). 
 
Table 34 shows the estimations of the Null Model, the Basic Model, and the variation of 
the  Basic  Model,  including  the  measure  for  shareholder  protection  instead  of  the 
dummy variables for the legal origin. Explanatory Power of Firm-, Industry-, and Country-Level Determinants     
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Table 34: Estimations of the Null, Basic-Model-I, and Model-Basic-II Model 
 
The estimation of the Null-Model shows a variance of 135 at the country-level, nine at 
the industry-level, and 420 at the firm- (and thus also the residual) level, accounting for 
a total variance of 564 for the whole null-model. These results confirm the observation 
of  the  previous  essays,  highlighting  the  importance  of  the  country-level  and  the 
subordinate role of the industry-level. Subsequently, this null-model is the reference 
point for all estimations; that is, all percentage values indicate how much of the variance 
of the respective level is explained by the included variables.  
Basic  Model  I  includes  covariates  on  the  firm-,  industry-,  and  country-level  in  the 
model, whereas the legal origin is represented by three dummies (1 = common law = 
base case; 2 = German civil law; 3 = French civil law). In total, the model explains 31% 
of the overall variance. The included firm-level covariates explain almost 6% of the 
variance on the firm-level, and all three covariates are highly significant on a 0.01 level 
and carry the expected signs. The regulation of an industry is not significant, although 
reducing  56%  of  the  industry  variance.  Interestingly,  the  country-level  variance  is 
explained  to  100%  by  the  two  included  dummies  for  the  legal  origins,  which  are 
correspondingly  highly  significant  on  a  0.01  level  and  indicate  that  the  ownership 
coef se coef se coef se
Firm-Level
logmarketcap -3.348*** (0.343) -2.952*** (0.491)
risk 27.700*** (5.788) 28.172*** (5.851)
risk_sqr -10.735*** (2.683) -10.874*** (2.711)
Firm-Level Variance (% Explained)
c 24 (6%) 34 (8%)
Industry-Level
regulation
a -0.101 (1.701) -0.368 (1.776)
Industry-Level Variance (% Explained)







Country-Level Variance (% Explained)
c
135 (100%) 103 (76%)
Constant 38.923*** (3.959) 76.616*** (4.057) 105.090*** (10.668)
Observations 900 900 900
Total Variance (% Explained) 564 174 (31%) 140 (25%)
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01
a Dummy Variable
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concentration is the highest in the French civil law countries, intermediate in German 
civil law countries, and the lowest in the base case for common law countries.  
To further investigate the country-level effect on the level of ownership concentration, I 
exchange the legal origin dummies for the shareholder protection measure and estimate 
Basic Model II. The effects of the firm- and industry-level variables are robust to this 
change.  The  variable  measuring  the  shareholder  protection  in  a  country 
(shareholderprotection) has a highly significant (0.01 level) negative effect on the level 
of ownership concentration. The total explained variance drops to 25%. On the country-
level, the explained variance drops by almost 25%, and interestingly, the at the industry-
level explained variance drops by over 30%. These results, on the one hand, confirm my 
expectation that the shareholder protection is one of the major drivers of ownership 
concentration in the light of the legal origin of a country. On the other hand, the results 
highlight that there is much more to the legal origin than just the shareholder protection, 
even influencing the effect of industry-level determinants on the level of ownership 
concentration. 
Accordingly,  evaluating  the  first  of  the  previously  formulated  hypotheses,  I  find 
confirmatory  evidence  for  hypotheses  1a,  1b,  2a,  and  2b.  First,  on  the  firm-level, 
hypothesis 1a states that the firm size, measured by logmarketcap, has a significant 
negative effect on the level of ownership concentration, which is confirmed by both 
Basic-Model-I  and  Basic-Model-II.  Similarly,  the  coefficients  of  the  two  variables 
measuring the risk of a firm (risk and risk_sqr) indicate a highly significant curvilinear, 
u-shaped  /  downwards  sloping  effect  on  the  level  of  ownership  concentration,  as 
predicted by hypothesis 1b.  
Second,  for  the  country-level,  I  can  confirm  hypotheses  2a  and  2b,  stating  that  the 
ownership concentration will be the highest in French civil law countries, intermediate 
in German civil law countries, and the lowest in common law countries, and that the 
shareholder protection will have a similar though weaker effect as the legal origin. The 
legal origin dummy for the German civil law (2.legalorigin) has, compared to the „base 
case‟ common law, a significant positive effect on ownership concentration, and the 
dummy  for  the  French  civil  law  (3.legalorigin)  has  an  even  stronger  effect  (Basic-
Model-I).  In  the  Basic-Model-II,  the  shareholder  protection,  as  expected,  has  a 
significant negative effect on the level of ownership concentration. However, the total 
variance  explained  by  the  country-level  drops  from  100%  to  76%,  confirming  the Explanatory Power of Firm-, Industry-, and Country-Level Determinants     
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second part of hypothesis 2b, stating that the effect of the shareholder protection will be 
lower  than  the  one  of  the  legal  origin.  Third,  on  the  industry-level  –  although  not 
formulated  in  a  specific  hypothesis  –  the  not  significant  results  of  the  industry 
regulation  strengthen  my  expectation  and  the  results  of  the  first  essay,  that  in  an 
international context, the regulation of an industry does not have a significant effect. 
 
In a next step, I include all previously identified determinants in the model, adding three 
industry-level covariates (industryrnd, industrycompetition, and industryrnd) and two 
additional  country  covariates  (uai  and  logmarketcap)  to  construct  Full-Model-I  and 
Full-Model-II. Table 35 illustrates the results for these two models.  
As discussed above, to account for relatively high correlations among a few variables I 
orthogonalized the two variables logstockmarket and logmarketcap for Full-Model-I, 
and uai and shareholderprotection for Full-Model-II. 
In  total,  Full-Model-I  explains  29%  of  the  variance  in  ownership  concentration. 
Comparing  the  explained  variance  on  the  firm-,  industry-,  and  country-level,  the 
explained  variance  at  the  firm-level  did  not  change  at  all.  Although  none  of  the 
coefficients  at  the  industry-level  is  statistically  significant,  the  at  the  industry-level 
explained variance soared to  78%, which is  significantly higher  than  for the Basic-
Models. As in the Basic-Model I, the explained variance of the country-level sums up to 
100%.  The  at  the  country-level  added  variable,  the  stock  market  development 
(logstockmarket,)  does  not  have  a  statistically  significant  effect  on  the  level  of 
ownership concentration.  
The results for Full-Model-II are similar to those of the Basic-Model-II. Once more, the 
firm effects, logmarketcap, risk¸ and risk_sqr are robust to the changes to the model and 
the total variance explained decreases for the Full-Models to 24%. Still, none of the 
industry  effects  has  a  statistically  significant  effect.  As  for  the  Basic-Model-II,  the 
explained  variance  on  the  industry-level  drops  significantly  to  33%.  As  before,  the 
effect of the stock market development is not significant. Evaluating the effect of the 
two  new  variables  on  the  country-level,  shareholderprotection  has  significantly 
negative  coefficient,  and  the  effect  of  the  level  of  uncertainty  avoidance  (uai)  is, 
contrary to my expectations, not significant. The decline in the explained variance on 
the country-level (24%) can be compared to the Basic-Models. This suggests that the Explanatory Power of Firm-, Industry-, and Country-Level Determinants     
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additionally  added  country-level  determinants  did  not  significantly  contribute  to  the 
explanatory power of the model. 
To further confirm these results, as discussed, I use interaction terms to account for the 
high correlation of the stock market development, the firm size, and the shareholder 
protection.  The  effects  of  the  respective  covariates  are  determined  by  the  marginal 
derivatives also provided in the table and designated by a ∂. As before, I use the legal 
origin dummies in Model I and the shareholder protection measure in Model II. The 
results for Full-Model-I and II are provided in Table A - 4 in the appendix. In total, the 
results are consistent with the previously illustrated models using the orthogonalized 
variables, however, the explained variance is higher for the industry-, and country-level 
as well for the total model. Full-Model-I explains 32% of the total variance and Full-
Model-I 30%. 
Table 35: Estimations of the Full-Model-I and Full-Model-II 
 
coef se coef se
Firm-Level
logmarketcap -7.800*** (0.832) -7.421*** (1.500)
risk 26.959*** (5.784) 27.597*** (5.872)
risk_sqr -10.186*** (2.707) -10.498*** (2.738)
Firm-Level Variance (% Explained)
c 24 (6%) 26 (6%)
Industry-Level
regulation
a -0.537 (1.684) -0.615 (1.788)
industrycompetition 4.304 (4.233) 5.158 (4.353)
industryrnd -0.642 (0.719) -0.637 (0.769)
industrylifecycle 0.095 (0.215) 0.032 (0.227)
Industry-Level Variance (% Explained)
c 7 (78%) 3 (33%)
Country-Level 







Country-Level Variance (% Explained)
c
135 (100%) 105 (78%)
Constant 46.249*** (4.796) 54.866*** (5.146)
Observations 900 900
Total Variance (% Explained) 164 (29%) 135 (24%)
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01
a Dummy Variable
c Random Intercept
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The results of the Full-Models confirm the assessment of the hypotheses evaluated in 
the first step. Looking at the so far disregarded hypotheses, I find mixed evidence for 
hypothesis 2c and hypothesis 2d in the light of the results. The hypotheses predict that, 
for  the  country-level,  the  level  of  uncertainty  avoidance  and  the  level  of  the  stock 
market  development  will  have  a  significant  effect  on  the  level  of  ownership 
concentration.  However,  neither  logstockmarket  nor  uai  are  statistically  significant. 
Still, in the models using the marginal derivatives, the interaction terms of uai (uai x 
shareholderprotection)  and  logstockmarket  (logstockmarket  x  logmarketcap),  have  a 
statistically  significant  effect  on  ownership  concentration  (Table  A  -  4).  Thus,  it  is 
actually possible that the stock market development and uncertainty avoidance have the 
predicted  effect  on  ownership  concentration  and  that  the  orthogonalization  led  to  a 
misinterpretation of the results due to the change of information carried by the variables 
(McCallum, 1970). 
On the industry-level, as expected according to the theory part of this essay, the results 
cast doubt on the findings of Thomsen and Pedersen (1998), as neither the life cycle 
stage  of  an  industry  (industrylifecycle),  nor  the  level  of  information  asymmetries 
(industryrnd), nor the intensity of competition (industrycompetition) have a significant 
effect on ownership concentration. However, as brought forward within the scope of the 
hypotheses development, it remains unclear whether that is because there is no effect of 
the factors on ownership concentration, or whether the effect is too small to be captured 
by the relatively rough measures. 
  
Lastly, assessing the explanatory analyses regarding the explained variance by the firm-, 
industry-,  and  country-levels,  I  find  confirmatory  evidence  for  the  formulated 
expectations. 
Whereas the country-level variance is almost completely explained (up to 100%), the 
estimated models explain a significant part (up to 89%) of the industry-level, and only a 
marginal part of the firm-level variance (up to 8%). However, it has to be considered 
that the residual variance is also attributed to the firm-level. Thus, we do not know how 
much of the unexplained firm-level  variance  is systematic and thus  can  actually  be 
explained or is subject to random influence factors, and thus, cannot be explained. Also, 
the explained variance of the country-level is artificially high due to the relatively high 
number  of  determinants  included  in  the  models  and  the  relatively  low  number  of Explanatory Power of Firm-, Industry-, and Country-Level Determinants     
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countries included in the sample. Overall, Full-Model II using the marginal derivatives 
possesses with 32% the highest explanatory power of all estimated models. However, 
depending  on  the  statistical  method  used  to  account  for  the  high  correlation  of 
logstockmarket and logmarketcap, the explanatory power drops down to 29%, which is 
similar or even worse than the explained variance of the Basic-Models.  
3.5.5  Preliminary Conclusion 
3.5.5.1  Summary and Discussion 
The  aim  of  this  essay  was  to  identify  the  key  firm-,  industry-,  and  country-level 
determinants  of  ownership  concentration  and  to  assess  their  explanatory  power  by 
evaluating the explained variance on the respective levels. Building particularly on the 
work of Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Thomsen and Pedersen (1999; 1997, 1998), LLSV 
(1998), and La Porta, et al. (1999), I derived hypotheses and tested them on a sample of 
900 firms from nine countries using hierarchical mixed models. 
Overall, I find confirmatory evidence for most of the formulated hypotheses, indicating 
that firm risk, firm size, legal origin, and shareholder protection significantly influence 
the level of ownership concentration. The regulation of an industry plays a subordinate 
role for the allocation of ownership rights. In total, the estimated models can explain up 
to 32% of the observed variance on ownership concentration. Whereas the legal origin 
and  the  level  of  shareholder  protection  explain  almost  the  complete  variance  in 
ownership structure between countries, up to 89% of the industry-level and only 8% of 
firm-level variance can be attributed to the tested determinants.  
The 3% change in explanatory power of the Full Models, depending on whether the 
orthogonalization or the marginal derivate technique was applied, can be considered as 
statistical artifact, as there is no theoretical explanation why the explanatory power for 
one  method  should  be  higher  than  for  another.  Comparing  the  Basic  with  the  Full 
models,  the  in  the  Full-Models  added  covariates  gained  only  marginal  additional 
explanatory power. 
The results suggest that new firm-level determinants of ownership concentration have to 
be  identified  to  yield  models  with  a  higher  explanatory  power.  Additionally,  the 
findings concerning the legal origin of a country call for further investigation. The legal 
origin  of  a  country  explains  a  significant  share  of  the  variance  in  ownership Explanatory Power of Firm-, Industry-, and Country-Level Determinants     
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concentration.  However,  it  appears  that  the  legal  origin  picks  up  a  whole  range  of 
effects we are not yet aware of, and thus calls for further investigation. 
Comparing the findings of the previous analyses with those of the first essay, the results 
are widely congruent. However, the explanatory power attributed to the legal origin is 
within the scope of this essay with up to 100% significantly higher than the one yielded 
by the analyses of the first essay (79%). This gap, however, can be explained with the 
differences in the statistical models, as I included the legal origin in the first essay as 
random intercept, and in the second essay as dummy variables.  
 
Although  the  conducted  analyses  yield  valuable  insights  into  the  allocation  of 
ownership rights, other questions are being raised at the same time. Whereas the results 
regarding the firm-level are quite clear, the industry-effects merit further discussion. 
After all, none of the industry variables had a significant effect in any of the estimated 
models, which might be for three different reasons: First, the industry effect in general 
is quite small, and thus, the industry characteristics analyzed do not have a significant 
effect indeed. Also, as discussed within the scope of the development of the hypotheses, 
the theoretical effect of the identified industry factors is not quite clear. Second, the 
significance might be – and surely is to a certain extent – influenced by the quality of 
the  proxies  used.  Apparently,  constructs  as  information  asymmetries,  are  hard  to 
measure and the used proxies are rough at best. Third, the sample used for the analyses 
exclusively contained fairly large companies, who are typically significantly diversified 
and are active, and several industries, diluting the industry effect.
36  
At the country-level, I found for the basic, as well as the full models that although the 
shareholder protection had a significant effect on the ownership concentration, the legal 
origin dummies explained a substantially higher share of variance. Accordingly, two 
questions arise: What other factors the legal origin picks up drive the level of ownership 
concentration, and, according to the previously mentioned criticisms of Braendle (2006) 
and  Coffee  (1999,  2001a,  2001b) ,  is  it  really  shareholder  protection  that  drives 
ownership concentration? I tried to  analyze  two isolated / additional country -level 
effects by including the level of uncertainty avoidance and the development of the stock 
                                                 
36According to self-reported two digit SIC-codes, 801 of 900 companies are active in two or more   
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market in the analyses. However, the high correlation of several of the country factors 
yielded difficult to interpret results, which illustrates a key issue in this concern: After 
all, it appears hardly possible to decompose the legal-origin effect by including a variety 
of potentially ownership-related country specific characteristics into regression models. 
Table 36 illustrates why a guiding framework, explaining the complex interactions and 
dependencies of the country characteristics, is needed first before decomposing the total 
effect of the legal origin.  
Table 36: Correlation Matrix of Key Development Indicators 
 
The  illustrated  correlation  matrix  shows  that  most  of  the  indicators,  all  of  which 
represent  a  certain  economic  characteristic  of  a  country,  correlate  fairly  highly: 
Unemployment  rate  (unemploymentrate),  shareholder  protection  (shareholder-
protection), Economic Freedom Index by Heritage Foundation (efi), GDP per Capita 
(gdpcapita),  stock  market  size  (logstockmarket)  and  level  of  uncertainty  avoidance 
(uai). All these variables appear to interact and influence each other significantly. This 
might also explain, why, contrary to my expectation, the uncertainty avoidance and the 
stock market development of a country did not have a significant effect on the level of 
ownership concentration, as the actual effect of the two variables might be concealed by 
the interrelation of all country factors and thus undetectable. These results shed further 
light  on  the  criticism  of  Braendle  (2006)  and  Coffee  (1999,  2001),  too.  The  high 
correlations of the country characteristics show that the question whether the corporate 
governance system, the level of shareholder protection, or the ownership structure in a 
country, developed first, is not a good one to ask, as the institutional conditions in a 
country  are  to  a  large  extent  highly  interrelated  and  develop  simultaneously. 
Accordingly, to understand the underlying effect of the legal origin on the ownership 
concentration, this network of characteristics has to be detangled first.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) unemploymentrate 1.00
(2) shareholderprotection -0.58*** 1.00
(3) efi -0.80*** 0.92*** 1.00
(4) loggdp -0.55*** 0.47*** 0.61*** 1.00
(5) gdpcapita -0.73*** 0.72*** 0.68*** 0.46*** 1.00
(6) logstockmarket -0.42*** 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.35*** 0.37*** 1.00
(7) uai -0.60*** 0.66*** 0.70*** 0.46*** 0.77*** 0.25*** 1.00
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01Explanatory Power of Firm-, Industry-, and Country-Level Determinants     
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Also related to the country-level, the effect of the country covariates on the industry-
level, becoming apparent when comparing the explained variance on the industry-level 
between the Basic and Full-Model I and II, calls for attention. Although no industry 
specific variable was added or removed from the models, the explained variance on the 
industry-level dropped significantly when exchanging the legal origin variable for the 
shareholder protection. As it appears, the close interaction and dependence of several 
factors influencing level of ownership concentration does not only appear to be true for 
the  country-level,  but  extents  to  the  industry-level.  However,  which  factor  on  the 
industry-level is influenced by the country-level cannot be explained by the present 
analyses. 
Talking about the explained variance, the question remains how far we eventually might 
be able to go in explaining the variance of  ownership concentration. The explained 
variance by the presented models largely coincides with the results of existing studies, 
such as those of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Thomsen and Pedersen (1999), raising 
doubt  whether  quick-wins  in  this  respect  are  possible  at  all.  However,  whereas  the 
previous results clearly show that the potential in the industry- and country-level is 
rather  limited,  the  firm-level,  with  only  up  8%  explained  variance  offers  room  for 
improvement.  Taking  into  consideration  that  the  ownership  structure  of  a  firm  is 
exposed to a near infinite number of potentially random effects, it remains to be seen 
though if significant improvements in explanatory power are possible after all. 
3.5.5.2  Limitations  
The study is subject to several limitations, which should be considered when evaluating 
the presented results and should be addressed by future research as  far as possible. 
Although the sample allows for a thorough study of the determinants  of ownership 
concentration,  even  in  an  international  context,  it  has  two  shortcomings:  First,  it 
contains cross-sectional data only, and, second, the sample comprises solely large, listed 
companies. Extending the sample to a time series might help to smooth annual one-time 
effects and thus yield improved estimation results. Furthermore, enlarging the sample 
by adding smaller, perhaps not listed firms, promises further insights. As mentioned 
previously,  especially  the  issue  that  the  in  the  sample  included  firms  are  highly 
diversified  limits  the  insights  into  the  industry  effects  on  ownership  concentration, 
which might be mitigated by including smaller, single industry firms in the sample. 
Furthermore,  besides  the  issues  regarding  the  sample,  several  proxies  used  in  the Explanatory Power of Firm-, Industry-, and Country-Level Determinants     
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analyses, e.g., the measure for information asymmetries, are far from optimal and rather 
rough at best. 
The primary focus  of this  study was  to  identify  the key determinants  of ownership 
concentration on the firm-, industry-, and country-level and to evaluate the explained 
variance  at  the  respective  levels.  Future  research  should  particularly  focus  on  two 
aspects:  First,  the  identification  of  further  firm-specific  determinants  of  ownership 
concentration, as the explained variance on the firm-level of about 8% leaves room for 
improvement. Second, particularly the decomposition of the effect captured by the legal 
origin  of  a  country  into  separate  components  might  gain  valuable  insights  into  the 
interplay  of features  of  alternative corporate  governance systems,  culture, and other 
aspects. The high correlations of several of those country-characteristics, as illustrated 
in the discussion, call for an alternative approach to the standard regression analysis to 
assess their effects on the allocation of ownership rights. New insights in these factors 
might also help to understand the observed interplay of the country- and industry-level, 
potentially leading to important policy-implications.  Explanatory Power of Firm-, Industry-, and Country-Level Determinants     
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3.6  Chapter Conclusion 
The two preceding essays provided further insights into the determination of the level of 
ownership  concentration  of  firms.  Compared  to  the  status  quo  of  the  research  on 
determinants of ownership concentration, my analyses contributed to our knowledge 
about  the  determination  of  ownership  concentration  by  showing  that  whereas  the 
country-level explains a significant share of the variance in ownership concentration, 
the industry-level plays only a minor role. Furthermore, I found that the so far identified 
significant firm-level determinants could only explain a marginal part of the total firm-
level variance. At the country-level, although the level of shareholder protection and 
legal origin of a country explain the lion‟s share of the country-level variance, they 
comprise  a  variety  of  effects.  The  results  clearly  show  that  the  applied  ownership 
framework  possesses  significant  explanatory  power  and  particularly  highlights  the 
importance of institutional differences for the level of ownership concentration. 
Accordingly, despite having made progress in the understanding of the allocation of 
ownership rights, several questions remain unanswered or arise from the results at hand, 
and  there  is  room  for  further  improvement  of  the  applied  ownership  framework. 
Particularly  the  significant  unexplained  variance  on  the  firm-level  calls  for  further 
identification and investigation of additional firm characteristics influencing the level of 
ownership  concentration.  Furthermore,  the  significance  of  the  country-level  for  the 
ownership structure of the firm on the one hand, and the rough measures of country 
differences  on  the  other,  demand  a  new  way  of  differentiating  the  institutional 
differences between countries to gain a better understanding of the respective effects on 
the level of ownership concentration.  
However,  in  the  light  of  the  results  of  the  recent  study  by  Holderness  (2009),  the 
findings  regarding  the  country  differences  in  ownership  concentration  have  to  be 
reconsidered. As mentioned, the shareholder protection and legal origin hypotheses by 
LLSV (1998) are not undisputed and were criticized, for example, by Braendle (2006) 
and Coffee (1999, 2001a, 2001b). Holderness, however, questions my results and the 
findings by the seminal works of LLSV and others on a completely different level. 
Conducting a study on 7,842 firms from 22 countries, Holderness (2009) challenges the 
ideas  of a dispersed  ownership  structure  in  the US  in  particular,  and  differences  in 
ownership  concentration  between  countries  in  general.  In  contrast  to  the  widely Explanatory Power of Firm-, Industry-, and Country-Level Determinants     
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accepted image of a highly dispersed ownership landscape in the US, Holderness finds 
that the average ownership concentration in the US is not significantly lower (or higher) 
than in any other country. Furthermore, the analyses of Holderness do not show any 
significant differences in ownership concentration between countries. 
Holderness (2009) concludes that the theory proposed by LLSV (1998), explaining the 
effect of investor protection on ownership concentration, is not valid. He argues that the 
frequent studies confirming the hypothesis of LLSV are actually tracking faint traces 
and find only confirmatory evidence because of highly biased samples. Indeed, whereas 
most studies analyzing the effect of country differences on ownership concentration 
include only the biggest firms in a country in their sample – just as I did – Holderness 
takes a different approach by collecting a random sample.  
Nonetheless,  despite  the  intriguing  findings  by  Holderness  (2009),  I  argue  that  the 
theory  of  LLSV  (1998),  and  so  my  findings,  are  meaningful  and  contribute  to  the 
understanding of the ownership structures  of firms.  I argue that  Holderness  himself 
mentions the key reasons for the different findings. First, as mentioned above, whereas I 
and most of the existing studies, such as those of LLSV and Thomsen and Pedersen 
(1999;  1996,  1997,  1998,  2000,  2003),  include  only  the  largest  public  companies, 
Holderness  constructs  a  random  sample.  Second,  the  database  used  by  Holderness 
includes on average 340 firms per country, and thus, significantly more than most of the 
existing studies. Both differences imply that the companies analyzed by Holderness are 
significantly  smaller  than  those  analyzed  in  my  and  in  most  of  the  other  studies. 
Accordingly,  as  Faccio  and  Lang  (2002)  already  argued,  “cross-country  differences 
become  less  significant  among  small  firms”  (p.  381).  Third,  unlike  the  data  I  use, 
Holderness  exclusively  includes  block  holdings  with  more  than  5%.  Thus,  per 
definition, minority owners with less than 5%, potentially particularly contributing to a 
very diffuse ownership structure, are not be covered by the data. Accordingly, I argue 
for those three reasons that Holderness (2009) is actually investigating an interesting 
facet of the ownership landscape in a country, which is different from what I did in the 
previous essays and from what authors, such as LLSV and Thomsen and Pedersen did, 
namely  analyzing  the  largest  companies  in  a  country.  Holderness‟  conclusion  that 
respective country differences actually do not exist is, in my opinion, premature. First, 
the results  at  hand for the influence of the country-level  on the level  of ownership 
concentration are just too striking to be attributed to random mistakes in the samples. Explanatory Power of Firm-, Industry-, and Country-Level Determinants     
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Second, Holderness does not take into account that the significant different firm sizes 
between countries, or the different levels of ownership concentration among the largest 
companies in countries, might actually be a country-specific ownership characteristic. 
Nevertheless, the question arises as to why the institutional differences on a country-
level appear to affect only the largest firms in a country, but not a random sample, 
including also small and medium sized enterprises. Performance Effects of Ownership Concentration     
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4  PERFORMANCE EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 
The subsequent chapters represent the third essay in this thesis. Accordingly, this essay 
addresses  the  third  research  question  dealing  with  the  effects  of  ownership 
concentration on firm performance.
37 
4.1  Introduction 
The  discussion  of  the  relationship  between  ownership  concentration  and  firm 
performance has attracted significant attention in the corporate governance literature. 
By investigating the contribution of majority shareholders to the solution of agency 
problems through active monitoring, the respective stream of literature has been unable 
to  come  to  a  consensus  on  whether  there  is  a  performance  effect  of  ownership 
concentration or not (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Sanchez-Ballesta & Garcia-Meca, 
2007; Thomsen, et al., 2006).  
The discussion itself dates back to the study of Berle and Means (1932), who suggested 
a positive relationship between ownership concentration and performance. Since  the 
publication  of  this  study,  a  number  of  authors  have  discussed  and  analyzed  the 
performance effect of ownership concentration. To mention one of the most important 
studies in this research area, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) challenged the view of Berle and 
Means. In their seminal work, Demsetz & Lehn found that the ownership structure of a 
firm is endogenously determined, optimizing the benefits and costs of alternative levels 
of concentration. They conclude that no systematic effect on firm performance exists. 
This result was confirmed by the study of Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). In contrast, 
Morck,  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1988)  suggested  a  curvilinear  relationship  between 
ownership concentration and firm performance, for which they also found empirical 
evidence.  
A  new  stream  of  research,  spearheaded  by  Thomsen  et  al.  (2006),  investigates  the 
performance effects  of ownership concentration in  different  countries  and finds  that 
there is no influence of ownership concentration on firm performance in countries with 
relatively  low  ownership  concentration  (such  as  the  US  and  the  UK).  However, 
Thomsen et al. (2006) argue that there may be conflicts of interest between blockholders 
                                                 
37Please note that Stefan Hilger contributed to this essay, particularly with respect to the literature 
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and minority investors in countries with higher levels of ownership concentration, and 
therefore expect negative effects of ownership concentration on firm performance.  
 
Two  of  the  most  recent  studies  on  the  topic  of  ownership  structure  and  firm 
performance, the meta-analyses of Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca (2007) and Van 
Essen and Van Oosterhout (2008), which are based on 33 and 69 studies, respectively, 
highlight the scattered results. The studies suggest that these differences in the findings 
stem  from  differences  in  performance  measures,  and  whether  studies  control  for 
endogeneity, curvilinearity, and differences in corporate governance systems or not. To 
my  knowledge,  the  majority  of  the  existing  studies  fail  to  include  these  effects 
simultaneously. In particular, the influence of country difference, for example, in terms 
of corporate governance systems, as illustrated by Thomsen, et al. (2006), has been 
disregarded widely. 
This essay fills this gap. Hence, the aim of this study is to conduct a comprehensive 
analysis  on  the  effects  of  ownership  concentration  on  performance.  The  analyses 
account for the potential endogeneity of the ownership structure, curvilinear effects, 
alternative  measures  of  firm  performance,  and  country  differences.  In  particular,  I 
investigate the effects of varying types of corporate governance systems. Accordingly, 
this study contributes to the extensive stream of literature on the effect of ownership 
concentration on performance, as to my knowledge no existing study accounts for all of 
the above mentioned issues in a satisfying way. 
The study is structured as follows. First, I provide an overview of the existing literature 
and derive hypotheses. Second, I describe the statistical methods used in the empirical 
study.  Then,  I  present  the  results  and  discuss  their  importance  with  respect  to  the 
theoretical  propositions  developed  at  the  outset.  Finally,  I  derive  implications  and 
recommendations for future research.  
4.2  Theory and Literature Review 
The  theoretical  effect  of  ownership  concentration  on  performance,  as  illustrated  by 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2003), is ambiguous. On the one hand, an increasing ownership 
concentration  can  have  a  positive  impact  on  firm  performance.  An  increase  in 
ownership concentration arises from an increase in ownership stakes held by individual 
owners relative to the total share capital in a firm. The bigger these stakes, the stronger Performance Effects of Ownership Concentration     
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the incentive for the owners to make use of their control rights and enforce performance 
maximizing decisions by means of thorough monitoring (Burkart, Gromb, & Panunzi, 
1997; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Zeckhouser & Pound, 1990).  
On the other hand, higher levels of ownership concentration can also have a negative 
effect on firm performance. An increasing level of block holdings raises the probability 
of entrenchment and opportunistic behavior by majority owners. The bigger the block 
holdings of single owners, the easier for them to divert benefits to themselves rather 
than to the company, as the majority owners can overrule the minority owners. Thus, 
the higher probability of opportunistic behavior leads to a negative performance effect 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983; Morck, et al., 1988; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Accordingly, at this point I cannot tell which of the two previously illustrated effects is 
stronger than the other, or if they potentially just cancel out. Additionally, to further 
complicate  the  relationship  of  concentration  and  performance,  Demsetz  and  Lehn 
(1985)  argue  that  alternative  levels  of  ownership  concentration  will  not  lead  to 
systematic  performances  differences  due  to  the  endogenous  determination  of  the 
ownership  structure.  According  to  this  perspective,  market  forces  push  costs  and 
benefits  of  different  concentration  levels  towards  efficiency,  preventing  sustaining 
performance effects. 
As  these  complementary  approaches  show,  the  relationship  between  ownership 
concentration and firm performance is a complex one. Accordingly, the results of the 
existing studies show great variance. Table 37 summarizes the findings of the existing 
research on the topic of ownership concentration and performance. 
Studies using single equation OLS models come to mixed results. Except for the studies 
by  Hill  and  Snell  (1989),  Gedajlovic  and  Shapiro  (2002),  and  Oswald  and  Jahera 
(1991),  they  tend  to  find  no  relationship  between  ownership  concentration  and 
accounting-based performance (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Holderness & Sheehan, 1988; 
Lehmann & Weigand, 2000; Mehran, 1995; Pedersen & Thomsen, 1999) and a positive, 
curvilinear  (in  most  cases  inverted  u-shaped)  relationship  between  ownership 
concentration  and  market-based  performance  (Anderson  &  Reeb,  2003;  Edwards, 
Nibler, Berglof, & Franks, 2000; Gorton & Schmid, 2000; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; 
Morck,  et  al.,  1988).  However,  these  studies  do  not  consider  the  possibility  of Performance Effects of Ownership Concentration     
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endogeneity. In addition, results vary for different countries, sample sizes, and when the 
identity of blockholders is taken into account. 
Simultaneous Equation Models (2SLS) and other analyses accounting for endogeneity 
(Granger  Causality  test)  widely  do  not  find  a  relationship  between  ownership 
concentration and performance  (Agrawal  &  Knoeber,  1996;  Cho, 1998;  Demsetz & 
Villalonga, 2001; Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999; Loderer & Martin, 1997; Miwa 
& Ramseyer, 2003; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2003; Welch, 2003). However, the results 
vary for different countries. Accordingly, Thomsen, et al. (2006) conclude that these 
differences  originate  from  variations  in  average  ownership  concentrations  across 
countries, resulting from different underlying corporate governance systems. Only two 
studies by de Miguel, Pindado, and Torre (2004) and Claessens and Djankov (1999) 
find confirmatory evidence for – according to de Miguel, et al. (2004) –  a “weakly 
robust” performance effect of ownership concentration when using 2SLS regressions. Performance Effects of Ownership Concentration     
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Table 37: Summary of Literature Review 
 
Methodology Authors Sample Performance Measure(s)
Linear Curvilinear No relationship
Single regression (OLS) Demsetz & Lehn (1985) 511 firms, 1980-81, US ROE x
Morck et al. (1988) 371 Fortune 500 firms, 1980 Q, Accounting Profit Rate x
Holderness & Sheehan (1988) 114 firms, 1979-84, US Q, ROE x
Hill & Snell (1989) 122 Fortune 500 firms, 1980, US Value added per employee x
McConnell & Servaes (1990) 1173 firms 1976, 1093 firms 1986, US Q x
Oswald & Jahera (1991) 654 firms, 1982-1987, US ROA, ROE x
Mehran (1995) 153 firms, 1979 -1980 Q, ROA x
Pedersen & Thomsen (1999) 518 firms, 1990, 12 countries within Europe ROE x
Thomsen & Pedersen (2000) 435 largest European firms, 1990 Q, ROA, Sales growth x
Gorton & Schmid (2000) 56-283 banks, 1985-86, Germany Q, ROE x
Lehmann & Weigand (2000) 361 firms, 1991-96, Germany ROA, ROE x*
Edwards & Nibler (2000) 156 firms, 1992, Germany Q x
Gedajlovic & Shapiro (2002) 334 firms, 1986-91, Japan ROA x
Anderson & Reeb (2003) 403 family firms, 1992-1999, US Q x
Edwards & Weichenrieder (2004) 97 firms, 1992, Germany Q x**
Simultaneous equations/2SLS Agrawal & Knoeber (1996) 383 firms, 1987, US Q x
Loderer & Martin (1997) 867 firm acquisitions, 1878-88, US Q x
Cho (1998) 326 Fortune 500 manufacturing firms, 1991 Q x
Himmelberg et al. (1999) 330-551, 1982-84, US Q x
Claessens & Djankov (1999) 706 firms, 1992-1997, Czech Republic Operating Profit over Assets x
Demsetz & Villalonga (2001) 223 firms, 1980-81, US Q, Accounting Profit Rate x
Pedersen & Thomsen (2003) 214 firms, 1991, Europe Q x
Welch (2003) 114 firms, 1999-2000, Australia Q, ROE x
Miwa & Ramseyer (2003) 637-710 firms, 1953, 1958, Japan ROA x****
de Miguel et al. (2004) 135 firms, 1990-1999, Spain Q x
Event studies Lewellen et al. (1985) 266 merger events, 1963-81, US Stock returns x
Agrawal & Mandelker (1990) 372 charter amendments, 1979-85, US Stock returns x
Barclay & Holderness (1991) 106 block trades, 1978-82, US Stock returns x
Song & Walking (1993) 153 acquisitions, 1977-83, US Stock returns x
Slovin & Sushka (1993) 85 deaths of corporate insiders, 1973-89, US Stock returns x
Bethel et al. (1998) 244 block trades, 1980-89, US Stock returns x
Han et al. (1999) 301 manufacturing firms, 1988-92, US Stock returns x
Renneboog (2000) 165-186 firms, 1989-94, Belgium Stock returns x
Granger Tests Thomsen et al. (2006)*** 598 firms, 1990-98, US, UK Q, ROA x
Thomsen et al. (2006)*** 278 firms, 1990-98, France, Germany Q, ROA x
*    positive effects are observed for listed German firms and negative effects for non-listed German firms
**   higher control rights are found to lower the market value of German firms and higher cash-flow rights are found to enhance the market value
***  Results vary for Continental Europe and the Anglo-Saxon system of corporate governance
****  Miwa & Ramseyer did not specifically use 2SLS, but account for the problem of endogeneity by a particular type of study
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Event studies and Granger tests produce ambiguous results. Some of them find positive 
effects  of  ownership  concentration  (Agrawal  &  Mandelker,  1990;  Barclay  & 
Holderness, 1991; Bethel, Liebeskind, & Opler, 1998; Han, Suk Hun, & Suk, 1999; 
Lewellen, Loderer, & Rosenfeld, 1985; Renneboog, 2000; Thomsen, et al., 2006), while 
others  do  not  detect  any  effects  (Slovin  &  Sushka,  1993;  Song  &  Walking,  1993; 
Thomsen, et al., 2006).  
To summarize, empirical studies based on OLS or event studies come to mixed results 
regarding  the  relationship  between  ownership  concentration  and  performance.  The 
analyses  accounting  for endogeneity  mostly  find no relationship  between ownership 
concentration and firm performance. However, most of the studies work with single-
country samples. Therefore, they do not cover moderating effects of country differences 
on the ownership concentration performance relationship. According to Thomsen, et al. 
(2006), the performance effect of ownership concentration is only significant in those 
countries  where  the  institutional  environment,  in  particular  in  terms  of  corporate 
governance systems, stimulates higher levels of ownership concentration. Thomsen, et 
al.  argue  that  the  level  of  ownership  concentration  can  only  exceed  the  value 
maximizing  point  when  all  influence  factors,  i.e.  firm-,  industry-,  and  country-
characteristics, push the concentration to the extreme. Accordingly, in countries with an 
institutional  environment  favoring  low  levels  of  ownership  concentration,  the  value 
maximizing point is unlikely to be exceeded. In countries with a corporate governance 
system  favoring  higher  levels  of  ownership  concentration,  however,  the  levels  of 
ownership concentration might exceed the optimal point and thus lead to a negative 
effect on performance.
38  
According to the literature review, it appears that analyses of the performance effect of 
ownership  concentration  need  to  account  for  the  possibility  of  an  endogenous 
determination  of  the  ownership  structure,  potential  curvilinear  effects,  alternative 
performance  measures,  and  institutional  differences  between  different  corporate 
governance systems. Building on the findings of the existing studies, in the following 
section, I will derive hypotheses regarding the effect of ownership concentration on 
performance and moderating effects, further detailing the findings by  Thomsen, et al. 
(2006). 
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4.3  Development of Hypotheses 
4.3.1  Endogeneity 
The argument put forward by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) states that alternative levels of 
ownership concentration can influence a variety of costs and benefits occurring within 
the firm as a nexus of contracts. Market forces push firms towards efficiency and to 
considering  costs  and  benefits  of  alternative  ownership  structures.  Accordingly,  no 
systematic  performance  differences  between  alternative  levels  of  ownership 
concentration  should  be  observable.  However,  for  example,  Denis  and  McConnell 
(2003) and Thomsen, et al. (2006) argue that the endogenous determination does not 
always  yield  a  value-maximizing,  and  thus  performance  neutral,  ownership 
concentration.  The  authors  reason  that  institutional  factors  can  drive  the  level  of 
ownership  concentration  beyond  the  value  maximizing  point,  leading  to  a  negative 
effect of ownership concentration on performance. Denic and McConnell hypothesize 
that  when  the  endogenously  determined  ownership  concentration  exceeds  the  value 
maximizing  level  of  concentration,  blockholders  might  focus  on  increasing  private 
benefits instead of shareholder value, leading to a negative effect on firm performance. 
However,  only  high  levels  of  ownership  concentration  will  lead  to  such  an  effect. 
Accordingly, I formulate the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: At high levels of ownership concentration there is a (negative) 
effect on firm performance. 
4.3.2  Country Differences 
The previous essays of this thesis show, in accordance with studies such as those of 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Van der Elst (2004), Thomsen and Pedersen (1998), and 
LLSV  (1998),  that  ownership  concentration  varies  significantly  across  firms  and  is 
influenced  by  a  variety  of  firm-,  industry-  and  country-specific  factors.  However, 
Thomsen,  et  al.  (2006)  argue  that  the  level  of  ownership  concentration,  which  is 
necessary  to  cause  negative  performance  effects,  is  most  likely  to  occur  in  those 
countries  that  favor  higher  ownership  concentration  due  to  their  institutional 
environment.  Roe  (2004)  and  LLSV  provide  alternative  (although  complementary) 
explanations  for  the  observation  why  ownership  concentration  is  the  highest  in 
Continental-European countries with German or French civil law backgrounds. Performance Effects of Ownership Concentration     
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LLSV (1998) argue that the legal origin of a country affects the level of ownership 
concentration by influencing the level of shareholder protection. According to LLSV, 
countries with a common law background (e.g., the US and the UK) have a higher level 
of shareholder protection than countries with a corporate governance system rooted in 
the German civil law (e.g., Germany and Brazil) and countries with a French civil law 
background  (e.g.,  France  and  Italy),  which  typically  have  the  lowest  shareholder 
protection.  In  countries  with  a  low  shareholder  protection,  the  level  of  ownership 
concentration will be relatively high. Owners will tend to acquire larger blocks of shares 
since minority holdings are rendered less attractive because of the relatively high costs 
connected  with  the  enforcement  of  ownership  rights  and  the  potential  risk  of 
expropriation and self-inflicted behavior by majority owners. In countries with better 
shareholder  protection,  minority  owners  are  not  as  threatened  by  these  issues  as  in 
countries  with  a  relatively  low  level  of  shareholder  protection  and  are  thus  not  as 
hesitant  to  acquire  smaller  stakes  of  a  company,  leading  to  a  lower  ownership 
concentration.
39  
Roe (2004) argues that in the continental European social democracies the relatively 
strong influence of the government and t he employees on managers might lead to 
suboptimal shareholder-value maximization. Therefore, shareholders try to increase 
their  influence  via  block  holdings,  which  leads  to  a  higher  level   of  ownership 
concentration. In contrast, the influence of employees  and politics on firms is much 
lower  in  Anglo -American  countries,  allowing  for  a  more  dispersed  ownership 
structure.
40 
Building on these concepts ,  I  identify two effects  of  how country differences may 
influence the relationship between ownership concentratio n and performance. First, 
institutional differences significantly influence the ownership structure of firms and may 
drive the level of ownership concentration beyond the value maximizing point. Second, 
the level of shareholder protection varies among coun tries, moderating the effect of 
ownership  concentration  on  performance.  Subsequently,  I  illustrate  the  two 
complementary effects.  
As developed in the section dealing with the topic of endogeneity, I argue that there is a 
(negative) effect of  ownership concentration on performance  only when the level of 
                                                 
39 For a detailed description of the theoretical argument of LLSV (1998) please refer to chapter 3.2.3. 
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ownership concentration exceeds the value maximizing point. In accordance with Roe 
(2004),  LLSV  (1998)  and  Thomsen,  et  al.  (2006),  this  critical  level  of  ownership 
concentration will only be exceeded in Continental-European countries with a German 
or French civil law background.  
At  the  same  time,  these  countries  are  characterized  by  a  comparably  low  level  of 
shareholder  protection.  In  combination  with  the  relatively  high  ownership 
concentration,  the  low  shareholder  protection  decreases  the  possibilities  of  minority 
holders  for  efficient  monitoring  due  to  relatively  few/weak  minority  owner  rights. 
Accordingly, it is easier for the majority of owners to maximize their private benefits in 
countries with a lower level of shareholder protection, further increasing the negative 
performance effect.  
Both arguments underline the hypothesis that country differences significantly influence 
the  ownership  concentration  performance  relationship  and  suggest  that  a  significant 
performance  effect  will  materialize  in  countries  with  particular  institutional 
environments. Accordingly, I formulate hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 2: In Continental-European countries with a German or French civil 
law  background,  there  is  a  negative  effect  of  ownership  concentration  on 
performance.  
4.3.3  Curvilinearity 
Morck, et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Stulz (1988), and Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1988) argue that any effect of ownership concentration on firm performance 
is curvilinear (bell-shaped) and has to be treated as such in the regressions to test the 
relationship. 
According to Berle and Means (1932), I would expect a positive effect of ownership 
concentration on firm performance. The dispersion of ownership rights among a large 
number  of  shareholders  may  induce  free-riding  behavior.  This  situation  could  be 
opportunistically exploited by the managers, for example, by pursuing business policies 
that do not maximize their firm‟s value but private benefits. For relatively low levels of 
ownership concentration, the counter-acting effects (free-riding and monitoring) will be 
stronger than for relatively high levels of ownership concentration. Thus, following the Performance Effects of Ownership Concentration     
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line of arguments of Berle and Means, I expect a positive, decreasing marginal effect of 
ownership concentration on firm performance. Accordingly, there should be a positive 
curvilinear effect with a decreasing slope as an increase in ownership concentration 
reduces free-riding behavior and increases the monitoring incentives. 
However, an increasing level of ownership concentration might also foster opportunistic 
behavior  by  owners  themselves.  This  can  lead  to  a  curvilinear  negative  effect  of 
ownership concentration on firm  performance,  contradicting the effect  suggested by 
Berle and Means (1932). From a certain ownership level onwards, the interests of block 
or majority owners might change from the value-maximization for the entirety of all 
owners to self-inflicted behavior focusing on private benefits e.g., by empire building 
and entrenchment. With low or intermediate block holdings, the blockholders might be 
prevented  from  self-inflicted  decisions  due  to  the  monitoring  of  other  owners. 
Significant  majority  holdings,  however,  will  enable  owners  to  make  according 
decisions, overruling potentially intervening minority holders. Contrary to the positive 
effect of ownership concentration, the negative effect of ownership concentration will 
be relatively weak on low/medium level and stronger on higher levels of ownership 
concentration.  This  increasing  marginal  negative  effect  leads  to  a  curvilinear 
relationship with increasing slope.  
Combining the positive as well as the negative effect of ownership concentration leads 
to  a  curvilinear,  bell-shaped  relationship  between  ownership  concentration  and 
performance (Morck, et al., 1988).  
As illustrated in the previous chapter, I argue that there is a significant (negative) effect 
of  ownership  concentration  on  firm  performance  for  high  levels  of  ownership 
concentration  only.  Thus,  at  these  high  levels  of  concentration  the  performance 
increasing effect will be outweighed by the performance decreasing effect. Still, the 
marginal negative effect of ownership concentration is increasing. Hence, I argue that 
the  negative  performance  effect  of  ownership  concentration  for  high  levels  of 
concentration is curvilinear with increasing slope. 
 
Hypothesis  3:  The  negative  performance  effect  for  high  levels  of  ownership 
concentration is curvilinear (downwards-sloping) with increasing slope.  
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4.4  Methodology 
In  this  chapter,  I  describe  the  methodology  and  the  statistical  model applied  in  the 
subsequent analyses. The sample and variables will not be described as they have been 
illustrated in chapter 2.2. Table A - 5 in the appendix provides an overview on all 
variables used in the first and second stage regressions. 
4.4.1  Statistical Method 
For the subsequent analyses, I considered two different econometric methods, both of 
which were mentioned within the literature review: First, as so far applied by most of 
the studies included in the literature review, two stage least squares (2SLS) and, second, 
the Granger test as applied by Thomsen, et al. (2006). Both methods are characterized 
by  advantages  and  disadvantages.  The  key  issue  for  the  2SLS  method  is  the 
identification  of  powerful  instruments.  For  the  Granger  test  there  is  no  need  for 
instruments,  however,  the  causality  the  Granger  test  assesses  is  a  specific  one  and 
particularly in the light of multivariate relationships, involving three or more variables, 
the results can be misleading (Granger, 1969; Hacker & Hatemi-J, 2006). I followed the 
studies by Loderer and Martin (1997), Cho (1998) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), 
and decided to use the 2SLS method to assess the effect of ownership concentration on 
performance  for  the  following  reasons.  First,  the  determination  of  the  ownership 
structure of a firm involves a variety of influence factors, which renders the results of 
the Granger tests less powerful and makes them hard to interpret. Second, following 
existing studies, as  Demsetz and Villalonga (2001),  I  can rely on established  2SLS 
models and use similar instruments. Third, as the majority of the existing studies use 
2SLS  models,  using  the  Granger  test  would  lead  to  difficulties  in  terms  of  the 
comparability with the findings of other studies. 
Accordingly, as in the studies by Loderer and Martin (1997), Cho (1998), and Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001), I will use simultaneous equation analysis to assess the effect of 
ownership  concentration  on  performance  while  accounting  for  endogeneity  of  the 
ownership  structure.  The  two  stages  least  squares  (2SLS)  models  consists  of  two 
equations: The first equation (1) determines the level of ownership concentration and 
the second equation (2), the firm performance. In the following, I will describe models 
(1) and (2) in detail. 
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The  central  and  most  frequently  criticized  issue  when  using  2SLS  models  is  the 
identification of viable instruments to yield consistent and meaningful results. To derive 
consistent estimates, the instruments must satisfy two conditions: First, the instruments 
must  be  highly  correlated  with  the  dependent  variable  of  the  first-stage  regression. 
Second, the instruments must not correlate with the error term, ε, of the second stage 
regression. Whereas, I can clearly test for the first condition (all chosen instruments 
correlate  highly  and  significantly  in  their  predicted  direction  on  a  0.01  or  0.05 
significance level), I cannot directly test for the second condition, as ε is unobservable 
(Baum, 2006). As pointed out by Himmelberg, et al. (1999) and Thomsen, et al. (2006), 
it is difficult to identify instruments for which the assumption of zero-correlation does 
completely hold. However, as illustrated in the literature review, several authors have 
successfully conducted 2SLS analyses on the ownership concentration / performance 
research,  yielding  consistent  and  robust  results.  Accordingly,  I  widely  rely  on 
previously  successfully  applied  instruments.  Additionally,  as  I  will  show  later  on, 
several post-estimation tests confirm the consistency of the model and the adequacy of 
the  instruments  used.  For  these  reasons,  I  believe  that  the  2SLS  approach  with  the 
subsequently  suggested  model  will  yield  meaningful  results  and  contribute  to  the 
understanding  of  the  relationship  between  ownership  concentration  and  firm 
performance.  
Still, the criticisms brought forward, for example, by Thomsen, et al. (2006), are valid 
and  the  instruments  cannot  be  perfect.  However,  in  due  of  a  clearly  superior 
methodology, I rely on the previously illustrated 2SLS technique with the subsequently 
presented models. 
4.4.2  Statistical Model 
4.4.2.1  First-Stage Regression  
The first stage regression uses equation (1) with the level of ownership concentration as 
the dependent variable. To determine the level of ownership concentration, I rely on an 
adapted version of a model initially developed by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), and also 
used for 2SLS regression analyses by Cho (1998) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). 
Subsequently, I describe the first stage regression, including the instrumented variable 
and  the  instruments,  in  detail.  The  complete  first  stage  regression  model  looks  as 
follows: Performance Effects of Ownership Concentration     
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Model (1) is estimated two times with two different dependent – thus, instrumented – 
variables,  namely  ownership  concentration  and  squared  ownership  concentration, 
respectively. The latter one is necessary to measure and test for a curvilinear effect of 
ownership concentration on performance.  
In terms of instruments, I include the firm performance in the model, as I argue that firm 
performance is as likely to influence ownership structure, as ownership structure is to 
influence performance. According to Demsetz & Villalonga (2001), this relationship is 
the reason that renders standard OLS models inadequate for determining the effect of 
ownership concentration on performance. Insider trading, corporate takeovers, and in 
particular events, such as leveraged buy-outs, clearly show that the firm performance 
and  differences  in  the  anticipated  future  firm  performance,  for  example,  caused  by 
information asymmetries, can strongly influence the ownership structure of a firm. 
The size of the firm is included in the model due to its decreasing effect on ownership 
concentration.
41  
To control for industry effects, I include the industry regulation shown to be  the most 
important influence factor on ownership cncentration on the industry-level (Thomsen & 
Pedersen, 2003). As initially advanced by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), industry regulation 
has a negative effect on ownership concentration, as in the absence of regulation, higher 
ownership  stakes  ensure  higher  control  powers  for  owners.  Regulation,  however, 
restricts the options a vailable to owners,  and thus,  renders the benefits of majority 
ownership less attractive, which leads to a decrease in ownership concentration.
42  
The firm risk and the squared firm risk are included in to model (1) to account for the 
curvilinear, bell-shaped effect of firm risk on ownership concentration. To explain this 
effect, Demsetz  and Lehn (1985) state that one of the main advantages of a higher 
ownership concentration is the higher incentive for large blockholders to monitor  the 
firm. The higher the risk of a firm, the more volatile is the business. The more volatile a 
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business is due to frequent decisions and unforeseen developments, the greater the need 
to  monitor  managerial  performance  is.  This  effect  favors  a  higher  ownership 
concentration for firms with a relatively high risk due to the increase in monitoring 
incentives. At the same time, Demsetz and Lehn argue that risk has a decreasing effect 
on ownership concentration.  The higher the risk, the smaller the stakes owners can 
acquire while maintaining an optimal portfolio diversification. This effect renders larger 
ownership stakes less attractive and results in a negative effect of risk on ownership 
concentration (Markowitz, 1952; Putterman, 1993). Taking these two opposing effects 
of risk into account, Demsetz and Lehn reason that risk has a curvilinear, bell-shaped 
effect on ownership concentration. The marginal increase in monitoring incentives is 
relatively high at low levels of risk, but decreases with increasing risk. The marginal 
negative effect of risk on portfolio diversification is relatively small for low levels of 
risk,  but  increases  with  higher  levels  of  risk.  Therefore,  at  low  risk  levels,  the 
concentration increasing effect of monitoring incentives will outweigh the decreasing 
effects  of  risk.  At  higher  levels  of  risk,  the  concentration  decreasing  effect  will 
outweigh the concentration increasing effect, which results in a bell-shaped effect of 
risk on ownership concentration.
43  
Lastly,  I  include  the  shareholder  protection  in  the  model  to  control  for  country 
differences. LLSV (1998) argue that in countries with lower shareholder protection , 
owners will acquire larger ownership stakes to exercise their control rights and avoid 
being expropriated by managers . Accordingly, an increase in shareholder protection 
leads to a decrease in ownership concentration.
44  
4.4.2.2  Second-Stage Regression  
The second-stage regression uses equation (2) with firm performance as the dependent 
variable. As in the case of the first stage regression, I use an adapted version of the 
models used by Cho (1998) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). Having determined the 
ownership concentration with the help of model (1), the second stage model includes the 
ownership measure, as well as various control variables. Estimating model (2) will give 
information about the relevance of ownership concentration on firm performance. In the 
following, I describe model (2) in detail. The complete second-stage regression model 
looks as follows:  
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As  suggested  by  Demsetz  and  Villalonga  (2001),  I  include  the  research  and 
development expenditures, capital expenditure, and debt over assets ratio to control for 
the  investments  in  intangible  assets,  differences  in  methods  of  depreciation,  and 
leverage of a firm. On the one hand, these variables control for variations across firms 
in terms of performance; on the other hand, they reduce differences in the performance 
measures caused by accounting artifacts.
45  
Finally,  the ownership  concentration  and  the squared  ownership  concentration  are 
included in model (2) to test the effect of ownership concentration on firm performance, 
accounting for a potential curvilinearity. The final, combined model looks as follows:  
 1 + 2 ???? ??????????? = 
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4.5  Results 
4.5.1  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 38 and Table 39 report descriptive statistics for the sample, including the number 
of observations, mean values, standard deviations, and maxima and minima of the full 
sample and by country and industry.  
The descriptive statistics show that over all variables, industries, and countries, there is 
a high variance in ownership concentration. For all industries and countries, firms with 
a relatively high and relatively low ownership concentration are included in the sample. 
At  59.13%, Spain  has  the highest  average ownership concentration, and at 25.12%, 
Japan the lowest. In terms of industries, the difference between the highest and the 
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lowest average ownership concentration is not as high as for the countries. The firms in 
the Construction industry have the highest average ownership concentration, at 48.50%, 
and the Mining industry has the lowest ownership concentration, at 34.91%.  
Table 38: Descriptive Statistics of cr5 by country 
 
Table 39: Descriptive Statistics of cr5 by industry 
 
Table 40 shows descriptive statistics of all variables used within the analyses of this 
essay and Table 41 illustrates the correlation matrix for all variables. Several correlation 
coefficients merit a closer look (Mela & Kopalle, 2002). 
Country N mean min max sd
Japan 150 25.12 6.36 67.81 13.62
United-States 150 25.84 11.79 72.17 10.27
United Kingdom 150 33.21 8.90 77.01 12.09
Canada 150 37.11 1.49 93.09 20.73
Germany 150 49.12 1.35 99.75 23.45
Brazil 101 49.84 2.05 100.00 25.87
France 121 55.29 1.42 99.87 23.8
Spain 107 59.13 8.24 99.34 19.43
Total 1,079 41.83 1.35 100.00 18.66
Industry N mean min max sd
Mining 51 34.91 7.53 97.69 24.06
Insurance, Real-Estate 207 43.48 1.42 99.65 22.38
Manufacturing 462 38.03 1.35 99.75 21.21
Retail/Wholesale 145 42.13 2.17 95.41 21.16
Transportation 165 41.08 1.49 100.00 25.77
Construction 49 48.50 10.89 97.23 22.53
Total 1,079 40.42 1.35 100.00 22.85Performance Effects of Ownership Concentration     
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Table 40: Descriptive Statistics of all Variables 
 
First, the two different performance measures (tobinsq5yr and roa5yr) correlate highly. 
This correlation, however, is neither unexpected nor does it cause any problems for the 
statistical  regressions,  as  the  two  measures  will  not  be  included  in  the  same  stage 
regression  model.  More  problematic  are  the  correlations  of  tcr5,  logebit5yr,  and 
logmarketcap, although I eventually decide not to exclude any of these variables from 
the sample. Since I argue that firm size, measured as market capitalization, is one of the 
strongest influence factors for ownership concentration, the observed high correlation 
between the size of the firm and the ownership concentration seems to be reasonable. 
Similarly, it appears plausible that the logarithm of market capitalization is correlated 
with the performance measure, logebit5yr. The correlation of tcr5 and logebit5yr (-0.18) 
is  unlikely to  cause any problems  in  the regression  analyses.  Lastly,  I  ran variance 
inflation tests for all regressions to follow up on the correlation of logmarketcap and 
tcr5 (-0.35) and logebit5yr and logmarketcap (0.35). However, the magnitudes of the 
variance  inflation  factors  (<10)  of  the  respective  variables  did  not  suggest 
multicolinearity issues, which is why I do not exclude any of the variables from the 
regression  analyses.  Furthermore,  the  small  and  mostly  not  significant  correlation 
coefficients  of  the  overall  dependent  variable,  tobinsq5yr,  with  the  instruments 
(tobinsq5yr,  logebit5yr,  logmarketcap,  regulation,  shareholderprotection,  risk,  and 
risk_sqr) do not suggest any problems with the validity of the instruments. 
Variable mean sd max min
cr5 40.39 23.67 100.00 1.35
tcr5 -0.40 1.38 6.64 -4.29
tobinsq5yr 0.98 0.78 7.03 -0.20
roa5yr 6.50 5.74 51.03 -64.89
logebit5yr 50.27 359.20 7741.76 -65.23
debttoassets 0.11 0.17 2.06 0.00
capextoassets 0.03 0.06 0.71 0.00
risk 0.87 0.41 2.93 -0.91
logmarketcap 8.86 2.60 16.64 1.00
rndtoassets 0.01 0.02 0.24 0.00
shareholderprotection 7.84 1.29 9.00 5.00
regulation
a 0.10 0.31 1.00 0
a Dummy VariablePerformance Effects of Ownership Concentration     











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
(1) tcr5 1
(2) tcr5_sqr 0.19*** 1
(3) tobinsq5yr -0.01 -0.06* 1
(4) roa5yr 0.01 -0.01 0.66*** 1
(5) logebit5yr -0.18*** 0.04 0.01 0.04 1
(6) debttoassets -0.05 0.04 -0.25*** -0.08*** 0.05* 1
(7) capextoassets -0.02 -0.02 0.13*** 0.21*** -0.05* 0.06** 1
(8) risk -0.20*** -0.15*** 0.01 -0.02 0.13*** -0.01 0.14*** 1
(9) risk_sqr -0.10*** -0.07** 0.02 0.01 0.12*** -0.02 0.14*** 0.92*** 1
(10) logmarketcap -0.35*** 0.02 0 -0.08** 0.35*** 0.01 0.02 0.21*** 0.13*** 1
(11) rndtoassets 0.04 -0.01 0.23*** 0.07** 0.03 -0.22*** -0.32*** -0.05* -0.06** -0.14*** 1
(12) shareholderprotection -0.19*** -0.11*** 0.16*** -0.04 0.09*** -0.05 -0.02 0.13*** 0.10*** -0.14*** 0.20*** 1
(13) regulation
a 0.07** 0.14*** -0.22*** -0.12*** 0.19*** 0.19*** -0.10*** 0.04 0.07** 0.07** -0.11*** -0.11*** 1
 * p<0.10  ** p<0.052  *** p<0.01
a Dummy VariablePerformance Effects of Ownership Concentration     
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4.5.2  Regression Analyses 
Subsequently,  I  provide the results  of the regression analyses  (OLS and 2SLS). To 
assess my hypotheses, I run the analyses on various (sub-) samples, too. All results of 
the second stage regression shown in the text use tobinsq5yr as the dependent variable. 
Results for the analyses using roa5yr as alternative dependent variable are provided in 
the appendix of this thesis.  
In the first analysis I use the full sample. Table 42 presents the results of the OLS and 
2SLS  regressions.  The  second  two  analyses  use  two  subsamples  including  only  the 
firms of the sample with the highest ownership concentration (Table 44 and Table 46). 
Third, the subsample (Table 49) is restrained to firms with a German civil law or French 
civil law background. Lastly, Table 50 shows the results of the regression analyses for 
two single countries (Spain and France).  
As  suggested  by  Wooldrige  (2001)  and  Baum  (2006),  all  analyses  were  tested  for 
several statistical issues, including heteroscedasticity (Pagan-Hall and White / Koenker 
tests),  weak-  or  under-identification  (Anderson-Rubin  test),  endogeneity  / 
appropriateness of 2SLS (Hausmann-Wu test), and over-identification (Sargan-Hansen 
statistic). None of the tests reported on a 0.10 significance level results which would 
indicate  problems  for  the  validity  of  the  models.  The  Sargan-Hansen  test  tests  the 
instruments  of  the  analyses  for  over-identification;  that  is,  that  the  instruments  are 
uncorrelated with the error term of the second stage regression, and thus, are valid. 
Rejecting  the  Sargan-Hansen  test  would  cast  doubt  on  the  validity  of  the  used 
instruments (Hayashi, 2000). The Anderson-Rubin test tests if the instruments under- or 
only weakly identify the model (Anderson & Lee, 1997; Anderson & Reeb, 2003). The 
appropriateness of the 2SLS model in general, that is, that an OLS model would yield 
inconsistent  estimates,  is  addressed  by  the  Hausmann-Wu  Test  for  endogeneity 
(Hausman,  1978;  Wu,  1973).  The  Pagan-Hall  test  and  White  /  Koenker  test  assess 
whether there is heteroscedasticity among the instrument variable estimations (Koenker, 
1981; Pagan & Hall, 1983; White, 1980). 
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Subsequently, I present the results of the estimated models. Table 42 reports the results 
of the regression analyses using the full sample.  
Table 42: Regression Results of Full Sample 
 
In the OLS model, the exogenous variables are significant on a 0.01 significance level 
and carry the expected coefficients and confirm the results of Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001). Whereas the leverage (debttoassets) has a negative effect on performance, the 
capital expenditure and research and development ratios have positive effects. 
The coefficients of the ownership concentration variables, tcr5 and tcr5_sqr, are not 
significant and do not confirm an effect of ownership concentration on performance.  
In the 2SLS model, except for debttoassets, all regression coefficients of the exogenous 
variables are not significant in the first stage regressions and carry the same signs as in 
the OLS model in the second stage regression. As in the OLS model, the ownership 
concentration measures do not carry significant regression coefficients.  
Most  of  the  instruments  at  the  first  stage  regressions  carry  the  expected  signs  and 
significance  levels.  For  the  ownership  concentration  variable  tcr5  the  risk  has  a 
significant curvilinear effect (risk and risk_sqr), and the size of a firm (logmarketcap) 
and shareholder protection (shareholderprotection) have a significant negative effect. 
Dependent Variable
Exogenous Variables
debttoassets -0.696*** (0.113) -0.039** (0.019) 0.526 (1.085) -0.707*** (0.142)
capextoassets 3.713*** (0.340) 0.039 (0.063) 1.306 (1.513) 3.873*** (0.464)
rndtoassets 15.989*** (0.900) 0.223 (0.179) 5.835 (6.179) 16.751*** (2.141)
Instruments
logebit5yr -0.001* (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
risk 0.104*** (0.033) 4.954** (1.877)
risk_sqr -0.042*** (0.011) -1.780** (0.658)
logmarketcap -0.013*** (0.002) 0.064 (0.054)
shareholderprotection -0.017*** (0.005) -0.207 (0.139)
regulation
a -0.023 (0.016) -1.296** (0.481)
Instrumented Variables
tcr5 -0.220 (0.177) -0.426 (0.618)
tcr5_sqr -0.008 (0.005) 0.031 (0.027)
Constant 1.281*** (0.437) 2.751*** (0.046) 5.072*** (1.355) 1.645 (1.530)
Observations 1079 1079 1079 1079
F-Statistic 89.44*** 28.41*** 2.59** 50.79***
R-squared 0.294 0.213 0.077 0.251
a Dummy Variable
Full Sample
OLS First Stage Second Stage
* p<0.10     ** p<0.05       *** p<0.01
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The effect of regulation, as discussed in the previous essay, does not appear to have a 
significant  effect.  The  performance  measure  logebit5yr  has  a  small  and  weakly 
significant effect. In total, just as for the control variables, the results of the instruments 
widely confirm the estimation results of Demsetz & Villalonga (2001). As expected, for 
the second first stage regression, using tcr5_sqr as dependent variable, the results for 
the  instruments  are  similar  as  for  the  first  second  stage  regression,  however  fewer 
variables  have  statistically  significant  effects  as  the  instruments  cannot  explain  the 
quadratic effect as well as the original variable. 
In total, the OLS model is able to explain 29.4% of the variance (R²) and the 2SLS 
model, 25.1% (R²). The F-statistics confirm the good fit of the model.  
As illustrated by Table A - 6 in the appendix, the results are widely robust to using an 
alternative performance measure, roa5yr. For this performance measure, there also is no 
significant effect of the concentration measures on performance. However, I see that the 
explanatory power of the models in terms of R² are significantly lower (up to 22%) for 
the OLS and Second Stage 2SLS model. Still, according to the F-tests, the models have 
a good fit. 
Although  there  is  no  evidence  for  the  full  sample  for  an  effect  of  ownership 
concentration,  I argue that  there might  be  a negative effect  on performance for the 
highest  levels  of  ownership  concentration  only,  and  thus,  the  coefficients  of  the 
ownership concentration measures are not significant for the full sample. Accordingly, I 
construct two subsamples containing exclusively firms with high levels of ownership 
concentration. 
The  first  subsample  contains  solely  50%  of  firms  with  the  highest  ownership 
concentration of the full sample. Table 43 shows descriptive statistics for the subsample. 
If there is only a relationship between ownership concentration and performance for 
high levels of ownership concentration, it should be more pronounced in this subsample 
than in the full sample.  
Table 43: Descriptive Statistics of cr5 (50 Percentile) 
 
N mean min max sd
Low (50 Pctile) 540 22.25 1.35 34.52 7.04
High (>50 Pctile) 539 58.62 34.57 100.00 17.43Performance Effects of Ownership Concentration     
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Table 44 provides the results of the regression analyses. The results for the exogenous 
variables and instruments are similar to those of the full sample. However, whereas the 
coefficient of logmarketcap is not significant any more, regulation has a significant 
negative effect.  
Looking at the coefficients of the ownership concentration measures, the OLS models 
show weak evidence of a curvilinear relationship. In the 2SLS model, however, this 
effect  is  not  significant  and  there  is  no  evidence  for  an  influence  of  ownership 
concentration on performance. In total, for this first subsample, the OLS model explains 
30.2% of the variance (R²) and the 2SLS model, 8.8% (R²). The F-statistics confirm the 
good fit of the model.  
As shown by Table A - 7 in the appendix, the results are robust when using roa5yr as 
alternative dependent variable for the second stage regression, although, as for the full 
sample, the R² is significantly lower. 
Table 44: Regression Results of Subsample (50 Percentile) 
 
The second subsample has an even higher ownership concentration, using only the top 
25% firms  by  ownership concentration. As  Table 45 shows, the  average ownership 
concentration is significantly higher than the first subsample. Therefore, any existing 
Dependent Variable
Exogenous Variables
debttoassets -0.604*** (0.137) -0.025 (0.018) -0.514 (1.220) -0.633*** (0.200)
capextoassets 3.047*** (0.436) 0.056 (0.065) 2.642 (3.988) 3.485*** (0.391)
rndtoassets 16.688*** (1.300) 0.295 (0.263) 17.795 (16.038) 17.507*** (2.548)
Instruments
logebit5yr -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
risk 0.132*** (0.037) 6.827*** (2.347)
risk_sqr -0.051*** (0.014) -2.480*** (0.819)
logmarketcap -0.001 (0.002) 0.067 (0.111)
shareholderprotection -0.009** (0.004) -0.255* (0.146)
regulation
a -0.053*** (0.014) -2.643*** (0.812)
Instrumented Variables
tcr5 0.358 (0.492) -5.053 (3.491)
tcr5_sqr -0.016* (0.009) 0.101 (0.068)
Constant -0.177 (1.235) 2.659*** (0.038) 5.692*** (1.686) 13.261 (8.720)
Observations 539 539 539 539
F-Statistic 46.11*** 10.21*** 3.86*** 9.09***
R-squared 0.302 0.189 0.155 0.088
a Dummy Variable
High Ownership Concentration (50 Percentile)
OLS First Stage Second Stage
* p<0.10     ** p<0.05       *** p<0.01
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performance  effect  of  tcr5  and  tcr5_sqr  should  be  even  more  pronounced  in  the 
subsequent regressions. 
Table 45: Descriptive Statistics of cr5 (25 Percentile) 
 
Table 46 illustrates the results of the regression analyses. The results for the exogenous 
variables and instruments widely resemble those of the first subsample, however, the 
effect  of  shareholderprotection  is  not  significant  any  longer.  Both  OLS  and  2SLS 
regressions  do  not  provide  evidence  for  a  performance  effect  of  ownership 
concentration, neither linear nor curvilinear. The OLS model explains 42.8% of the 
variance for the second subsample, and the 2SLS model, roughly 40.9%. According to 
the F-statistics the model has a good fit. 
The results are robust to using roa5yr as alternative dependent variable of the second 
stage regression (Table A - 8 in the appendix) but the R² decrease significantly with the 
alternative performance measure. 
Table 46: Regression Results of Subsample (25 Percentile) 
 
N mean min max sd
Low (<=75 Pctile) 809 29.66 1.35 55.29 12.49 
High (>25 Pctile) 270 72.65 55.29 100.00 13.21 
Dependent Variable
Exogenous Variables
debttoassets -0.371** (0.169) -0.019 (0.021) 0.245 (1.659) -0.413** (0.187)
capextoassets 3.395*** (0.662) 0.086 (0.059) 3.757 (6.773) 4.008*** (0.591)
rndtoassets 22.476*** (1.811) 0.267 (0.285) 25.769 (24.471) 24.734*** (2.963)
Instruments
logebit5yr 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
risk 0.122** (0.045) 8.566** (3.292)
risk_sqr -0.042** (0.017) -2.847** (1.139)
logmarketcap 0.002 (0.004) 0.164 (0.202)
shareholderprotection -0.006 (0.005) -0.317 (0.245)
regulation
a -0.039*** (0.013) -2.943*** (0.896)
Instrumented Variables
tcr5 0.792 (0.996) -0.080 (3.316)
tcr5_sqr -0.021 (0.014) 0.004 (0.045)
Constant -1.442 (2.544) 2.657*** (0.050) 6.583** (3.040) 0.665 (8.433)
Observations 270 270 270 270
F-Statistic 39.35*** 3.32** 3.26** 10.29***
R-squared 0.428 0.179 0.186 0.409
a Dummy Variable
High Ownership Concentration (25 Percentile)
OLS First Stage Second Stage
* p<0.10     ** p<0.05       *** p<0.01
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With respect to the hypotheses, hypothesis 1 states that whereas low levels of ownership 
concentration  will  have  no  effect  on  firm  performance,  high  levels  of  ownership 
concentration  will  have  a  negative  effect  on  performance.  The  analyses  suggest  a 
significant  effect  neither  for  low,  nor  for  high  levels  of  ownership  concentration. 
Accordingly, I reject hypothesis 1. 
According to hypothesis 2, there will be only an effect of ownership concentration on 
firm performance in Continental-European countries with a German or French civil law 
origin,  as  the  level  of  ownership  concentration  is  significantly  influenced  by 
institutional  differences.  To  assess  this  hypothesis,  I  run  the  models  on  two  more 
subsamples containing firms from German civil law and French civil law countries, 
respectively.  Table  47  shows  descriptive  statistics  by  different  legal  origins.  As 
expected,  ownership  concentration  is  highest  in  French  civil  law  countries,  second 
highest in German civil law countries, and lowest in common law countries. ANOVA 
confirms the systematic differences in ownership concentration between the three legal 
origins on a 0.01 significance level (Table 48). 
Table 47: Descriptive Statistics of cr5 (by legal origin) 
 
 




N mean min max sd
Common Law 450 32.06 1.49 93.09 15.75 
German Civil Law 401 40.32 1.35 100.00 24.08  
French Civil Law 228 57.09 1.42 99.87 21.90  
 
Number of Observations  1079 R-Squared 0.1266
Root MSE  0.10 Adj. R-Squared 0.1250
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F
Model 1.54 2 0.77 77.97 0.000
sample 1.54 2 0.77 77.97 0.000
Residual 10.66 1076 0.01
Total 12.12 1078 0.01Performance Effects of Ownership Concentration     
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Table 49 illustrates the results of the regression analyses on the French and German 
civil law subsamples. The results for the exogenous variables and instruments widely 
resemble those of the previous analyses. 
For  German  civil  law  countries,  there  is  a  positive  effect  of  tcr5  on  ownership 
concentration in the OLS model, which is not significant in the 2SLS model. For the 
French  civil  law countries,  no significant  effect for ownership concentration can be 
found. The shareholder protection variable is not significant for the German civil law 
countries, as the shareholder protection is almost the same for the countries included in 
this subsample. For the French civil law subsample, the shareholderprotection variable 
drops  out,  as  all  countries  in  this  subsample  carry  the  same  shareholder  protection 
index. According to the R² and F-statistics, the models are well specified and have a 
good fit. With respect to the results for the alternative performance measure roa5yr 
(Table A - 9 in the appendix), the results of the 2SLS estimations are robust for the 
French  civil  law  subsample,  but  I  find  a  weak  curvilinear  effect  of  ownership 
concentration on performance for the German civil law. However, the coefficient is only 
significant on a 0.10 level, so the evidence is weak. If any, I would have expected a 
stronger influence of ownership concentration on performance in the French civil law 
subsample, as the average ownership concentration is higher in countries with a French 
than a German civil law origin. As there is no theoretical evidence why there should be 
a significant  effect  of ownership concentration  on performance  for countries  with  a 
German civil law origin only, and except for this one only weak significant coefficient, 
there is no evidence for other subsamples, so I do not attach particular importance to 
this observation and consider it as a statistical artifact. 
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debttoassets -0.930*** (0.170) -0.109** (0.055) 1.421 (2.740) -0.960*** (0.253) -0.283* (0.158) -0.034 (0.043) 0.476 (2.154) -0.508* (0.283)
capextoassets 2.974*** (0.561) 0.287*** (0.096) -0.936 (4.330) 2.949*** (0.730) 2.915*** (0.659) 0.095 (0.104) -2.464 (3.887) 3.020***(0.634)
rndtoassets 8.247*** (1.417) 0.400 (0.502) 23.048 (25.822) 5.230* (2.761) 19.232*** (1.401) -0.183 (0.189) -7.100 (5.185) 19.575*** (2.543)
Instruments
logebit5yr -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.001** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
risk 0.251*** (0.077) 11.162*** (3.723) 0.102** (0.042) 5.066* (3.043)
risk_sqr -0.112*** (0.036) -4.853*** (1.671) -0.040** (0.016) -1.532 (1.149)
logmarketcap -0.010*** (0.002) 0.072 (0.103) 0.006 (0.008) -0.029 (0.362)
shareholderprotection 0.001 (0.004) -0.025 (0.176)
regulation
a -0.051*** (0.019) -1.378* (0.816) -0.055** (0.022) -1.726 (1.436)
Instrumented Variables
tcr5 0.588*** (0.215) 0.546 (0.732) 0.405 (0.307) 0.066 (0.891)
tcr5_sqr -0.003 (0.006) -0.006 (0.032) -0.007 (0.007) 0.011 (0.028)
Constant -0.668 (0.528) 2.654*** (0.050) 6.267*** (1.711) -0.541 (1.730) -0.469 (0.774) 2.532*** (0.049) 4.769** (2.315) 0.379 (2.199)
Observations 401 401 401 401 228 228 228 228
F-Statistic 24.60*** 11.45*** 2.41** 11.22*** 42.52*** 2.48** 2.52** 9.42***
R-squared 0.236 0.247 0.122 0.223 0.489 0.102 0.080 0.466
a Dummy Variable * p<0.10     ** p<0.05       *** p<0.01
German Civil Law French Civil Law
OLS First Stage Second Stage OLS First Stage Second Stage
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As for the first two hypotheses, I created subsamples to further assess hypothesis 2. 
Potentially, the institutional environments of the selected countries of the three groups 
of legal origin do not favor high levels of ownership concentration to a similar extent, 
thus diluting the effect. To test for this issue, I run the regressions on the firms from the 
two  countries  with  the  highest  ownership  concentration  (Spain  and  France),  only. 
However, also for these two subsamples, there is no significant performance effect in 
the 2SLS models (Table 50). All results are robust to alternative performance measures 
as the dependent variable (Table A - 10). According to R², the OLS and 2SLS second 
stage regressions are well specified. However, the results have to be interpreted with 
caution due to the relative low number of observations per country and relatively high 
number  of  variables,  which  becomes  apparent  for  the  second  of  the  first  stage 
regression,  determining  tcr5_sqr,  as  the  F-statistic  is  not  significant.  Thus,  the 
explanatory power of the tcr5_sqr and the test for a curvilinear relationship is limited. 
Also, the significance of the instruments and control variables is significantly lower 
than in the previous models, most likely due to the much smaller sample size. 
In the light of the previously illustrated test results, I reject hypothesis 2, as I do not find 
a  performance  effect  of  alternative  levels  of  ownership  concentration.  Furthermore, 
looking at individual countries and groups of countries, for example by legal origin, I 
only find evidence for a weak significant effect for the German civil law legal origin, 
which I consider a statistical artifact. 
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debttoassets -0.843*** (0.247) 0.027 (0.043) 1.433 (1.980) -0.798** (0.355) -0.114 (0.189) -0.083 (0.078) -0.357 (2.831) 0.071 (0.319)
capextoassets 3.666*** (0.917) 0.028 (0.132) 5.019 (5.396) 3.260*** (0.957) 2.290*** (0.844) 0.049 (0.157) -10.235 (8.707) 2.645***(0.915)
rndtoassets 23.302*** (1.940) -0.305 (0.258) -1.345 (5.099) 25.917*** (5.278) 15.065*** (1.806) -0.213 (0.314) -14.979 (9.407) 18.144*** (3.036)
Instruments
logebit5yr -0.001*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.001* (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
risk 0.081 (0.062) 7.799** (3.784) -0.082 (0.058) -1.513 (3.562)
risk_sqr -0.036* (0.021) -2.684** (1.310) -0.006 (0.031) -0.661 (1.800)
logmarketcap 0.011* (0.005) 0.213 (0.187) 0.009 (0.016) -0.377 (0.737)
shareholderprotection
regulation
a -0.030 (0.022) -1.067 (1.098) -0.082** (0.039) -2.840 (3.381)
Instrumented Variables
tcr5 2.041*** (0.736) 1.719 (1.072) -0.062 (0.315) 1.805 (1.649)
tcr5_sqr -0.029 (0.019) -0.022 (0.023) -0.006 (0.006) 0.032 (0.046)
Constant -4.393** (1.840) 2.496*** (0.045) 3.366** (1.316) -3.642 (2.661) 0.670 (0.799) 2.523*** (0.097) 7.178 (4.786) -4.242 (4.062)
Observations 107 107 107 107 121 121 121 121
F-Statistic 34.15*** 5.22*** 1.44 9.54*** 16.27*** 8.00*** 0.76 9.36***
R-squared 0.628 0.216 0.269 0.617 0.414 0.120 0.064 -0.027
a Dummy Variable * p<0.10     ** p<0.05       *** p<0.01
Spain France
OLS First Stage Second Stage OLS First Stage Second Stage
tobinsq5yr tcr5 tcr5_sqr tobinsq5yr tobinsq5yr tcr5 tcr5_sqr tobinsq5yrPerformance Effects of Ownership Concentration 
Chapter Conclusion    127 
 
Summing up, according to the results of the regression analyses on the full, and sub-
samples, I reject both hypotheses 1 and 2.  
In light of the results, I clearly reject hypothesis 3, predicting a curvilinear effect, as I 
did  not  find  convincing  evidence  for  a  significant  performance  effect.  The  only 
evidence for a (weakly) significant performance effect, found for the German civil law 
subsample, shows a positive, bell-shaped effect. However, because of the absence of 
any  other significant  performance effect  for  the  other subsamples  I decide to  reject 
hypothesis 3. 
4.6  Chapter Conclusion 
4.6.1  Summary and Discussion 
The aim of this study was to assess the relationship between ownership concentration 
and  firm  performance  while  accounting  for  endogeneity  of  ownership,  potential 
curvilinear effects, and alternative performance measures. Building in particular on the 
work of Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), and Thomsen, et al. 
(2006), I formulated hypotheses and tested them on a sample of 1,079 firms from eight 
countries using OLS and 2SLS regressions. 
Overall,  my  analyses  cannot  confirm  a  persistent,  significant  linear  or  a  curvilinear 
performance  effect  of  ownership  concentration  on  performance.  The  results  are  in 
accordance  with  the  findings  of  Demsetz  and  Villalonga  (2001)  that  ownership  is 
endogenously determined. In detail, not only the findings regarding the performance 
effect resemble those of the Demsetz and Villalonga study, but also the results regarding 
the  control  variables  and  instruments  are  widely  congruent  for  almost  all  estimated 
models. I attribute the minor changes in significance levels of the instruments between 
the different models to the different, mostly decreasing sample sizes and differences 
between countries, e.g. the varying significance of the effect of regulation on ownership 
concentration.
46 
Accordingly, all in all  I cast considerable doubt on the findings of  Thomsen, et al. 
(2006), who argue that in some countries , ownership concentration might exceed the 
optimal level and thus leads to a negative performance effect.  
                                                 
     
46 For a detailed discussion of this issue refer to chapters 3.4 and 3.5. Performance Effects of Ownership Concentration 
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Furthermore,  I  find that  using alternative performance measures  does not  affect  my 
overall finding as described above. In my analyses, the two alternative performance 
measures,  roa5yr  and  tobinsq5yr,  did  not  influence  the  ownership  concentration  / 
performance  relationship,  yielding  robust  results,  except  for  one  weak  significant 
difference for the German civil law subsample. Accordingly, assuming that this result is 
representative for most of the existing studies, the contradicting results in the literature 
cannot  be  explained  by  the  different  performance  measures.  However,  many  of  the 
studies do not measure firm performance over time, as I did, but at the end of one year, 
which potentially might have lead to more severe differences between the performance 
measures due to annual one-off effects. 
Interestingly, throughout all analyses, the explanatory power of all 2SLS models using 
tobinsq5yr as a dependent variable was much higher than for the 2SLS estimations 
using roa5yr. As illustrated in the description of the variables, I argue that Tobin‟s Q 
provides  a  more  adequate  picture  of  the  performance  of  a  firm  as  it  combines  an 
accounting and a market based performance measure. The return on assets is influenced 
by accounting standards and accounts for intangible assets and the forecasted future 
development of a company. I reason that the explained variance for the models using 
Tobin‟s  Q  as  dependent  variable  is  significantly  higher  because  the  included 
independent variables explain the actual (market based) performance of a firm better as 
they  are  not  able  to  control  for  accounting  biases  and  managerial  discretion  to  full 
extent. These distortions are much more pronounced for the purely accounting based 
return on assets measure than for Tobin‟s Q. 
My analyses support the view that OLS models, as used by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
and Morck, et al. (1988), are inappropriate to test for a performance effect of ownership 
concentration due to the endogenous determination of the ownership structure. In the 
analyses a few OLS results report a significant effect of ownership concentration on 
performance, which is not significant in the 2SLS models. However, even in some of 
the OLS models there is no statistically significant effect of ownership concentration on 
performance. This raises the question, whether I actually found true evidence for the 
endogeneity of the ownership structure of firms, or whether there is just no relationship 
between  ownership  concentration  and  performance.  I  argue,  however,  that  the 
ambiguity of the existing results, as highlighted in the literature review, clearly speaks 
in favor of the endogeneity. As more than 50% of the identified studies using OLS Performance Effects of Ownership Concentration 
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techniques,  and  thus  not  accounting  for  endogeneity,  successfully  identified  a 
performance effect on ownership concentration, it seems to be very unlikely that there is 
no relationship between ownership concentration and performance whatsoever. 
Furthermore, I cannot offer a theoretical explanation why Thomsen, et al. (2006) found 
a  significant  relationship  between  ownership  concentration  and  performance  for 
countries with a high level of ownership concentration whereas I could not identify a 
significant  effect  for  no  concentration  level  and  thus  had  to  reject  my  hypotheses. 
Differences in the sampling and the statistical methods might explain the ambiguous 
results to a certain extent. Whereas similar countries were included in Thomsen, et al‟s 
and mine study, they used panel data and I did not. Furthermore, Thomsen, et al. applied 
Granger tests, whereas I used 2SLS models. As I did not have access to panel data, I 
could not apply to respective Granger tests to my results for robustness to these two 
alternative methodologies. 
With respect to the theoretical argument underlying the rejected hypothesis, the results 
at hand clearly point out that even for firms which are located in countries with high 
levels of ownership concentration, and which are doing business in industries favoring 
high levels of ownership concentration, the ownership concentration does not lead to a 
sustaining  performance  effect.  It  appears  that  market  forces  yield  efficient  firm 
structures even for extreme levels of ownership concentration. 
In terms of implications, being one of the most comprehensive studies in this research 
area,  my  study  contributes  to  the  ongoing  debate  about  the  relationship  between 
ownership concentration and corporate performance, and thus, the value of monitoring 
owners. I find hardly any support for the view that large blockholders use their power at 
the  expense  of  minority  shareholders.  In  contrast  to  the  findings  of  the  study  by 
Thomsen, et al. (2006), my results indicate that corporate governance systems actually 
do work more efficiently than expected.  
4.6.2  Limitations  
My study is subject to several limitations, which should be addressed in future research. 
First,  I  did  not  have  access  to  panel  data. Extending the data by  observations  over 
several  years  will  help  to  further  test  the  results  for  robustness  and  mitigate  the 
influence of one-off effects in single years. Performance Effects of Ownership Concentration 
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Second, as mentioned by Thomsen, et al. (2006), the applied performance measures do 
not capture private benefits to owners. Although difficult to measure, finding a proxy 
for private benefits would potentially increase the explanatory power of the models.  
Third, I neglected in this study that, as it was termed by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), 
ownership  is  a  multi-dimensional  phenomenon.  In  the  previous  analyses  I  focused 
exclusively on the ownership concentration of firms, neglecting the identity of owners. I 
argue  that  a  possible  performance  effect  should  be  observable  for  ownership 
concentration per se. Nevertheless, future studies should include the identity of owners 
in their analyses to gain more detailed insights into the differences between alternative 
types of owners and the respective performance implications. 
Finally, I was not able to distinguish between control rights and cash flow rights of 
ownership. I believe that this does not pose a significant problem, as previous studies 
e.g., Edwards & Weichenrieder (2004), showed that including those two rights into the 
analysis might improve the validity of the results.  
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5  OVERALL CONCLUSION 
In the following section, I will summarize the key findings of this thesis and discuss the 
overall implications of the presented results. 
5.1  Overall Summary 
The  objective  of  this  thesis  was  to  gain  further  insights  into  the  determination  and 
effects of the level of ownership concentration. To achieve this objective, I addressed 
three overarching research questions within the scope of the analyses:  
Question 1:  What  is  the  relative  importance  of  the  industry-  and 
country-level  for  the  determination  of  the  ownership 
concentration of firms? 
Question 2:  How much of the observed variance do the key firm-, 
industry-, and country-level determinants of ownership 
concentration explain? 
Question 3:  Does the level of ownership concentration have an effect 
on firm performance? 
 
Compared  to  the  most  studies  on  the  determinants  and  /  or  effects  of  ownership 
concentration, I apply relatively complex models to determine the level of ownership 
concentration of a firm and use a much more diverse sample, including firms from a 
variety  of  industries  and  countries.  Furthermore,  to  my  knowledge,  the  previously 
presented essays are the first studies in the ownership research accounting for the nested 
structure  of  ownership  data.  Subsequently,  I  describe  the  key  findings  of  the  three 
essays and illustrate the structure of the conducted analyses.  
 
Based on theories and concepts presented in section 1.4, I addressed question one and 
two in two separate essays within chapter 3 and question three in chapter 4. 
Highlighting the motivation for research question one and two in section 3.1, I reviewed 
the relevant literature on the topic of firm-, industry-, and country-level determinants for 
both essays (section 3.2). In section 3.3, I illustrated the statistical methods, which I 
applied in the subsequent chapters. For both essays, beside descriptive statistics and  
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ANOVAs,  I  estimated  HLMs  to  account  for  the  nested  structure  of  the  firms.  The 
existing studies on determinants of ownership concentration had so far disregarded this 
issue. To derive the explained variance of the analyzed determinants, I used variance 
decomposition techniques based on the results of the HLMs. Building on the conjoint 
literature review in section 3.2, I provide separate subsections for the development of 
hypotheses, results, and discussion for both individual essays in sections 3.4 and section 
3.5. 
Highlighting the motivation for the first research question in section 3.4.1, section 3.4.2 
illustrates the theoretical foundation of the relative importance of industry- and country-
determinants of ownership concentration. However, in default of a specific theoretical 
framework explaining the relative importance of different levels of influence factors, I 
did  not  formulate  specific  hypotheses  and  conducted  exploratory  analyses  in  the 
subsequent  chapters.  Section  3.4.4  shows  the  results  of  the  descriptive  statistics, 
ANOVAs,  and  of  the  estimation  of  the  random  intercept  model.  Using  a  sample 
containing 1,305 firms from nine countries, the statistical analyses show that, whereas 
the country-level, with 25.3% explained variance, has a strong effect on the level of 
ownership  concentration  of  a  firm,  the  industry-level  explains  only  2.1%  of  the 
observed variance, and thus, plays a minor role for the determination of the ownership 
concentration. Furthermore, the analyses show that of these 2.1%, the regulation of an 
industry explains the lion‟s share; however, the effect of industry regulation turns out to 
be significant for countries with a common law background only. The results clearly 
show that, although most of the existing ownership frameworks are built on principal 
agency theory, an institutional economics perspective – particularly on the country-level 
– has to be considered when analyzing the ownership structure of firms. Furthermore, 
analyzing  the  effect  of  the  industry-level  on  the  level  of  ownership  concentration 
promises only weak additional insights in the allocation of ownership rights. 
Section 3.5.1 focuses on the motivation of the second research question. Within section 
3.5.2,  I derive theoretical  hypotheses  for the key firm-, industry-,  and country-level 
determinants. The analyses are based on a sample of 900 firms from nine countries. In 
section 3.5.4, I present the results of the HLMs. The empirical analyses show that firm 
risk, firm size, legal origin, and shareholder protection significantly influence the level 
of ownership concentration. For the industry-level, no significant determinant could be 
identified.  In  total,  the  models  could  explain  up  to  32%  of  the  observed  variance.  
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However, on the firm-level, only 8% of the firm-level variance was explained by the 
included determinants. On the industry-level, up to 89% could be attributed to industry-
level determinants. On the country-level, the most advanced model could explain the 
full  variance.  According  to  the  results,  new  firm-level  determinants  of  ownership 
concentration have to be identified in order to build models with higher explanatory 
power. Furthermore, the identified country-level determinants, although explaining up 
to 100% of the country-level variance, call for further investigation of the relatively 
rough  determinants  and  for  disentanglement  of  the  highly  correlated  country-level 
characteristics. 
Chapter 4 addresses the third research question dealing with the performance effects of 
ownership  concentration.  Section  4.1  introduces  the  topic  of  performance  effects  of 
ownership concentration and highlights the motivation of this research question, namely 
the  ambiguity  of  the  results  of  existing  studies  on  the  topic  of  the  ownership 
performance relationship. Based on section 4.2, providing a literature review, I derive 
respective  hypotheses  in  section  4.3.  The  sample  comprises  1,079  firms  from  eight 
countries when accounting for all variables and the OLS and 2SLS models used in the 
subsequent analyses. Section 4.5 provides the results of the analyses.  The statistical 
analyses  do  not  find  persistent,  significant  performance  effects  of  ownership 
concentration. The effect of ownership concentration on performance is neither for a 
high or low level of ownership concentration, nor for particular countries or alternative 
performance measures significant when accounting for the endogenous determination of 
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Figure 13: Summary of the Key Findings 
 
 
The implications of this thesis are widely of theoretical nature and of particular interest 
for the further understanding of the determination and effects of the ownership structure 
of firms. Whereas most of the existing ownership frameworks, as for example, the one 
initially developed by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) are based on principal agent theory, my 
findings clearly show that the institutional economics perspective is at least as important 
and has to be included into holistic ownership frameworks. Furthermore, I put emphasis 
on the endogeneity of the ownership structure of firms, which appears to hold true even 
for extreme levels of ownership concentration, and thus, has to be considered under any 
circumstances in respective studies.  
The practical implications of the findings are limited; however, they suggest that in 
terms of policy making under certain circumstances, industry regulations might be less 
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efficient than expected and can be influenced by the characteristics of the corporate 
governance system in the respective country. Furthermore, the results clearly confirm 
that the ownership structures in certain countries and industries have developed to the 
current status for particular economic reasons. 
 
As  mentioned  in  the  introduction,  the  overarching  perspective  of  this  thesis  is  the 
economic view of ownership. I argued, and showed within the scope of the analyses, 
that the level of ownership concentration of firms follows certain economic laws and 
optimizes costs and benefits connected with alternative ownership structures. However, 
the analyses also show that highly concentrated ownership structures persist throughout 
all countries. Accordingly, following the criticism of Proudhon (1840), as mentioned in 
the introduction of this thesis, relatively few owners use the privileges connected with 
ownership  to  accumulate  substantial  wealth  and  power.  Thus,  the  question  arises 
whether  the  modern,  capitalistic  understanding  of  ownership  really  ensures  a 
distributive justice, at least to a certain extent. Furthermore, despite the endogenous 
determination of the ownership structure, the recent – and with regularity occurring – 
economic crises show that market forces do not work flawlessly. Probably for these 
reasons  alternative  forms  of  ownership,  particularly  employee,  customer  and  family 
ownership,  have  attracted  more  attention  in  recent  years  (Caspary,  2000;  Ellerman, 
1990; Nembhard, 1999). However, I argue that for the time being, capitalistic values are 
too  deeply  anchored  and  rooted  in  our  society  than  it  would  be  realistic  to  expect 
significant changes in the underlying system in the near future. Still, this does not mean 
that efforts should be reduced to gradually work towards a better understanding and 
alternative  forms  of  ownership  without  inhibiting  or  abandoning  the  idea  of  free 
markets.  
5.2  Outlook on Future Research 
In the previous chapter, I summarized the key findings of the three essays. In sections 
3.4.5.2, 3.5.5.2, and 4.6.2 of the respective essays, I illustrated the key limitations of the 
analyses. Combining the findings of the individual essays, the analyses provide several 
starting points for future research.  
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For the determinants of ownership concentration, addressed by the first two essays, the 
results suggest two different approaches to gain further insights into the allocation of 
ownership rights.  
First,  whereas  in  the  last  years,  more  and  more  studies  focused  on  industry-,  and 
country-differences and the respective effects on the level of ownership concentration, 
my results suggest that much can still be learned and understood from the firm-level 
perspective. Whereas the identified firm-level determinants of ownership concentration 
are highly significant, the lion‟s share of the firm-level variance cannot be explained so 
far.  To  tackle  this  issue,  future  research,  besides  the  frequently  applied  regression 
analyses, might pursue alternative methods of analysis, such as in-depth case studies, to 
dig deeper and to identify additional drivers of concentration. 
Second, whereas the scope of the analyses has further stressed the importance of the 
institutional environment, the understanding of the relationship between the ownership 
structure and institutional differences is marginal so far. Thus, I recommend that the 
institutional  perspective  has  to  be  considered  and  added  to  the  existing  ownership 
frameworks.  Accordingly,  future  research  has  to  develop  new  and  finer-grained 
concepts of the institutional characteristics of a country to take a next step toward a 
better understanding of the complex interrelations.  
For the analysis of the effects of ownership concentration on performance, I suggest that 
future research should particularly focus on country differences on the one hand, and 
alternative statistical methods on the other hand. The third essay of this thesis and the 
work of Thomsen, et al. (2006) are two of the few studies so far particularly addressing 
the potential effect of country differences on the ownership concentration performance 
relationship. However, these two analyses already yield conflicting results and call for 
further investigation. Future research should particularly focus on alternative statistical 
models to the 2SLS and the Granger test to account for endogeneity. 
For both field of studies mentioned above, the conducted analyses should be extended to 
other ownership characteristics. At this point, I disregarded the identity of the owner, 
and thus, the multi-dimensionality. Extending the analyses  in  this  way will test  the 
results for robustness, and potentially provide additional insights into the allocation of 
ownership rights.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A - 1: SK- and SW-Tests for Normality of cr5 
 
 
Table A - 2: SK- and SW-Tests for Normality of tcr5 
 
 
Table A - 3: Sources of Ownership Data 
Filing Type / Source  Description 
13D  This Schedule discloses beneficial ownership of certain 
registered equity securities. Any person or group of persons 
who acquire a beneficial ownership of more than 5% of a 
class of registered equity securities of certain issuers must 
file a Schedule 13D reporting such acquisition together with 
certain other information within ten days after such 
acquisition. Moreover, any material changes in the facts set 
forth in the Schedule generally precipitates a duty to 
promptly file an amendment on Schedule 13D. 
13G  Schedule 13G is a much abbreviated version of Schedule 
13D that is only available for use by a limited category of 
“persons” (such as banks, broker/dealers, and insurance 
companies) and even then only when the securities were 
acquired in the ordinary course of business and not with the 




Ownership sources included in this filing type are 13F, 
Aggregates, and Shareholder Report. 
SK-Test SW-Test
Initial Sample 0.000 0.000
First Essay 0.000 0.000
Second Essay 0.000 0.000
Third Essay 0.000 0.000
SK-Test SW-Test
Initial Sample 0.000 0.000
First Essay 0.000 0.000
Second Essay 0.000 0.000
Third Essay 0.000 0.000 
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IP: 13F  Quarterly report of equity holdings filed with the SEC by 
institutional investment managers having equity assets under 
management of $100 million or more. Included in this 
category are certain banks, insurance companies, investment 
advisors, investment companies, foundations and pension 
funds. Non-US institutional investment managers are 
required to file a Form 13F if they use any means or 
instrumentality of United States interstate commerce in the 
course of their business; and (2) exercise investment 
discretion over $100 million or more in Section 13(f) 
securities. 
IP: Aggregate  Institutional position derived from cumulative mutual fund 
holdings. An Aggregate position may represent only a 
portion of total shares held and while not a regulatory filing 
per se, is formulated based on filing data. 
IP: Shareholder Reports  Complete portfolio holdings supplied directly to Thomson 
Financial or obtained through other means, e.g., investor 
website or annual report. 
Other Declarable Stakes  Ownership sources included in this filing type are 
Substantials, Early Warning Reports, Alternative Monthly 
Statements, 10-K, and 20-F. 
Substantials  Ownership data on non-US-traded obtained on through a 
number of sources including, but not limited to, the media 
and official company-issued statements. 
Early Warning Reports  An initial declarable stakes report required when an investor 
acquires 10% or more of a class of securities (within 2 
business days of the transaction). An update is required 
when the percentage held increases or decreases by 2% or 
more, or when the percentage held falls below the 10% 
reporting threshold (again, within two business days). 
Alternative Monthly 
Reports 
 Essentially the same declarable stakes report as the Early 
Warning, except that the type of investors who are allowed 
to use this filing is limited to “eligible institutional 
investors” (investment managers, mutual funds, pension 
funds, etc.). An initial report is required within ten days 
after the end of the month in which an investor acquires 
10% or more of a class of securities. An update is required 
within 10 days after the end of the month in which the 
percentage held increases or decreases by 2.5%, or when the 
percentage held falls below the 10% reporting threshold. 
The difference between those two types of filings in Canada 
is roughly similar to the difference between 13Ds and 13Gs 
in the US. The Alternative Monthly Report (13G) is an 
abbreviated version of the Early Warning Report (13D) that 
only certain filers are allowed to use.   
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10-K  Ownership positions obtained from company annual reports 
filed with the SEC. 
20-F  Ownership positions obtained from foreign private issuer 
annual or transition report filed with the SEC. 
Proxy  Ownership positions listed on a US company‟s annual proxy 
statement that lists holdings of owners over 10%, as well as 
shares held by directors, officers, and some board members. 
Insider update  Position calculated using Form 4 holdings that have a more 
recent date than the proxy (13f, 13D/G) position. 
Japanese 5% 
Shareholders 
Any individuals or institutions that hold more than 5% of the 
total shares outstanding of Japanese listed companies. These 
holders have to report to local financial bureaus that are 
under control of the Ministry of Finance within five business 
days. If there is 1% or more of an increase / decrease in 
shares held after the submission, they must submit a 
subsequent report within five business days from the date of 
the change. 
Registers  Shareholder positions in US-listed companies supplied to the 
company registrar by the registered owner. Disclosure is 
made in compliance with the UK Companies Act, an Act of 
the UK Parliament and this data is available to the public, 
including Thomson Financial to purchase or view. Included 
in this filing type are S212 and S213 filings. 
RNS: Investor purchases, sales, and holdings changes 
resulting from mergers, takeovers, or buybacks of UK listed 
companies and announced on the Regulatory News Service 
(RNS), the London Stock Exchange‟s official news outlet. 
Furthermore, SEC, DGAP, and other country specific 
registers. 
 
Insider Filings (IF)  Forms 3, 4, 5, and 144, as well as RNS filings by Directors 
IF: Initial Statement of 
Ownership 
Form 3 is filed only once by an insider, for each company 
that he or she is affiliated with, and is usually filed within 
ten (10) days of the company going public, and/or within ten 
(10) days of an insider being appointed an executive officer 
or director. 
 
IF: Statement of 
Changes in Beneficial 
Ownership 
Form 4 is required any time there is an open market 
purchase, sale, or an exercise of options. It must be filed by 
the 10th of the month following the transaction and contains 
the details of all non-exempt transactions that exceed 
$10,000 during that month.  
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Annual Statement of 
Changes in Beneficial 
Ownership  
 
This form is required to be filed annually for those insiders 
who have had exempt transactions and had not reported 
them previously on a Form 4. It must be filed within 45 days 
after the close of the issuer‟s fiscal year. 
Intention To Sell 
Restricted Securities 
This form must be filed as notice of the proposed sale of 
restricted securities or securities held by an affiliate of the 
issuer in reliance on Rule 144 when the amount to be sold 
during any three-month period exceeds 500 shares or units 
or has an aggregate sales price in excess of $10,000.  
RNS  Director purchases, sales, and holdings changes resulting 
from mergers, takeovers, or buybacks of UK listed 
companies and announced on the Regulatory News Service 
(RNS), the London Stock Exchange‟s official news outlet. 
Funds  Mutual funds, hedge fund portfolios, unit trusts, investment 
trusts, variable annuities, and other portfolios organized for 
retail and/or institutional investors and run by a professional 
money manager. 
Indirect Holdings  Shares that are controlled by the insider, yet are held by 
another entity such as a family member, a trust, a company 
plan, or even a corporation to which the insider is affiliated. 
In many cases, the same block of indirect stock may be 
claimed by several insiders, such as a group of trustees over 
the same trust, or several partners in the same partnership. 
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Table A - 4: Estimations of the Full-Model-I and Full-Model-II (Marginal Effects) 
 
   
coef se ∂  coef ∂ se coef se ∂  coef ∂ se
Firm-Level
logmarketcap 14.461* (7.681) -2.918*** (0.395) 22.623** (10.308) -3.310*** (0.501)
risk 27.366*** (5.769) 28.449*** (5.871)
risk_sqr -10.375*** (2.700) -10.732*** (2.736)
Firm-Level Variance (% Explained)
c 25 (6%) 26 (6%)
Industry-Level
regulation
a -0.736 (1.648) -0.687 (1.759)
industrycompetition 6.731 (4.353) 6.135 (4.412)
industryrnd -0.623 (0.702) -0.561 (0.753)
industrylifecycle 0.060 (0.212) 0.050 (0.224)
Industry-Level Variance (% Explained)
c 8 (89%) 5 (56%)
Country-Level 





shareholderprotection 1.985 (2.142) -0.371** (0.161)
uai 1.173*** (0.340) -1.51 -0.121
Country-Level Variance (% Explained)
c
135 (100%) 129 (96%)
Interaction Terms
c.logstockmarket#c.logmarketcap




Constant -73.997 (75.760) -304.689 (188.651)
Observations 900 900
Total Variance (% Explained) 178 (32%) 169 (30%)
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01
a Dummy Variable
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Table A - 5: List of Variables 
 































































debttoassets -2.806*** (0.990) -0.039** (0.019) 0.526 (1.085) -3.621** (1.663)
capextoassets 24.762*** (2.978) 0.039 (0.063) 1.306 (1.513) 22.471*** (3.679)
rndtoassets 39.384*** (7.874) 0.223 (0.179) 5.835 (6.179) 19.025 (19.421)
Instruments
logebit5yr -0.001* (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
risk 0.104*** (0.033) 4.954** (1.877)
risk_sqr -0.042*** (0.011) -1.780** (0.658)
logmarketcap -0.013*** (0.002) 0.064 (0.054)
shareholderprotection -0.017*** (0.005) -0.207 (0.139)
regulation
a -0.023 (0.016) -1.296** (0.481)
Instrumented Variables
tcr5 -0.348 (1.550) 4.752 (5.865)
tcr5_sqr -0.021 (0.044) 0.135 (0.246)
Constant 6.993* (3.820) 2.751*** (0.046) 5.072*** (1.355) -5.295 (14.428)
Observations 1079 1079 1079 1079
F-Statistic 17.85*** 28.41*** 2.59** 17.93***
R-squared 0.076 0.213 0.077 0.049
a Dummy Variable
Full Sample
OLS First Stage Second Stage
* p<0.10     ** p<0.05       *** p<0.01
roa5yr tcr5 tcr5_sqr roa5yr 
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Table A - 7: Regression Results of Subsample (50 Percentile) 
 




debttoassets -1.941 (1.351) -0.025 (0.018) -0.514 (1.220) -2.082* (1.230)
capextoassets 18.263*** (4.285) 0.056 (0.065) 2.642 (3.988) 19.703*** (2.409)
rndtoassets 43.198*** (12.775) 0.295 (0.263) 17.795 (16.038) 50.044*** (8.006)
Instruments
logebit5yr -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
risk 0.132*** (0.037) 6.827*** (2.347)
risk_sqr -0.051*** (0.014) -2.480*** (0.819)
logmarketcap -0.001 (0.002) 0.067 (0.111)
shareholderprotection -0.009** (0.004) -0.255* (0.146)
regulation
a -0.053*** (0.014) -2.643*** (0.812)
Instrumented Variables
tcr5 9.592** (4.834) 21.196 (17.678)
tcr5_sqr -0.187** (0.092) -0.242 (0.418)
Constant -17.867 (12.130) 2.659*** (0.038) 5.692*** (1.686) -47.124 (43.937)
Observations 539 539 539 539
F-Statistic 6.24*** 10.21*** 3.86*** 31.00***
R-squared 0.055 0.189 0.155 0.036
a Dummy Variable
High Ownership Concentration (50 Percentile)
OLS First Stage Second Stage
* p<0.10     ** p<0.05       *** p<0.01
roa5yr tcr5 tcr5_sqr roa5yr
Dependent Variable
Exogenous Variables
debttoassets -0.807 (1.862) -0.019 (0.021) 0.245 (1.659) -0.041 (1.657)
capextoassets 23.850*** (7.293) 0.086 (0.059) 3.757 (6.773) 26.332*** (5.535)
rndtoassets 73.418*** (19.944) 0.267 (0.285) 25.769 (24.471) 80.226*** (10.746)
Instruments
logebit5yr 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
risk 0.122** (0.045) 8.566** (3.292)
risk_sqr -0.042** (0.017) -2.847** (1.139)
logmarketcap 0.002 (0.004) 0.164 (0.202)
shareholderprotection -0.006 (0.005) -0.317 (0.245)
regulation
a -0.039*** (0.013) -2.943*** (0.896)
Instrumented Variables
tcr5 15.163 (10.971) 34.251 (24.141)
tcr5_sqr -0.255* (0.150) -0.252 (0.311)
Constant -33.194 (28.009) 2.657*** (0.050) 6.583** (3.040) -83.025 (61.315)
Observations 270 270 270 270
F-Statistic 4.92*** 3.32** 3.26** 63.17***
R-squared 0.085 0.179 0.186 0.029
a Dummy Variable
High Ownership Concentration (25 Percentile)
OLS First Stage Second Stage
roa5yr tcr5 tcr5_sqr roa5yr
* p<0.10     ** p<0.05       *** p<0.01 
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Table A - 9: Regression Results of Subsample: Different Legal Origins 
 
   
Dependent Variable
Exogenous Variables
debttoassets -4.273*** (1.640) -0.109** (0.055) 1.421 (2.740) 1.567 (3.377) -1.391 (1.775) -0.034 (0.043) 0.476 (2.154) -1.877 (4.392)
capextoassets 27.436*** (5.430) 0.287*** (0.096) -0.936 (4.330) 17.539** (8.059) 2.537 (7.396) 0.095 (0.104) -2.464 (3.887) 7.736 (8.979)
rndtoassets 31.220** (13.706) 0.400 (0.502) 23.048 (25.822) 28.220 (18.805) -21.924 (15.708) -0.183 (0.189) -7.100 (5.185) -3.328 (39.619)
Instruments
logebit5yr -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
risk -0.251*** (0.077) -11.162*** (3.723) -0.102** (0.042) -5.066* (3.043)
risk_sqr 0.112*** (0.036) 4.853*** (1.671) 0.040** (0.016) 1.532 (1.149)
logmarketcap -0.010*** (0.002) 0.072 (0.103) 0.006 (0.008) -0.029 (0.362)
shareholderprotection 0.001 (0.004) -0.025 (0.176)
regulation
a -0.051*** (0.019) -1.378* (0.816) -0.055** (0.022) -1.726 (1.436)
Instrumented Variables
tcr5 4.006* (2.081) 33.410* (9.354) 3.990 (3.443) 3.072 (15.156)
tcr5_sqr 0.067 (0.056) -0.691* (0.337) -0.141* (0.075) -0.140 (0.396)
Constant -4.411 (5.110) 2.654*** (0.050) 6.267*** (1.711) -75.408*** (22.233) -2.483 (8.679) 2.532*** (0.049) 4.769** (2.315) -0.732 (37.502)
Observations 401 401 401 401 228 228 228 228
F-Statistic 9.25*** 11.45*** 2.41** 10.81*** 1.39 6.79*** 2.52** 0.35
R-squared 0.104 0.247 0.122 -0.770 0.030 0.102 0.080 0.022
a Dummy Variable * p<0.10     ** p<0.05       *** p<0.01
German Civil Law French Civil Law
OLS First Stage Second Stage OLS First Stage Second Stage
roa5yr tcr5 tcr5_sqr roa5yr roa5yr tcr5 tcr5_sqr roa5yr 
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debttoassets -10.379*** (3.000) 0.027 (0.043) 1.433 (1.980) -7.781** (3.105) 5.518*** (1.938) -0.083 (0.078) -0.357 (2.831) 6.810 (4.375)
capextoassets 1.100 (11.139) 0.028 (0.132) 5.019 (5.396) 2.217 (8.792) 5.105 (8.665) 0.049 (0.157) -10.235 (8.707) 4.978 (11.655)
rndtoassets -53.656** (23.569) -0.305 (0.258) -1.345 (5.099) -66.172* (34.045) 25.152 (18.544) -0.213 (0.314) -14.979 (9.407) 38.169** (16.169)
Instruments
logebit5yr -0.001*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.001* (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
risk 0.081 (0.062) 7.799** (3.784) -0.082 (0.058) -1.513 (3.562)
risk_sqr -0.036* (0.021) -2.684** (1.310) -0.006 (0.031) -0.661 (1.800)
logmarketcap 0.011* (0.005) 0.213 (0.187) 0.009 (0.016) -0.377 (0.737)
propertyrights
regulation
a -0.030 (0.022) -1.067 (1.098) -0.082** (0.039) -2.840 (3.381)
Instrumented Variables
tcr5 20.024** (8.946) 13.113 (13.569) 1.523 (3.236) 19.589 (19.089)
tcr5_sqr -0.348 (0.230) -0.041 (0.266) -0.123* (0.066) -0.193 (0.466)
Constant -39.024* (22.356) 2.496*** (0.045) 3.366** (1.316) -23.244 (33.567) 0.818 (8.201) 2.523*** (0.097) 7.178 (4.786) -45.210 (47.154)
Observations 107 107 107 107 121 121 121 121
F-Statistic 4.29*** 5.22*** 1.44 2.36** 2.50** 8.00*** 0.76 1.69
R-squared 0.175 0.216 0.269 0.145 0.098 0.120 0.064 -0.157
a Dummy Variable * p<0.10     ** p<0.05       *** p<0.01
Spain France
OLS First Stage Second Stage OLS First Stage Second Stage
tcr5 tcr5_sqr roa5yr roa5yr tcr5 tcr5_sqr roa5yr roa5yr 
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